On 30 August 2023, Congolese soldiers brutally suppressed a demonstration by a political and religious group in Goma, eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), killing at least 56 people according to the official count, injuring over 80 and arbitrarily arresting over 150 more. The group, Natural Messianic Judaic Faith Towards the Nations – The Power of Word (FNJMN), whose followers call themselves “Wazalendo” or “Messiatha”, had been demanding the departure of the UN Mission for the Stabilization of the DRC (MONUSCO). In the wake of the massacre, authorities played down the death toll and blamed victims for the incident, describing them as “armed, drugged, and manipulated bandits playing into the hands of M23/RDF,” in reference to the Movement of 23 March (M23) armed group, which is active in North Kivu province where the city of Goma is located, and which has been backed by the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF). Faced with a public outcry after videos of the massacre emerged on social media, and following claims that the death toll was higher than they had originally acknowledged, authorities admitted that security forces had killed several dozens of people. However, they maintained that security forces intervened to restore order, claiming that the group’s followers had sowed violence in the first place, attacking the police and stoning a police officer to death. Subsequently, six officers were arrested and tried by a military court in Goma. In early October 2023, four of them, including an army commander, were convicted of murder and attempted murder.

Between September 2023 and October 2024, Amnesty International investigated the massacre by examining the crime sites, interviewing over 70 people, including survivors, eyewitnesses and perpetrators, and analysing court records and confidential official documents. Amnesty International’s Crisis Evidence Lab verified dozens of videos and photos of the massacre as well as satellite imagery to corroborate findings. Amnesty International was able to reconstruct the exact temporal and spatial sequence of events and identified three army officers who should be individually investigated and, if there is sufficient evidence, be prosecuted for the killings and other crimes under international law committed. These include: Lieutenant-General Constant Ndima, who, as the Governor and Military Operations Commander in North Kivu at the time of the massacre, ordered the security forces to plan the operations that led to the massacre and failed to take any action against those responsible; Colonel Mike Mikombe Kalamba, Commander of the Republican Guard’s Combined Arms Brigade (BIA) in North Kivu, whose full responsibility appears not to have been established during the Goma trial; and Major Peter Kabwe Ngandu, Special Forces Battalion Commander in Goma, who appeared to personally lead the raid at the Wazalendo radio station where several members of the group were killed, injured or detained, and who was present during the mass shooting at the “temple”[1] where dozens more were killed. He also oversaw Special Forces soldiers’ loading of bodies and the wounded onto trucks.  

Between July and October 2024, Amnesty International wrote to several Congolese and UN officials, including the President of the Republic, the minister of defence, the General Military Prosecutor and the UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, sharing a summary of its key findings and requesting their response or comment. Amnesty International also wrote to the three army officers named in this report for their individual responsibility. At the time of writing, Amnesty International had received and  reflected, in the report, responses from the UN Under-Secretary General for Peace Operations, the former Military Governor of North Kivu, Constant Ndima, and the former BIA Commander in North Kivu, Mike Mikombe, which are annexed to this report. Other officials and the third army officer implicated, Major Peter Kabwe, did not respond to Amnesty International’s requests.

Operation “Keba”

During previous protests between June and August 2023 in Goma, which took place without notable incident, Wazalendo’s leader, Efraimu Bisimwa, announced plans for a major protest on 30 August 2023 to demand the departure of MONUSCO and other foreign forces, accusing them of “occupying the DRC against the will of Congolese ancestors”. On 19 August 2023, he wrote to the mayor of Goma to formally give notice about the planned protest, as required by Congolese law.

On 21 August 2023, the Head of MONUSCO’s Goma Office wrote to the Military Governor of North Kivu, Lieutenant-General Constant Ndima, copying the mayor of Goma, expressing the UN’s concerns about the planned protests and urging him to prohibit it “given its hateful and violent nature”. Two days later, the mayor of Goma – who, since the introduction of the “State of Siege” in May 2021, has been a serving police officer – issued a statement banning the protest, saying that the FNJMN (Wazalendo) association did not have legal status to operate, even though they had held similar protests unhindered over the previous three months. On 25 August 2023, in his capacity as the Military Operations Commander in North Kivu, the Governor issued an order to army and police units under his jurisdiction to take all necessary measures to protect MONUSCO facilities and the city. Amnesty International obtained operational plans developed by the police and army in response to the governor’s instructions. One of these plans, code-named Operation “Keba” (“Watch Out”, in Lingala language), was established by the Commander of the Republican Guard’s Combined Arms Brigade, which includes the Special Forces. It was this force that would be at the heart of the massacre.

Killing Spree

On 30 August, around 3am, a commando unit, which appears to have been led by Major Peter Kabwe Ngandu, Special Forces Battalion Commander in Goma, raided the FNJMN radio station in Kyeshero district, north-west of Goma. Soldiers broke into the radio station, where they arrested 12 people, including the Wazalendo leader, and confiscated transmitters and other equipment. They tied up those arrested and escorted them to the street, where army pickup trucks were parked. There, they opened fire on a group that comprised the 12 people who had been in the radio station and others who had gathered after hearing about the raid, killing six and injuring at least 10. Those killed included 44-year-old journalist Tabita Fabiola and one of the security guards who had been arrested inside the radio station building. The Wazalendo leader, Efraimu Bisimwa and five other detainees who survived the shooting were taken to the Republican Guard headquarters at Goma airport, where they were subjected to torture and other ill-treatment.

In the meantime, two blocks away, a police patrol had shot at Wazalendo followers who were headed to the radio station, killing one. Some of the followers captured an officer after he ran out of ammunition and took him back to their temple. At around 6am, the police shot at another group of Wazalendo followers as they left the temple, killing one of Efraimu Bisimwa’s sons, Uwezo Milele. After this incident, a group of Wazalendo followers stoned the captured police officer.

Congolese soldiers, mainly from the Republican Guard’s Special Forces, deployed massively around the temple at 7am, as hundreds of Wazalendo followers gathered on a street near the temple. For about half an hour, two officers from the 34th Military Region tried to persuade the group to halt their march. At around 7.30am, the Republican Guard’s BIA Commander in North Kivu, Colonel Mike Mikombe Kalamba, cut short the talks and, according to five witnesses, including the two officers from the 34th Military Region, ordered his soldiers to open fire. Images verified by Amnesty International show bursts likely from bullets being fired towards the crowd, soldiers collecting bodies, dragging them and loading them onto army trucks. According to witnesses, officers stayed in the area for hours, cleaning puddles of blood and body parts and arresting Wazalendo followers, bystanders and residents. Before leaving the area, they looted the temple and burned it to ashes.

Uncertain Toll, Abused Bodies

Authorities say 56 civilians were killed. It is not clear whether this number includes those who died from injuries in the following days. Amnesty International received consistent reports of at least 10 people last seen at the Wazalendo temple on 30 August and whose whereabouts are since unknown, including one woman and her four-year-old child. A confidential UN report, seen by Amnesty International, put the death toll at 102, including 90 men, eight women and four boys, and 80 more injured. No soldier was killed or wounded. Amnesty International found no evidence that the Wazalendo followers were armed, and neither did military courts, which handed down two judgments in relation to the massacre. 

For a fortnight, the authorities denied families access to the bodies to identify them or bury them with dignity. The bodies remained piled up in Goma’s military hospital, some in the open air. When buried three weeks later, they were in an advanced state of decomposition. No ballistics investigations or autopsies were carried out as part of investigations promised by the authorities. No DNA samples were taken for identification of 27 officially unidentified bodies. A man who identified the decomposing body of his slain nephew said: “It is as if they had killed him for a second time.”

Flawed Justice

Between 1 September and 10 October, the authorities organized two separate trials before military courts in Goma: that of 116 Wazalendo followers and other related persons accused of the murder of the police officer and insurrection; and that of six Republican Guard members, including two high-ranking officers, accused of killing and wounding the Wazalendo followers. Although one officer and three soldiers were convicted in connection with these murders, Amnesty International found the investigation rushed and incomplete. The trial of the Wazalendo followers, including their collective prosecution for the murder of the police officer, also fell far short of fair trial standards.

This report reveals that the 30 August massacre resulted from a series of deliberate actions by the authorities, following an explicit request made to them by MONUSCO to “prohibit” the protest. The massacre was not the result of a blunder on the part of a few soldiers who intervened unexpectedly following the lynching of a police officer by the Wazalendo followers, as claimed by the authorities.

By reconstructing the events of 29 and 30 August 2023, the report shows that soldiers carried out the first raid targeting Wazalendo followers at around 3am at their radio station, killing at least six people and arresting others, including the Wazalendo leader. It was this raid that triggered the capture of a police officer at around 4am by a group of Wazalendo followers, and his stoning at around 6am.

The operation against protesters took place against the backdrop of unwarranted claims that FNJMN (Wazalendo) was not a registered organization and that their activities should, therefore, be restricted. The authorities cited this as grounds for pre-emptively banning the protest in defiance of peaceful assembly standards.

Congolese security and defence forces should not have been deployed to police the protest as such roles should be reserved for law enforcement officials trained in policing assemblies. Firearms can only be justified as a last resort in the face of an imminent threat to life or severe injury. The soldiers deliberately killed dozens of people, both in the hours preceding the protest and during it, in violation of international human rights standards, including those governing the use of firearms.

These killings should be viewed in the context of widespread and/or systematic attacks against the civilian population of North Kivu and other parts of eastern DRC by both government forces and armed groups. They may, therefore, constitute crimes against humanity of murder. The situation in DRC is the subject of an investigation by the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (OTP),[2] within which the OTP recently decided to give “priority” focus to “any alleged Rome Statute crimes occurring in North Kivu since January 2022”.[3]

Key Calls

As this report shows, the massacre in Goma on 30 August 2023 was a well-prepared operation carried out mainly by the Republican Guard,  following a request from MONUSCO for a “firm intervention to prevent any threats against MONUSCO bases and staff” and to prohibit the protest “given its hateful and violent nature”. The right to peaceful protest is guaranteed by Congolese law and several international instruments ratified by the DRC. Similarly, the right to life, freedom from torture and all other rights violated in the context of the 30 August massacre in and around Goma are protected under international law. Victims of these heinous crimes have a right to truth and justice. They should not be collectively punished.

Amnesty International is calling on President Tshisekedi to immediately suspend General Ndima and Major Peter Kabwe from the army pending investigation. Colonel Mike Mikombe, who was the Republican Guard’s Commander in North Kivu at the time and who was convicted in connection with the killings, should also be further investigated and, if there is sufficient evidence against him, prosecuted for his other actions, including torture and other ill-treatment against the Wazalendo as well as his possible liability as a superior. The DRC authorities must reopen investigations into this massacre, in line with regional and international standards, to establish the truth and hold all of those involved accountable. President Tshisekedi should further take urgent steps to specify the exceptional circumstances under which the Republican Guard can participate in law-enforcement activities, in line with international standards. Lastly, the president must lift the “State of siege” in North Kivu and Ituri provinces and, together with parliament, take urgent steps to limit the involvement of the army in law enforcement missions. As for the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, it should consider examining the 30 August 2023 killings in Goma as part of the ongoing investigation into the situation in eastern DRC.

MONUSCO’s request to the Congolese authorities to prohibit the Wazalendo protest failed to give appropriate emphasis either to the presumption that assemblies should be considered peaceful (in the absence of compelling evidence to the contrary) or to the State’s obligations to facilitate and protect the assembly. This request provided the immediate context for the violation by the Congolese authorities of the right to peaceful assembly as protected under international human rights law. MONUSCO’s statement in the immediate aftermath of the massacre was also deficient as it appeared to justify the response of the authorities to the demonstration and to place blame on the protest’s organizers. It stated that the protest had not been authorized – which is not required under the DRC law – adding that “in accordance with their primary responsibility for security in the country, the Congolese defence and security forces” “attempted to prevent the demonstration that was going to be violent, according to its organisers”. Amnesty International calls on the UN Department for Peace Operations to promptly investigate the role played by MONUSCO and its leadership in the events that led to the massacre.

Amnesty International

Armed Conflict, Foreign Intervention and Popular Uprising

The UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC, MONUSCO, deployed since 1999,[4] has often been unable to protect civilians from attacks by armed groups, including M23, and sometimes by the Congolese army itself.[5]  

When he came to power in 2019, DRC’s President Félix Tshisekedi pledged to improve security and civilian protection in eastern DRC.[6] Opting for an essentially militaristic approach, he gave a more prominent role to the Congolese army and sought military interventions from countries in the region, while criticizing MONUSCO and pushing for its withdrawal.[7] He declared a “State of siege” (similar to a state of emergency) in Ituri and North Kivu provinces in May 2021, granting extraordinary powers to the army and the police, claiming it was a means to rapidly restore security.[8] The measure was continually extended and used by the army and police to undermine human rights.[9] Later that year, the Tshisekedi administration authorized the intervention of the Ugandan army in parts of North Kivu and Ituri,[10] and, in June 2022, that of the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF).[11] In May 2023, after criticizing the failure of the EACRF,[12] he requested the intervention of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which was deployed to North Kivu in December 2023.[13]

The DRC government has openly mobilized local armed groups[14] and resorted to private military companies[15] to support the army since 2023, amid persistent war rhetoric between the DRC and Rwanda. Congolese authorities accuse Rwanda of aggression and sponsoring M23 rebels.[16] The M23 rebels have occupied parts of North Kivu province since November 2021, despite regional and international efforts for disarmament.[17]

Faced with persistent insecurity despite interventions by the UN and regional forces, the population has regularly protested against the presence of these forces. During anti-MONUSCO protests in Goma and other towns in July 2022, security forces killed at least 32 people, while four UN peacekeepers were killed by protesters, according to the government.[18]  

This is the context in which FNJMN emerged in early 2023. Although the political and religious group’s statements and actions began to be widely publicized around June 2023, it had been legally registered as a non-profit association and operating in Goma since 2019, according to official registration documents seen by Amnesty International and testimonies from members of the group.[19] It advocates a return to traditional Congolese and African spiritual practices and “rejection of imperialism in all its guises”.[20] Followers of this group are called Wazalendo, which means “patriots” in Swahili.[21] Before its protest planned for 30 August 2023, the group held three peaceful protests in Goma on 30 June, 30 July and 2 August 2023.[22] These protests, at least two of which were at MONUSCO’s headquarters, took place without violence^.[23]

Plans for Protest and Authorities’ Reaction

During previous protests in June and July, Efraimu Bisimwa, Wazalendo’s leader, announced a “major protest for 30 August” to demand MONUSCO’s departure.  For weeks, he repeated this call via local radio stations, social media, and during the group’s worship services, mobilizing his followers and the public to participate.[24] On 19 August, he wrote to the Mayor of Goma to formally give notice about the planned protest as required by Congolese law.[25] He said: “As usual, it will be a silent and peaceful march. We will depart from our temple and head to the MONUSCO headquarters. Our ancestors will protect us from anyone who might be tempted to attack us.”[26]  

MONUSCO’s Request to Prohibit Protest

On 21 August, the Head of MONUSCO’s Goma Office wrote to the North Kivu Governor Lieutenant-General Constant Ndima, expressing concerns about the planned protest and urging him to prevent it from taking place.[27] The letter stated: “the [Wazalendo’s] call is “a clear incitement to violence against MONUSCO and also against the authorities if they were to interfere with this mobilization. […]. We remain concerned about the motivations of these ‘Wazalendo’ and the FNJMN in particular, as well as the security risks that their actions could pose not only to our bases and staff but also to the Congolese security services and the established authorities.”[28] In what appears to be an implicit reference to the conflict with M23 and DRC’s tensions with Rwanda, she went on to reference “a manipulation” which could “create instability and vulnerability that will be difficult to contain at a time when your own efforts are aimed at containing insecurity and anticipating threats in the province”.[29] The letter requested the governor’s “firm intervention” with the Wazalendo “to prevent any threats against MONUSCO bases and staff”, and urged him to prohibit the protest “given its hateful and violent nature”.[30]

On 28 August, the governor wrote back to MONUSCO’s Head of Goma Office, reassuring her that he had instructed the security forces “to make the necessary arrangements” regarding her request.[31]

In response to Amnesty International’s findings and questions, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, said that MONUSCO’s request to the authorities to prohibit the protest followed exchanges of information with the authorities which indicated that “the actions planned for 30 August posed significant risks to both peacekeepers and residents in Goma”.[32] He stressed that “the Mission’s communications emphasized the need for the Congolese authorities to proactively address these concerns to prevent any loss of life and were delivered within the framework of regular dialogue, stressing the importance of respecting human rights while avoiding undue restrictions on the freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly.”[33] He stated: “Notable examples include: a letter dated 30 June from Mr. Bisimwa, leader of the Faith Natural Judaic Messianic towards the Nations (FNJMN), addressed to President Félix Tshisekedi, inciting violence against MONUSCO and other United Nations agencies; a public communication from FNJMN on 18 July to the Mayor of Goma reiterating their intention to erect a statue of Patrice Lumumba on the land occupied by the Mission’s logistics base in Goma; protests organized by FNJMN on 30 and 31 July in front of the Mission’s logistics base; the broadcast of hostile messages targeting MONUSCO disseminated on 2 August on FNJMN’s community radio, Uwezo wa Neno; as well as messages affiliated with Wazalendo and FNJMN circulated on social media, calling for a widespread campaign against MONUSCO starting on 30 August.”[34] Amnesty International reviewed most of FNJMN’s statements and messages in the lead-up to 30 August 2023, including Bisimwa’s 30 June letter to President Tshisekedi, his 18 July letter to the Mayor of Goma, as well as several social media posts, but could not find evidence of incitement to violence. On 11 October 2024, Amnesty International sent a follow up letter to the UN Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, requesting additional information to support his claims.[35] The letter reiterated unanswered questions regarding the assessments undertaken by MONUSCO, if any, to determine whether and how the risks identified might have been mitigated without resorting to an outright prohibition of the planned protest, and in relation to the possible consequences of requesting the Congolese authorities to prohibit the protest. Amnesty International further reiterated its question about the reasons why the UN did not publish the findings of its own investigations into these events. At the time of publication, the UN had not responded to our follow up requests.

Preemptive Ban

On 23 August, the Mayor of Goma released a statement announcing that the 30 August protest planned by the Wazalendo was banned because of the group’s registration status.[36] Several letters followed between him and the Wazalendo leader, with copies sent to other authorities, including the governor. In his letters, the mayor claimed that the protest was banned because Wazalendo was not legally registered as a non-profit association and because of the “State of siege”.[37] However, Efraimu Bisimwa provided evidence that FNJMN had been legally registered as a non-profit association since 2019 and insisted that the protest go on as planned.[38] In any event, authorities were not justified in banning the protest on the basis of Wazalendo’s registration status.[39]  

In an interview with Amnesty International, Efraimu Bisimwa stated that they reached a compromise after a police official went to see them and urged them to call off the protest.[40] He said:

“On the evening of 28 August, Colonel Thierry arrived at our temple at around 4pm. He had reached us thanks to our follower, Mama Deborah, who is close to him. We had a three-hour meeting with him as he tried to convince us not to hold the protest on 30 August. I told him that the followers were largely mobilized and that it was downright difficult for nothing to be done on that day. In the end, I suggested that, as a police commander, he sends a few police officers to escort a small delegation of ours that would go and deliver our message to the authorities on 30 August. That was our final compromise. Colonel Thierry even sat down with us around the fire as we left the temple. He took part in some of our rituals, saying that he was also the son of a traditional chief. He even drank the Kasiksi [a local beer made from bananas] with us, which is a sign of the covenant. For us, this meant that the agreement had been reached and sealed by all parties.”[41]

Operational Plan

Meanwhile, at the request of the governor, the army was in the process of planning and mounting an operation against the Wazalendo. In an official message (“télégramme”) sent to the army and police units under his jurisdiction on 25 August, in his capacity as Military Operations Commander, Governor Lieutenant-General Ndima characterized the Wazalendo as “a pressure group which supports M23 and the Rwanda Defence Force terrorists”, and whose aim was to “sow unrest in the town in order to facilitate enemy infiltration.”[42] He ordered them to take all necessary steps to protect MONUSCO facilities and Goma.[43] Among those copied in the message were the defence minister, the army chief of staff and the head of the President’s military household.

Following the governor’s message, the 34th Military Region issued an operational order on 28 August to all army units in Goma, including the Republican Guard’s Combined Armed Brigade (BIA).[44] The order stated that “according to information in our possession, the so-called Wazalendo pressure group, which is increasingly acting as an auxiliary of the M23-RDF movement, is planning a march on 30 August 2023 in the town of Goma to demand the departure of MONUSCO, while sowing unrest in order to facilitate enemy infiltration into the town” (emphasis added).[45]

The operational order characterized the Wazalendo as a pressure group engaging in a march. The instructions were to “secure and permanently defend the city of Goma by reinforcing the CltZ [military area control] apparatus, protect MONUSCO facilities and disperse protesters”.[46] While the order recalled that rules of engagement and behaviour are strict, including the ban on the use of firearms “except in self-defence”,[47]  its instructions did not recognize or refer to the right of peaceful assembly or reflect the obligation of law enforcement authorities to protect and facilitate the exercise of this right.

In the order’s annex, each unit involved, including the Republican Guard/BIA, is given precise instructions in three phases corresponding to the response on 28, 29 and 30 August.[48] In the final phase (30 August), their mission was to: “pursue the enemy”, “destroy isolated enemy elements”, “consolidate the area”, and “reorganize”.[49]

In response to the operational order, on 29 August, the Commander of the Republican Guard’s Combined Arms Brigade, Colonel Mike Kalamba Mikombe, issued a detailed “Motorised Deterrence Patrol Order” code-named “Keba”,[50] to units under his direct command, including the elite Special Forces (FS)[51] The document set out the same allegation of collusion between the Wazalendo and the M23 and the Rwanda Defence Force and specified that it had been drawn up on the “orders/authorisation of the higher level.”[52] BIA’s objective, as stated in the document, was to “carry out a motorised deterrence patrol in the main roads around the city of Goma” on 30 August between 4am and 11.30am and to “nip in the bud the attempt [to sow chaos] by the Messianic pressure group.” While the order recalled the ban on the use of firearms, it included broader exceptions: “except upon order or in case of self-defence.”[53]

On 28 August, the police also drew up a detailed “service order”[54] for their own units, but according to the Mayor of Goma (who, since the “State of siege”, is also a police officer), the service order was not implemented “because the army had taken the lead”.[55]

The massacre prompted a series of reactions from international actors, including MONUSCO, the OHCHR, the East African Community, the European Union (EU), and the US Embassy in Kinshasa.

In a statement on 31 August 2023, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in the DRC and Head of MONUSCO expressed her “deep regrets that the banned demonstration resulted in the deaths of civilians, police officers and members of the Congolese armed forces, as well as injuries to many others.”[164] Seeming to justify the intervention and use of force by the army and police, MONUSCO’s statement insisted that the Congolese defence and security forces had acted “in line with their primary responsibility” and “had attempted to prevent the holding of this demonstration that was going to be violent, according to its organisers.[165] The US government through its embassy in Kinshasa seemed to echo MONUSCO’s watered-down reaction, expressing regrets for “the loss of human life resulting from the recent clashes in Goma” and welcoming the DRC government’s response.[166] OHCHR’s response was much stronger from a human rights perspective. Warning that the death toll could be higher, OHCHR urged the authorities to ensure a “thorough, effective and impartial investigation.”[167] “Such an investigation must also comprehensively examine the use of force by the security forces”, the statement emphasized, adding that “those responsible for violations must be held to account, regardless of their affiliation.”^[168]

The EAC Secretary-General “deplored” the deaths of civilians “amidst unrest”, and urged the Congolese government to conduct an independent enquiry into the incident.[169] The European Union also reacted, condemning “the excessive and disproportionate use of force that led to the deaths of around fifty people and to many being wounded” and expressing its expectation that the investigation launched by the Congolese authorities would lead to the perpetrators being identified and held accountable.[170]

In early September 2023, the UNJHRO, which reports to both MONUSCO and OHCHR, conducted its own investigation into these events, according to a confidential report seen by Amnesty International in mid-October. UNJHRO’s preliminary findings gave a far higher toll than the official one: “The mission established that during the FARDC-PNC [Congolese National Police] operation, 102 people (90 men, eight women and four boys) were victims of extrajudicial executions, and 80 other people (66 men, nine women, four boys and one girl) were wounded.”[171] The UN investigation also found that several defence and security units, including “a unit of the Republican Guard”, were involved in the operation. At the time of writing, the UNJHRO had still not made its findings public.  

Justice… What justice! All this was nothing but a PR stunt to dissipate pressure and to be able to tell anyone who brings up the topic: the officer responsible was punished and justice was served.A lawyer for the victims

Survivors in the Dock

On 30 August, as authorities congratulated themselves on “foiling a plot against Goma”, they announced the arrest of 158 people whom they described as “armed bandits, drugged, in the pay of M23 and Rwandan terrorists.”[172] Two days later, 13 of them were released, while 145 others, including 29 children, were brought before the Garrison Military Court of Goma and charged with “participation in an insurrectional movement”, “criminal conspiracy”, and “murder.”[173]

The 29 children were transferred to the juvenile justice system, which dropped charges and released them in mid-September. Meanwhile, 116 adults, including 102 men and 14 women, remained in detention as they were brought to trial.[174] On 9 October, the Garrison Military Court of Goma found 64 of them guilty of “participation in insurrectional movement”, “murder” and “attempted murder” of police officers. The court sentenced Efraimu Bisimwa and three other Wazalendo leaders to death, while 60 followers were sentenced to 10 to 20 years in prison.[175] The court acquitted 52 people who were subsequently freed from prison.[176]  

The court prosecuted the 116 Wazalendo followers, 64 of whom it convicted of “participation in insurrectional movement” solely because they belonged to the religious and political group or because they planned or participated in the 30 August protest, which was meant to be peaceful. The court ruled that spending the night at the Wazalendo temple when the 30 August protest had been banned by the mayor of Goma was proof of participation in an insurrectional movement.[177] Yet, in the separate trial of the officers and soldiers for killing the protesters, the North Kivu Military Court dismissed the officers’ claims that the Wazalendo were armed or used the gun they took from a police officer, thereby rejecting that there was any armed resistance or actions that could constitute insurrection.[178]

Regarding the charges of “criminal participation” in the murder of a police officer, the Garrison Court of Goma’s judgment did not show how each of the 64 convicts participated in the stoning of the police officer nor provided any evidence whatsoever in this regard.[179] Not all these people, if any, could have individually participated in the stoning of the police officer. Therefore, for at least some of these people, their sole crime was to be or to be perceived to be members of the Wazalendo, to have participated in the protest and/or to have found themselves in the path of soldiers during the crackdown. A resident of Nyabushongo who witnessed intimidation and arbitrary arrests by Special Forces soldiers in his neighbourhood after the massacre told Amnesty International: “After the mass shooting, the Hiboux [Special Forces soldiers] went into the shops and houses in the neighbourhood, confiscating smartphones and arresting people, especially men. It was as if, for them, everyone in the neighbourhood was Wazalendo, and that was a crime.[180] I saw them arrest four young men in a shop. They released three of them, but they took the fourth away, and he is still in prison.”[181] This was corroborated by the Garrison Military Court of Goma, which found that at least 52 out of the 116 people it prosecuted had been arrested by soldiers outside of any protest. This included cases where individuals were apprehended in their homes and shops.[182] Despite this, the court alleged that while many may not have directly participated in the stoning of the police officer, they must have encouraged and approved of it by their presence at the crime scene and were, therefore, guilty.[183] As for the “attempted murder” conviction, the court relied solely on the testimonies of three police officers who claimed that they had been attacked and wounded by a group of Wazalendo followers while on foot patrol, in the incident in which their colleague was kidnapped, taken to the Wazalendo temple, and later stoned to death.[184] They identified two Wazalendo followers whom they said were part of the group which attacked them.[185] No further evidence was adduced to support these claims and, above all, to determine the individual responsibility of each of the accused.  

Amnesty International is of the view that the Garrison Military Court of Goma failed to sufficiently demonstrate that the 64 convicts had individually participated in the murder of police officer Kipapa Safari or were even present when he was stoned. In addition, civilians should never be tried by military courts.[186] They should either be immediately released or retried in conformity with fair trial standards before competent civilian courts and without the recourse to the death penalty.

These proceedings against the survivors of the 30 August massacre largely appear to be an attempt by the military justice system to primarily hold the Wazalendo leader and followers responsible for the violence that took place on 30 August in Goma and its consequences, rather than an attempt to genuinely investigate and prosecute those responsible for the stoning of the police officer.

One of their lawyers summed up what their prosecution meant to them:

“These are survivors of carnage. About half of them were bystanders, neighbours, and other people unrelated to the Wazalendo. Many were tortured during or after their arrest. One woman was completely undressed. Those injured were not treated. Many lost a family member in the massacre. Bisimwa himself lost two of his children. Yet they were the ones who were brought to justice, called terrorists, and humiliated. Worse, they are being judged by the army that attacked them, and with the assistance of MONUSCO, against whom they were about to protest. Do you think this qualifies as justice?”[187]

Those convicted appealed, and their case before the North Kivu Military Court started on 29 December 2023. At the time of writing, the appeal trial was still ongoing.

Perpetrators’ Accountability

As the Wazalendo were on trial, many people denounced the authorities’ eagerness to arrest and prosecute survivors of the massacre rather than holding the military accountable.[188] It was not until five days after the massacre and because of mounting public pressure that authorities took some steps towards justice and accountability. On 3 September, the government[189] announced that six Republican Guards, including the Republican Guard commander for North Kivu and his deputy, had been arrested and would be brought to trial.[190] In addition, the government announced that the governor and operations commander for North Kivu, Lieutenant-General Constant Ndima, had been “immediately recalled to Kinshasa for consultations” and that two police officials in Goma were suspended from their duties and also recalled to Kinshasa.[191]

The trial of the two officers and four Republican Guard soldiers was held before the North Kivu Military Court in Goma from 4 September to 3 October 2023. They were charged with crimes against humanity by murder and violating orders.[192] On 2 October, the court handed down its judgment. The commander of the Republican Guard in North Kivu, Colonel Mike Kalamba Mikombe, was found guilty and sentenced to death for “murder”, “attempted murder”, and “destruction of armaments.” He was also dismissed from the armed forces.[193] The Special Forces Regiment Commander and one soldier were acquitted, while three other soldiers were sentenced to 10 years in prison for “murder” and “attempted murder.”[194] In addition, the court recognized 109 people as victims and ordered Mike Mikombe and the three soldiers to pay them the equivalent of 100,000 US dollars for reparations[195] (917 US dollars per person on average). However, the court did not recognize the FNJMN/Wazalendo as a legal entity capable of bringing claims before a court of law, and as a victim. [196] The court also rejected Efraimu Bisimwa’s claim for reparations on the grounds of “immorality.”[197]

The investigations carried out by the authorities on both the murder of the police officer and the unlawful killings of the Wazalendo followers were marred by serious shortcomings:[198]

• No investigators were sent to the shooting scenes to collect evidence.[199] By the military prosecutor’s own admission, there were no ballistic investigations or autopsies (while the DRC has limited capabilities in this area, a UN official told Amnesty International that they expressed readiness to provide technical assistance, but the authorities did not seem interested in the offer).[200] The military prosecutor said: “We did not request UN assistance for autopsies, but we did for ballistic investigation. I think they sent an expert from Kinshasa – I caught a glimpse of him here – but unfortunately, I had a lot of setbacks, and we ended up not meeting.”[201] Amnesty International believes the investigation failed to identify all those who should have been investigated for their possible responsibility.
  
• The investigation also failed to identify the names, ages, genders, addresses and family members of all 56 officially recognized dead. Moreover, some victims are still missing. These gaps in the investigation prevented several families from participating in the trial to get justice for their relatives or to request reparations.
  
• Throughout the trial of the Republican Guard officers and soldiers, only six victims were called to testify, compared to 33 requested by victims’ lawyers.[202] One lawyer representing the victims stated that “each witness would potentially bring some new information or a new perspective in the interests of truth and justice, but after hearing from only six witnesses, the court said it was ‘sufficiently enlightened’ and refused to call any more witnesses”.[203]
  
• While victims appealed the court’s judgment in the case of six members of the Republican Guard, they were not able to effectively exercise their appeal rights due to the remoteness of the appeal court (the Superior Military Court), which sits 2000km away, in the capital Kinshasa.[204] Victims and their lead counsel told Amnesty International that they may not be able to travel to Kinshasa to participate in the appeal trial and expressed concerns that the injustices they have experienced may never be addressed.[205] On 25 October 2023, the victims’ committee wrote to the president of the military appeals court, formally requesting that the court hold the appeal hearings in Goma on an exceptional basis to ensure their effectiveness.[206] They were yet to receive a response at the time of writing,[207] while the appeal trial continued in Kinshasa. 
  
• Restriction on defence rights in the trial of the army officers and soldiers: of the 12 witnesses called by the defence, only three appeared before the court.[208] At least three times, the court rejected requests from the victims’ and defence lawyers to summon Governor Constant Ndima to testify before the court, even as a witness.[209] One defence counsel in the Wazalendo lawsuit commented: “Justice… What justice! All this was nothing but a PR stunt to dissipate pressure and to be able to tell anyone who brings up the topic: the officer responsible was punished, and justice served. In the meantime, many families still don’t know the whereabouts of their loved ones, a critical radio station has been silenced, a church has been reduced to ashes, and dozens of innocent people are languishing in prison.”[210]
  

People have a right to express themselves freely and to assemble peacefully, even if in protest at the United Nations and other actors. Authorities must facilitate the right to peaceful assembly.Spokesperson for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Ravina Shamdasani, commenting on the army and police massacre on 30 August 2023 in Goma – 1 September 2023

Congolese authorities must respect, protect and fulfil human rights at all times, whether during an armed conflict or in peacetime. Notwithstanding the public declaration of a so-called “State of Siege”, introduced in North Kivu and Ituri provinces in May 2021, States Parties are only permitted to derogate from certain provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights if the proclamation of the state of emergency meets certain requirements, including that the circumstances are notified in writing to the UN Secretary-General[211] – a formal requirement which the DRC authorities have not complied with.

The “State of siege” has been extended in disregard of international human rights law and standards, as Amnesty International has demonstrated.^[212] It gives excessive powers to the army, including restriction of civil liberties and the trial of civilians by military courts.[213] As highlighted by the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), even if the “State of Siege” had been validly proclaimed, “the measures adopted by the authorities would still themselves need to be limited to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, giving weight to the principle of proportionality.”^[214] In addition, many of the rights that were violated, as shown in this report, including the right to life and the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, are rights that cannot be derogated from under international law[215] as well as under DRC’s constitution.^[216] The DRC is also a State Party to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), which does not allow derogation from the rights enshrined therein.

The Congolese authorities have obligations under international human rights law, including under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)[217] and its Optional Protocols,[218] the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention against Torture),[219] and the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR).[220] These instruments guarantee the following human rights, among others:

• Right to Life – Article 6.1 of the ICCPR provides: “Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”[221] Article 4 of the ACHPR reads, “Human beings are inviolable. Every human being shall be entitled to respect for his life and the integrity of his person. No one may be arbitrarily deprived of this right.”[222] The UN Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions[223] and the Revised UN Manual on the Effective Prevention of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions (the Minnesota Protocol),[224] further expand on the obligations of States in that regard.
  
• Right to dignity and freedom from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment – Torture means “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.”[225] The prohibition of torture is central to the Convention against Torture, it is also included in Article 7 of the ICCPR and Article 5 of the ACHPR and is a jus cogens principle of customary international law. The Convention against Torture underlines that “no exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.” The UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials further emphasizes: “No law enforcement official may inflict, instigate or tolerate any act of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, nor may any law enforcement official invoke superior orders or exceptional circumstances such as a state of war or a threat of war, a threat to national security, internal political instability or any other public emergency as a justification of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”[226] Linked to the prohibition of torture or other ill-treatment, Article 5 of the ACHPR emphasizes that “every individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human being.”[227] The right to dignity and to be “treated with humanity” is also recognized under Article 10 of the ICCPR.[228]
  
• Death penalty – Amnesty International opposes the death penalty in all cases, on the grounds that it is the ultimate cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and violates the right to life. The African Commission in its resolution CHPR/Res.544 (LXXIII) also urges States to “take steps towards abolishing the death penalty,” including ratification of the second Optional Protocol of the ICCPR aiming at the abolition of the death penalty.^[229] After two decades of hiatus on the execution of the death penalty, in March 2024 the Congolese government reinstated executions for a series of offences and crimes, including “criminal association” and “insurrectional movement”. Amnesty International has called on authorities to immediately halt any plans to resume executions and establish an official moratorium on executions with a view to permanently abolishing the death penalty.[230]
  
• Prohibition of enforced disappearances – In 2007, the DRC signed the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (ICPPED). This obligates DRC to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty until such time as it indicates its intention not to ratify it.[231] Indeed, the DRC has accepted recommendations to ratify the ICPPED,[232] but has not yet done so. Article 2 of the ICPPED defines enforced disappearance as “… the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law.” Article 12(2) ICPPED states that: “Where there are reasonable grounds for believing that a person has been subjected to enforced disappearance, the authorities referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall undertake an investigation, even if there has been no formal complaint.”
  
• Freedoms of thought, conscience and religion,[233] freedom of opinion and expression,[234] and freedom of association[235] and peaceful assembly[236] – States are obligated to protect the rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (indeed, Article 18 of the ICCPR is listed as a non-derogable right under Article 4(2) of the ICCPR) and to freedom of expression – even expression that many people may find deeply offensive.[237] The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has declared: “Freedom of expression should not be restricted on public order or national security grounds unless there is a real risk of harm to a legitimate interest and there is a close causal link between the risk of harm and the expression.”[238] The right to freedom of association with others (under Article 22 of the ICCPR and Article 10 of the ACHPR) protects the voluntary grouping of persons with a common interest to form or join an association. Associations, in turn, must be able to freely determine their purposes and activities, and informal associations must “not be punished or criminalized under the law or in practice on the basis of their lack of formal … status.”^[239] The right to freedom of peaceful assembly (recognized by Article 21 of the ICCPR and Article 11 of the ACHPR) is an individual right exercised collectively that protects the non-violent gathering by persons for specific purposes.[240] Assemblies may, for example, express or convey a contentious message, affirm group identity, and/or have cultural or religious objectives.[241] Moreover, the term “peaceful” must be interpreted to include conduct that annoys or offends others, as well as conduct that hinders, impedes or obstructs the activities of third parties. Isolated acts of violence do not render an assembly non-peaceful in its entirety.[242] States have obligations to refrain from unwarranted interference with these rights and to protect and facilitate their exercise.
  
• Right to liberty and security of person – Article 9 of the ICCPR states: “Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are established by law. Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him. Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release.” Article 6 of the ACHPR also protects the right to liberty and security of one’s person. The UN Human Rights Committee has emphasized that the notion of “arbitrariness” is not to be equated with “against the law” but must instead “be interpreted more broadly to include elements of inappropriateness, injustice, lack of predictability and due process of law, as well as elements of reasonableness, necessity and proportionality.”[243]
  
• Right to truth, justice and reparations – A person whose human rights have been violated has a right to be provided with truth, justice, and effective reparation, which includes restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition. Article 7 of the ACHPR states that “every individual shall have the right to have his cause heard.” With regards to victims of gross violations of international human rights law such as those documented in this report, the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation develop what are the obligations of States in this regard, which encompasses their obligation to “investigate violations effectively, promptly, thoroughly and impartially and, where appropriate, take action against those allegedly responsible.”[244] “Victims should be treated with humanity and respect for their dignity and human rights, and appropriate measures should be taken to ensure their safety, physical and psychological well-being and privacy, as well as those of their families. The State should ensure that its domestic laws, to the extent possible, provide that a victim who has suffered violence or trauma should benefit from special consideration and care to avoid his or her re-traumatization in the course of legal and administrative procedures designed to provide justice and reparation.”[245]
  
• Fair trial rights – The right to equality before the courts and tribunals and to a fair trial is enshrined, inter alia, in the ICCPR (Articles 14-15) and the ACHPR (Article 7). Article 14 of the ICCPR provides: “All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”[246] Both the UN and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the African Commission) have developed standards pertaining to free trial rights.[247] The African Commission stresses: “Military courts should not in any circumstances whatsoever have jurisdiction over civilians.”[248]

Crimes Under International Law and Other Human Rights Violations

Crimes Against Humanity

Amnesty International considers that this massacre must be viewed in the context of the ongoing armed conflict in eastern DRC since the 1990s. Within that armed conflict, there have been many violations of international humanitarian and human rights law committed by all parties to the conflict, reflecting attacks against the civilian population, especially in the eastern regions of Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu. This prompted the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to open an investigation focusing on “alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed mainly in eastern DRC, in the Ituri region and the North and South Kivu Provinces since 1 July 2002” (although the office acknowledged that alleged crimes were reported since the 1990s but that the Court’s jurisdiction started on 1 July 2002).[264] Since then, several members of armed groups have been prosecuted by the ICC for war crimes and crimes against humanity, with three convicted. However, the ICC is yet to prosecute crimes committed by the army. More recently, the OTP announced its decision to “renew investigative efforts in the DRC”.[265] The OTP stated: “[…] the latest episodes of violence in North Kivu since 2022 are interconnected with patterns of violence and hostilities that have plagued the region since at least 1 July 2002, the start of the Court’s jurisdiction in the DRC.”[266]

Amnesty International considers that the 30 August massacre may amount to a crime against humanity, as part of the military’s ongoing widespread or systematic attack against civilians in eastern DRC.

The massacre was mainly perpetrated by the Republican Guard, a unit of the Congolese army. The Congolese military court[267] itself charged some officers and soldiers with crimes against humanity. Although they were not convicted of these charges, Amnesty International has already noted the deficiencies in the investigation and in the trial.

Crimes against humanity are defined under Article 7 of the Rome Statute as prohibited acts “committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.”[268] Acts constituting crimes against humanity may include murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation or forcible transfer of population, torture, rape, enforced disappearance and other crimes. Crimes against humanity are “among the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole [and] warrant and entail individual criminal responsibility”.[269] The DRC has been a State Party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court since 2002 and has incorporated provisions of the Statute into national legislation.[270] Article 222 of the Ordinary Penal Code is identical to Article 7 of the Rome Statute in defining the crime against humanity and its elements.

In the following paragraphs, we will first examine the chapeau elements of the crime, which are (i) the existence of an attack against a civilian population pursuant to a state policy and (ii) the widespread or systematic nature of the attack. We will then turn to the argument that the 30 August crimes are constitutive of crimes against humanity as (iii) murders (iv) committed within the context and with knowledge of the chapeau elements (nexus and knowledge).

Chapeau elements: widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population

An attack against a civilian population, as required to qualify as a crime against humanity, is defined as a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute, such as murders and rapes among others,[271] whose primary target is the civilian population.[272] The Elements of Crimes of the Rome Statute add that such an attack is understood to be conducted “pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack”[273] so that random or isolated acts would not be prosecuted as crimes against humanity. A crime against humanity can be committed in peacetime or during an armed conflict, and one attack can involve several incidents of crimes (among those listed in Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute) against the civilian population.

Amnesty International considers that there has been an attack by the Congolese army and its allies pursuant to a state policy in the eeastern DRC since the 1990s. The attack is characterized by the commission of multiple killings and rapes targeted at the civilian population over the years, as documented by the UN and several civil society organizations.[274]

International courts have developed guidance on how to demonstrate the existence of a state policy. The ICC Trial Chamber in the Bemba case, for instance, explained: “[T]he ‘policy’ need not be formalized and may be inferred from a variety of factors which, taken together, establish that a policy existed. Such factors may include (i) that the attack was planned, directed or organized; (ii) a recurrent pattern of violence; (iii) the use of public or private resources to further the policy; (iv) the involvement of the State or organizational forces in the commission of crimes; (v) statements, instructions or documentation attributable to the State or the organization condoning or encouraging the commission of crimes; and/or (vi) an underlying motivation.”[275]

In the present case, indications that the attack against the civilian population is pursuant to a state policy include that the killings are recurrent and repeated over many years, they are perpetrated in a coordinated manner (through units acting together rather than by isolated individuals), often directly by State forces or by armed groups affiliated with or supported by State forces, and in most cases the authors of these acts have never been prosecuted.[276] These elements show the unlikeliness of these acts being committed randomly, as isolated acts. On the contrary, the State likely condones these acts by not taking action to stop them and punishing those responsible, if not supporting, covering up or promoting these acts, such as in the case of the killings documented in this report.[277]

Second, this above-mentioned attack may be widespread and/or systematic. “Widespread” refers to “the large-scale nature of the attack and the number of victims”[278] and “systematic” signifies “the organized nature of the acts of violence and the improbability of their random occurrence”.[279] Although an attack against a civilian population underlying the commission of crimes against humanity must be either widespread or systematic and does not need to be both, widespread attacks composed of a series of events would often entail being systematic as well, given that they are conducted pursuant to a state or organizational policy, which in itself shows the organized (and not random) nature of the acts constitutive of the attack. It is the overall attack on the civilian population, not the individual prohibited acts, that must be widespread or systematic.

Amnesty International considers the numerous killings and rapes[280] by State forces and their allies against civilians in eastern provinces of the DRC since the 1990s may be widespread and/or systematic. Since 1996, attacks directly targeted at the civilian population in North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri provinces have led to dozens of thousands of people killed and hundreds of thousands more subjected to sexual violence, including rape.[281] Killings and rapes have been committed in over a thousand repeated incidents and during the course of a prolonged period of nearly 30 years. These killings were perpetrated in a similar manner, generally through directly shooting at people, indiscriminate bombing, burning, and stabbing.

Even if viewed as a single attack, without reference to the ongoing unlawful acts committed since the 1990s by State forces and their allies against civilians, the large-scale killing, torture and other ill-treatment, arbitrary detention of the Wazalendo protestors and other civilians on 30 August and for weeks thereafter can by itself be considered a widespread or systematic attack. On 30 August in Goma, the defence and security forces killed between 50 and 100 people,[282] in different locations within the city, all victims undoubtedly civilian,[283] which by itself may satisfy the criterion of “widespread”. Moreover, the killings appear systematic, not random, with the army and police targeting the victims when they pose no threat. The torture of some protesters, the arbitrary arrest of 116 protesters, and enforced disappearances can all constitute part of the attack carried out by the State.

Underlying acts: murders committed within the context of this attack

Amnesty International documented that on 30 August in Goma, the army deliberately and unlawfully killed dozens of people. More details about these killings can be found in the section below, “Unlawful Killings”, and in the previous chapter.

Amnesty International considers that these killings of Goma were likely perpetrated as part of the widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population.[284] In determining whether the requisite nexus exists, the assessment can take various factors into account, including the similarities between the acts at stake and the acts occurring within the attack, the nature of the events and circumstances surrounding the accused’s acts, the temporal and geographical proximity of the acts with the attack, the aims and consequences of the acts, including the manner in which the acts are associated with the attack or the policy underlying the attack.[285]

There is indeed a clear link between these killings and the State’s widespread and continuing attack against the civilian population of eastern DRC. The 30 August killings were committed in Goma, which is the main city in North Kivu province, eastern DRC, in the geographical area where the armed conflict and attack against the civilian population is ongoing. The conduct of these killings fits the pattern of the army targeting and killing civilians, who are sometimes targeted due to being perceived as hostile to the government or linked to the opposing parties to the armed conflict. Moreover, from the planning of the operation to the statements made after the killings, military commanders involved in these killings themselves make the link between these events and the ongoing armed conflict very explicitly, including by alleging on repeated occasions that the people they killed were linked to their “enemies” in the armed conflict.[286]

Amnesty International is of the view that further investigation is warranted to determine whether the crime against humanity of murder was committed on 30 August in and around Goma, taking into consideration the gravity and magnitude of what happened on that day and the weeks thereafter, and given the pattern of similar crimes committed with impunity for years by government forces in eastern DRC. 

Extrajudicial Executions and Other Unlawful Killings

Extrajudicial executions are the unlawful and deliberate killing of a person by state agents or by people acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of state authorities. While it can sometimes be difficult to establish with certainty that the evidential threshold for extrajudicial executions has been met in relation to a specific intention to kill and/or the authorization or acquiescence of the state, the facts presented here, drawing on first-hand testimony of survivors, eyewitnesses and perpetrators, make a compelling case that these were deliberate killings carried out by soldiers acting on unambiguous orders of senior officials.

It is clear from the account presented in chapters 1 and 2 that the killings were carried out by army soldiers in the context of a detailed and pre-planned public order operation targeting Wazalendo followers or anyone perceived to be a Wazalendo follower, with the stated objective to “take all necessary steps to protect MONUSCO facilities and Goma town”, including to “pursue the enemy” and “destroy isolated enemy elements.” The operational plan provided for the deployment of elite Special Forces troops who appeared to be in command on the day and had military-grade weapons. Eyewitness accounts, image verification and medical reports suggest that those who were killed died from close-range shots, including to the head, back or abdomen.

There is further evidence that the killings were carried out by order of the State or, at the very least, with its acquiescence. This evidence includes the means and units deployed, instructions given, the high death toll, attempts to minimize this death toll, the apparent disappearance of bodies, and the failure of authorities to undertake ballistic investigations or autopsies. Statements by senior officials and officers further substantiate this assessment – as described in section 3.3, the governor claimed that the army had acted “professionally” to “neutralize troublemakers”; the Republican Guard Commander for North Kivu boasted that the Special Forces “operated with determination” and “managed to nip in the bud the Wazalendo’s attempt [to seize Goma]”; and an officer stated that “we eliminated the enemy as described in the operational order”.

• Between 3.30 and 4.30am on 30 August, soldiers killed at least six people outside of the Wazalendo radio station. They shot them for no apparent or stated reason while they were proceeding to arrest those found at the radio station (see section 2.1 “3.30am: Unlawful Killings”)
  
• Around 4.00am on that same day, police officers shot at a group of Wazalendo followers who were peacefully heading to the radio station after hearing about the raid, killing 35-year-old Jean-Claude Rusina and wounding two others. A bit later, soldiers shot at the wounded and those who tried to take them to the hospital, killing at least one more person.
  
• Around 6.00am, police officers killed 19-year-old Uwezo Milele. They shot him to death while he was peacefully walking in the street (see section 2.2 “6am: Shooting and Stoning at The Temple”).
  
• Between 7.00 and 8.00am, when the protest was about to start, soldiers shot at the crowd. Soldiers did not need to protect themselves or others against an imminent threat of death or serious injury. Soldiers shot at people in the absence of any danger. In some instances, they also chased protesters who were running away, found them and killed them in their hiding places (see section 2.2 “7.30am: Mass Shooting”).

The soldiers unlawfully killed over 102 people, according to the UN.[287] Many of these killings may also constitute extrajudicial executions.

These unlawful killings violate the right to life. DRC authorities have an obligation to investigate these killings and, where there is evidence, prosecute and judge those responsible in fair trials before competent, independent and impartial courts.[288]

Violations of the Rights to Association and Peaceful Assembly, Including Excessive Use of Force, Use of Firearms and Deployment of Military Personnel

A significant background factor (preceding the predominantly military deployment against the protesters) was an unwarranted questioning of FNJMN’s registration status. This was subsequently cited as grounds for pre-emptively banning the protest. State authorities must not, however, compel associations to register for them to exist or operate freely. In any case, the right to freedom of peaceful assembly extends to unregistered associations,^[289] and authorities have positive obligations to protect and facilitate the exercise of the right of peaceful assembly.

This right of peaceful assembly can only be limited if necessary, and even then, only in a proportionate way, in pursuit of a legitimate aim, such as the protection of public order or public safety. A mere hypothetical risk of public disorder does not meet this threshold. As such, MONUSCO’s claims (as described in this report) that the planned protest could get out of hand, or that it would be “hateful and violent” could not, without further evidence, adequately justify their request to the Congolese authorities to outrightly prohibit it (see the Executive Summary “Operation ‘Keba’”).[290] The possibility that a peaceful assembly may provoke hostile reactions from others does not detract from its peaceful nature.^[291] Prohibiting an assembly is a measure of last resort, and authorities should always explore less intrusive measures before resorting to an outright ban.^[292] In this regard, the authorities’ ban on the Wazalendo’s protest (see section 1.2 “Preemptive Ban”) and mourning ceremonies (see section 2.3 “Undignified Burials”) was a violation of their right to peaceful protest. Furthermore, even where the conduct of an individual places them beyond the protective scope of the right of peaceful assembly (if, for example, they engage in violent conduct), they nonetheless retain their other rights under the ACHPR and other treaties ratified by the DRC.^[293] The stoning to death of a police officer by some protestors could not, under any circumstances, warrant the army’s brutal crackdown on all protesters, let alone the massacre, gunshot wounds, torture and other ill-treatment by law enforcement authorities (see Section 2.2). They should have sought to disperse those members of the crowd who were attacking the police officer, using force, if necessary, in a progressive, proportionate manner, and by distinguishing between peaceful demonstrators/bystanders and those directly involved in the stoning.

MONUSCO should not have requested authorities to pre-emptively impose a ban on the protest. Rather, MONUSCO should have emphasized the presumption of peacefulness and underscored the obligations of the authorities to plan and conduct the policing operation with the objective of facilitating the assembly, de-escalating any situation that might result in violence, exhausting non-violent means and avoiding the use of force unless absolutely necessary (in compliance with the principles of legality, necessity, proportionality, precaution and non-discrimination) and not deploying the military to police assemblies.

Congolese security and defence forces should not have been deployed to police the protest since this role should be reserved for law enforcement officials trained in policing assemblies. Moreover, firearms are an inappropriate tool for policing assemblies and can only ever be justified as a last resort in the face of an imminent threat to life or serious injury – which is not demonstrated by the evidence concerning the protest as documented here.

Torture and other Ill-Treatment

Members of the Republican Guard subjected 12 people to torture and other ill-treatment after arresting them at the Wazalendo radio station (see section 2.4). The victims were tied up, beaten up and threatened with a weapon. Some were lifted and dropped as a punishment or to extract information from them. The soldiers also arrested and detained over 150 more people, including dozens of children, many of whom they subjected to degrading or humiliating treatment. They stripped off their shoes and men’s tops and beat and humiliated them simply because they were Wazalendo followers or perceived as such.   

These acts violate the prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment under international law. Congolese authorities should ensure no person arrested or detained is subjected to torture or other ill-treatment and should investigate these instances where torture was allegedly committed in view of prosecuting those responsible in fair trials.

Mass Arbitrary Arrest and Detention

Over 150 people, including at least 29 children, were arbitrarily arrested and detained in the aftermath of the army and police crackdown on the Wazalendo followers (see section 2.5 “Survivors in the Dock”). While some were released in the following days and weeks, including the children, 116 were prosecuted and tried on unsubstantiated charges. 64 were eventually sentenced for participating in an “insurrectional movement” simply because of their alleged membership of the political and religious group Wazalendo, as well as for the “murder” and “attempted murder” of police officers with the court failing to demonstrate their individual responsibility as required in criminal matters (see section 2.5“Survivors in The Dock”).

This violates their freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention, as well as their right to a fair trial. As the appeal is ongoing in this case, the authorities should drop the charges of “participation in an insurrectional movement” against the 64 people and release all those whose individual responsibility for the stoning to death of the police officer cannot be indisputably and fairly established.  

Enforced Disappearances

As shown in this report (see section 2.3 “Missing Persons”), at least ten people appear to have been forcibly disappeared in connection with the 30 August events in and around Goma, while several dozens of bodies of people believed dead were not recovered.

Even though the DRC signed the ICPPED in 2007 but has not yet ratified it,[294] cases of enforced disappearances documented in this report not only breach DRC’s obligation not to act against the purpose of the ICPPED, but also breach a range of other state obligations under international law. Enforced disappearances violate the rights of the missing person to recognition as a person before the law, the right to liberty and security, and the right not to be subjected to torture and other ill-treatment as protected under the ICCPR, the ACHPR and CAT. They may also violate, or at least constitute a grave threat, to the right to life. DRC authorities must provide information on the fate or the whereabouts of these persons to their relatives without delay and, depending on the circumstances, investigate and prosecute those responsible.

Violations of the Right to Dignity and Humane Treatment

Bodies of dozens of people killed on 30 August were dragged along the ground, piled onto a truck, not appropriately cared for, and later presented to families in unimaginable conditions, often making it impossible for their relatives to identify them (see section 2.3 “Bodies Left to Rot”). These people had the right for their bodies to be treated with care and respect and to be properly preserved until burial. Their families should not have had to go through the inhumane experience of seeing their loved ones’ dead bodies in a state of putrefaction.

Authorities organized one collective burial for all people they recognized as having been killed on 30 August. Families were prevented from organizing burials themselves, in line with their own wishes and beliefs, and some were prevented from attending the burial as they were not informed it was taking place or were detained at the time (see section 2.3 “Undignified Burials”). The manner in which bodies were handled, and families of the deceased were treated violated their right to dignity and humane treatment under Article 5 of the ACHPR and Article 10 of the ICCPR.

Lack of Truth and Justice

While the North Kivu Military Court conducted a trial of six Republican Guard members between 4 September and 2 October, Amnesty International considers this trial insufficient to provide adequate truth and justice to all victims and survivors of the 30 August events. The truth about what happened has not been fully established due to incomplete and rushed investigations, which did not allow a full account of all crimes and prejudices suffered or all individual criminal responsibilities, including for those who gave the orders (see section 3.3). The trial was also conducted before a military court, which Amnesty International and ACHPR guidelines oppose for cases of crimes against civilians. Investigations should start afresh so that where evidence is sufficient, all those responsible, including superiors, are prosecuted and judged before competent, independent and impartial civilian courts.

In addition, the trial only recognized 109 victims (parties civiles). Considering the officially recorded number of the dead (56) and wounded (75), the number of victims who may want to seek redress – including direct victims and relatives of those who suffered the crimes – is much higher. Amnesty International talked to several victims who were not able to participate in the trial, be recognized as victims or receive compensation. The court dismissed Efraimu Bisimwa’s claim as a victim on the grounds that he called the protest and, therefore, was responsible for what happened, despite two of his children being unlawfully killed and him suffering torture and other ill-treatment (see section 2.4). With regard to the payment of those who were awarded financial compensation by the court,[295] this depends solely on the solvency of the four soldiers who were convicted, which raises serious concerns that they will not receive the reparations they are entitled to. Ensuring that all victims obtain adequate justice and reparations is ultimately the State’s responsibility under international human rights law.

Individual Responsibilities

Unlawful killings, including possible extrajudicial killings, documented in this report were perpetrated by the Republican Guard’s Special Forces and police units. The raid at the Wazalendo radio station, conducted by the Republican Guard’s Special Forces, led to the unlawful killing of at least six individuals, numerous injuries, and 11 cases of torture and other forms of ill-treatment (see section 2.4). They also carried out the mass shooting at the Wazalendo temple, killing at least 42 people and injuring several dozen others. They were responsible for the manhandling of bodies and the wounded. Police officers killed at least two Wazalendo followers (Jean-Claude Rusina and Uwezo Milele) and injured scores (see sections 2.3 and 3.2). Overall, according to the authorities, members of the Republican Guard and the police killed at least 56 people (at least 102 people according to the UN), injured over 80 and forcibly disappeared scores. They subjected dozens to torture and other ill-treatment and arbitrarily arrested and detained over 150 people.

The Republican Guard, a unit of the Congolese army reporting directly to the president, is tasked with the responsibility of protecting the president, his family, and presidential property. ^[296] They were mobilized on 30 August because, under Congolese law, the army, including the Republican Guard, may participate in law enforcement operations along with the police.[297] During an insurrection, a state of siege or a state of emergency, as has been the case in North Kivu since May 2021, the law gives precedence to armed forces over the police in law enforcement operations.[298]

The Congolese National Police is a public service responsible for, among other things: public security, the safety of persons and their property, and maintaining and restoring public order.[299]  In this case, the police had issued a separate “service order” for maintenance and restoration of order related to the protest planned by Wazalendo and were deployed on 30 August.[300]

Lieutenant-General Constant Ndima Kongba

AFP via Getty Images

General Constant Ndima Kongba held political and administrative powers as “military governor” and commander of military operations for North Kivu.[301] Under the “State of siege, the Governor has full authority for managing policing operations and maintaining order in the province. “He decides on all matters except those that fall within the competence of the national authorities.”[302] In this dual capacity as governor and military operations commander for North Kivu, all police and military commanders in North Kivu, including the Republican Guard’s BIA and Special Forces commanders, are under his authority. General Constant Ndima sent an official message (“télégramme”) to military and police commanders under his authority stating that the FNJMN (Wazalendo) followers constituted a serious threat to Goma and directed them to “take all measures to secure MONUSCO facilities and to deploy a security operation in the town.”[303]  

Following this message, the 34th Military Region on 28 August issued a detailed “operation order” and shared it with him.[304] Subsequently, the Republican Guard’s Combined Arms Brigade (BIA) Commander in North Kivu developed and issued the Keba operation plan on 29 August 2023 to “nip in the bud” FNJMN’s planned protest through organizing a “Motorized Deterrence Patrol” on Goma’s main roads,[305] with Governor Ndima copied in. The police issued a Service Order to all police units in and around Goma, also copying in Governor Ndima.[306] This shows that these military and police units adopted orders to implement Ndima’s “télégramme” and kept him informed of preparations for the operation.

On 30 August, the Republican Guard’s Special Forces and other army and police units perpetrated numerous crimes while conducting the above-mentioned operations, unlawfully killing several dozens of people and injuring scores of others, subjecting some to torture or other ill-treatment, arbitrarily arresting over a hundred more, ransacking their radio station and looting and burning down their temple (see Section 2.2 “10am: Looting and Burning of the Temple”).

Ndima knew about the commission of crimes right after they were perpetrated, perhaps even as they were ongoing. He admitted to touring the town during that morning and seeing “six bodies” of those killed in connection with these events. According to two journalists who accompanied him, his visit took place around 9am on 30 August, when the army intervention at Wazalendo temple was still ongoing.[307] The BIA Commander in North Kivu, Colonel Mike Mikombe, and 34th Military Region’s General Staff Commander, Colonel Yves Rubenga, who were present at the Wazalendo temple before, during and after the mass shooting, told Amnesty International that they spoke with the governor on the phone straight after the mass shooting and told him that soldiers had opened fire killing 42 people.[308] According to Mikombe, Ndima told them to “collect those bodies and take them to the Military Hospital”.[309] A leaked confidential intelligence dispatch from the Sukola II Operational Sector, also under Ndima’s jurisdiction, reported a death toll of 48 killed and 75 wounded as early as the morning of 31 August.[310] Furthermore, the news and images of the mass shootings at the Wazalendo radio station and temple were quickly and widely shared on social media from the morning of 30 August. These elements demonstrate that Ndima was aware or should have been aware that the defence and security forces had killed dozens of people.

As the highest provincial military authority to which commanders of the operation were reporting, he had a responsibility to prevent and punish such crimes. To Amnesty International’s knowledge, he did not take any measures to prevent such crimes or stop them, nor did he attempt to investigate the killings, identify those responsible and hold them to account as soon as he was made aware of their commission. Instead, Ndima publicly justified and took credit for acts committed by security forces against Wazalendo followers, at a time when he could not have been unaware of crimes committed during the operation. A few hours after the mass shooting at the Wazalendo temple, several of his officers, including his spokesperson, Lieutenant-Colonel Guillaume Ndjike, were seen with several army officers, including those who had just carried out the massacre, presenting stripped and battered Wazalendo detainees to the press and blaming them for the violence.[311] Later the same day, Ndima’s office issued a press release praising the defence and security forces for “professionally stopping these troublemakers playing into the hands of the aggressor M23/DRC.”[312] In an interview with national radio and television on the morning of 31 August, Ndima justified the army’s intervention and its use of lethal force, falsely claiming that it was prompted by protesters who were “armed” and who “attacked the security forces in the first place.”[313]

In response to Amnesty International’s findings, Constant Ndima stated: “Nothing has shown or proved that I gave the order to anyone to shoot on the population (my constituents), or that I gave an order or instruction for these unfortunate events to take place in my capacity as Governor and in charge of military operations in North Kivu. […] It is not true to claim that I did not react, for in my capacity as the Provincial Authority, I immediately ordered the military justice to open investigations and arrest the presumed perpetrators of these events without distinction, which was done.”[314] He added that he immediately drew up a circumstantial report to the hierarchy as a matter of urgency, which led to the visit to Goma of a high-level government delegation on 2 September 2023.[315]

He did not address several of Amnesty International’s questions, especially regarding his specific actions in the lead-up to the massacre including his official message that prompted the military operations, his knowledge of the massacre as it unfolded and justification afterwards, or his congratulatory messages to the defense and security forces despite being aware of their unlawful actions. Further, he provided no evidence to support his claims about ordering investigations and arrests in the immediate aftermath of the massacre, and Amnesty International was unable to find evidence to support these claims either. Although he indicated that he had appeared before the High Military Court in Kinshasa since May 2024 as a witness in the appeal trial of the army officers who were convicted by the North Kivu Military Court, to Amnesty International’s understanding being called to testify in court does not show that his role in the events was the subject of judicial investigations or proceedings. On 11 November 2024, Amnesty International sent him a follow-up letter requesting additional information, which remained unanswered at the time of publication.

Amnesty International believes that Ndima should be investigated and, if there is sufficient evidence, be prosecuted in civilian courts without recourse to the death penalty; at minimum, he should be investigated for criminal responsibility as commander for his failure to prevent, investigate and punish crimes committed by military and police forces on 30 August in Goma.

Colonel Mike Mikombe Kalamba

AFP via Getty Images

Colonel Mike Mikombe Kalamba was the commander of the Combined Arms Brigade (Brigade Interarmes, or BIA) in North Kivu, with all soldiers in this elite unit, including the Republican Guard’s Special Forces, reporting directly to him. In the context of the ongoing war between the Congolese army and the Rwandan-backed M23 rebels in North Kivu, he told Amnesty International that his unit’s core mission was “to defend the town of Goma and its surroundings in the event of enemy infiltration or attack.”[316] Following the governor’s official message (Télégramme) and the Operation Order issued by the 34th Military Region, he personally devised and supervised the execution of Operation Keba.[317]

According to the North Kivu Military Court records, in a text message sent at 3.02am on 30 August, Mike Mikombe shared the location of the Wazalendo radio station with the commander of the Republican Guard’s 19th Regiment (under which Major Peter Kabwe’s 192nd Special Forces Battalion is placed).[318] This suggests that Mikombe was at least aware of Special Forces’ assault on the FNJMN radio station in which a zone people were killed, and others wounded, tortured, or arbitrarily detained, hours before the incidents at the Wazalendo temple.

When Special Forces under his authority opened fire into the crowd with tactical weapons on 30 August, Mike Mikombe was undoubtedly present, and there is strong evidence that he ordered his forces to open fire. His presence is confirmed by two videos verified by Amnesty International and several testimonies, including his own (see Chapter 2 “30 August: The Massacre”). Although there were at least two other officers of his rank (Colonel) on-site, he behaved de facto as the highest officer in charge and was regarded as such. For example, in one video verified by Amnesty International, he was seen shouting at the other Colonels and ordering them to end the talks, which they did.[319] Several individuals have testified that he gave the order to open fire, including four during the trial,[320] as well as three eyewitnesses interviewed by Amnesty International.[321] Special Forces proceeded to fire at protesters and to pursue them as they were running away, killing several dozens of unarmed protesters and injuring scores, most likely with the acquiescence of their commander Mikombe, who was in the vicinity as he admitted.[322]

The next day, in a report to the overall Republican Guard Commander about these events, Mikombe took credit for the Special Forces’ actions, boasting that they had “firmly defended the town of Goma” and “succeeded in nipping in the bud all the odious attempts of Wazalendo followers.”[323] He added: “No incident was observed during the [BIA’s deterrence] march except for some material and human damage committed by the followers of the mystical-religious sect.”[324]

Special Forces under Mikombe’s authority also committed crimes at other moments of the day, including unlawful killings during the raid at Wazalendo radio station and committing acts of torture against those they detained (see section 2.4).

Colonel Mikombe was prosecuted for some of these crimes before the North Kivu Military Court. On 2 October, the North Kivu Military Court found Colonel Mikombe guilty of “murder” and “attempted murder” (as the authority who had effective command of troops during the mass killing at the Wazalendo temple), as well as “destruction of armaments”.[325] Colonel Mikombe was sentenced to death, which Amnesty International opposes in all cases. He appealed the verdict.

In response to Amnesty International’s findings, through his lawyer, Mike Mikombe said that the goal of Operation “Keba”, under his command, was not to nip the Wazalendo protest in the bud, but “to dissuade any hostile forces from attempting any kind of infiltration or aggression” into the city of Goma.[326] He referred to the mission as “protecting the town of Goma” and undertaking “a dissuasive patrol through the town (…) to deter any enemy incursion”. He stated that he had found himself at the shrine of the Wazalendo followers “by pure coincidence” after being stopped by another Colonel and asked to accompany him to a location where Wazalendo followers were allegedly kidnapping a police officer. As this investigation has shown, the kidnapping and stoning of the police officer took place following Republican Guard’s actions, notably their overnight assault on the FNJMN radio station, and not the other way around. Regarding the order to open fire, he claimed that his first reaction to hearing weapons being fired was to “Who fired, who fired? Stop firing, stop firing!” a claim Amnesty International has not been able to verify. He further stated: “In its ruling, at the end of the investigation, the North Kivu Military Court shared our opinion that Colonel Mike KALAMBA MIKOMBE did not give an order to fire and, moreover, did not fire[327]This is partly incorrect. Indeed, the North Kivu Military Court did not find that Mike Mikombe fired, however the court did establish that Mike Mikombe was the person who gave the order to fire, which is consistent with what Amnesty International documented. [328]

Amnesty International believes that in the first instance, the trial against Mikombe was inadequate to establish the truth about the full scope of crimes committed for which Mikombe may be held responsible, whether on the basis that he ordered them and/or for his command responsibility. His trial on appeal, or subsequent investigations and proceedings, should ensure that he is investigated for all killings and disappearances which were committed at the protest and possibly for his command responsibility for crimes committed by his troops at the Wazalendo radio station, including the unlawful killings, torture, and ill-treatment. He should be tried by a civilian, competent and impartial court, which should uphold his defence rights and exclude the death penalty.

Major Peter Kabwe Ngandu

Major Peter Kabwe Ngandu is the Special Forces Battalion Commander in Goma. He supervised one battalion of Special Forces in Goma and reported to the Special Forces’ Regiment Commander, who reported to Colonel Mikombe.

Amnesty International found strong evidence that Major Peter Kabwe, Special Forces Battalion Commander in Goma, participated, in person, in the raid which he appeared to lead. Analysis of footage of the assault on Wazalendo temple (see Section 2.2 “Assault on Wazalendo’s Temple”) shows one officer who appeared to be commanding the Special Forces. The individual did not wear a balaclava and was seen carrying a pistol, which is consistent with witness testimony. Through additional interviews, including with three experts knowledgeable about the Republican Guard and its chain of command, as well as open-source intelligence, Amnesty International established that that was Peter Kabwe, a Major and Commander of the 192nd Special Forces Battalion of the Republican Guard/Combined Arms Brigade in Goma.[329] Three eyewitnesses identified him from the footage.[330] One of them said: “This is the man with a pistol who found me where I was hiding in one of the rooms and took me where the other people arrested were sitting. He told us in Swahili: ‘Here you are! You claim that you do not die, that is what we shall see today.’”[331] Another said: “We spent quite a long time with him and his men before they took us outside. He slapped me as he interrogated us. I have absolutely no doubt it is him.”[332]

An official from a different private military company working with the Congolese army told Amnesty International that a Special Forces commander claimed responsibility for the raid on the radio station: “He told me: ‘we eliminated the enemy as described in the Operational Order’, he was all proud as if he had saved Goma.”[333] There is strong evidence that he appeared to lead the Special Forces’ raid at the Wazalendo radio station around 3.00am on 30 August, where at least six people were unlawfully killed, scores injured (see Section 2.1 “Assault on Wazalendo’s Radio Station”) and 11 people arbitrarily arrested and subjected to torture or other ill-treatment. Eyewitnesses from the Wazalendo radio station said he was giving orders to other soldiers and appeared to be reporting to someone via a military communication device (see Section 2.1 “Assault on Wazalendo’s Radio Station”). Through additional interviews, including with three experts knowledgeable about the Republican Guard and their chain of command,[334] as well as open-source intelligence, Amnesty International established that this was Major Peter Kabwe Ngandu, the Special Forces Battalion Commander in Goma.[335] Eyewitnesses from the radio station identified him from the footage as the officer without a balaclava who appeared to lead the raid at the Wazalendo radio station earlier that day.  

Three videos,[336] verified by Amnesty International, also show him later that day, along with his Brigade Commander Colonel Mike Mikombe, present when soldiers shot at protesters, as well as overseeing victims’ bodies and the wounded being dragged and loaded onto the Republican Guard’s trucks. At the time of publication, Major Peter Kabwe had not responded to Amnesty International’s findings, which were detailed to him in a letter on 26 July 2024.[337] 

Amnesty International believes that Major Kabwe Ngandu should be investigated and, if there is sufficient evidence, prosecuted by an independent and impartial civilian court without recourse to the death penalty, for his direct participation, at least in the arbitrary arrests and acts of torture and other ill-treatment committed during the raid at the radio station on 30 August. Further investigations are needed into his possible involvement in unlawful killings committed during the raid and during the protest and/or the covering up of these killings. Pending investigation and prosecution, he should be suspended from command of the Special Forces and any other position within the Congolese defence and security forces.

The massacre in Goma on 30 August, mainly by the Special Forces, was not an unfortunate accident or blunder. It followed an operation planned by Congolese military authorities. It was carried out using abusive powers unlawfully granted to the army under the prolonged “State of Siege” and reflects the tendency of the Congolese authorities to militarize responses to real or perceived security risks.

The immediate context for the massacre was the banning of the Wazalendo protest; a course of action that was expressly urged by MONUSCO. This intervention, calling for the protest to be prohibited, showed a fundamental disregard for the international human rights standards that the UN is supposed to promote. The Wazalendo had already held peaceful protests, including against MONUSCO, between June and August 2023. Amnesty International found no documented evidence supporting claims, including by the UN, that the Wazalendo leaders incited or aimed to sow violence. Rather than exhorting the authorities to prohibit the protest, MONUSCO should have emphasized the presumption of peacefulness and underscored the obligations of the authorities to plan and conduct the policing operation with the objective of facilitating the assembly, to de-escalate any situation that might result in violence, to exhaust non-violent means and avoid the use of force unless absolutely necessary (in compliance with the principles of legality, necessity, proportionality, precaution and non-discrimination) and not to deploy the military to police assemblies.

The army’s deliberate and widespread shooting of protesters on 30 August resulted in at least 56 people unlawfully killed in less than six hours, according to authorities (102 according to a confidential UN report) and may amount to a crime against humanity.

After the massacre, the authorities initially responded by congratulating the army, minimizing the death toll, demonizing the victims, and punishing survivors by arbitrarily detaining them and unfairly prosecuting them. They also prevented families of victims from organizing, sometimes even attending, the burials of their loved ones.

The trial of some army officers that ensued in Goma between 4 September and 2 October 2023, following public outrage, resulted in one commander and three soldiers being found guilty of murder (among other charges), but the investigations were incomplete and did not recognize all victims or bring all perpetrators to account.

This is not the first time that the Congolese army has targeted and committed heinous crimes against the civilian population it is supposed to protect. Authorities should take all necessary measures to ensure effective accountability and justice as a way of preventing this from happening again.

Amnesty International’s recommendations are as follow:

To the President of the Republic:

• Immediately suspend General Constant Ndima and Major Peter Kabwe Ngandu from the Congolese army pending an investigation.
• Issue a presidential decree formally prohibiting the intervention of the Republican Guard, including the Special Forces, in law enforcement operations and specifying the exceptional circumstances and process under which the armed forces, including the Republican Guard, could intervene in law enforcement operations in support of the police, in accordance with international standards.

To the Government:

• Rehabilitate the Wazalendo radio station and temple and ensure that Wazalendo followers can exercise their rights to freedom of religion and peaceful association and assembly without undue hindrance.
• Immediately halt any plans to resume executions of persons sentenced to death, including for those sentenced to death in connection with the 30 August 2023 massacre in Goma, and establish an official moratorium on executions with a view to abolishing the death penalty.

To the Judicial Authorities:

• Immediately release or provide a retrial before civilian courts and in line with fair trial standards to individuals who were convicted for the stoning of the police officer in the absence of any evidence against them.
• Reopen investigations into all killings, including the stoning of a police officer and the unlawful killings of dozens of protestors, enforced disappearances, injuries and other crimes committed on 30 August in Goma, to ensure that flaws of the first investigation are remedied, all victims are accounted for, and all those responsible for these crimes are prosecuted and judged in fair trials before competent, independent and impartial courts without recourse to the death penalty. This should include investigating Lieutenant-General Constant Ndima for his alleged responsibility as a commander, Colonel Mike Mikombe for all his alleged crimes as a perpetrator and a commander, and Major Peter Kabwe Ngandu for his alleged crimes. If there is enough evidence, prosecute them. Where appropriate, request technical assistance from the UN, including OHCHR.
• Reveal the fate or whereabouts of those forcibly disappeared.
• Uphold all victims’ right to adequate, effective, prompt reparations for the harm suffered.

To the Parliament:

• Repeal provisions of the law governing the armed forces that give the military the power to intervene in law enforcement matters during peace times and strengthen legal and parliamentary oversight of their interventions, including during times of war, insurrection, state of emergency and state of siege, in line with relevant international standards.
• Repeal all legal provisions allowing military courts to prosecute civilians or to deal with crimes under international law in any circumstance. Give exclusive jurisdiction to ordinary courts to investigate and prosecute crimes under international law in line with international standards, and provide them with appropriate resources to discharge this task.
• Adopt a resolution calling on the government to establish a moratorium on executions of death row inmates in all circumstances pending the abolition of the death penalty in law.
• Urgently consider the passage of a law abolishing the death penalty in all circumstances.

To the UN Department of Peace Operations:

• Swiftly initiate an independent inquiry into the role played by MONUSCO and its leadership in the events that led to the 30 August 2023 massacre in Goma and make the findings public.
• Provide assurances to ensure accountability and non-repetition.

To the OHCHR and UNJHRO:

• Provide technical assistance for fresh, comprehensive investigations before competent, independent and impartial courts, including forensic and ballistic expertise, as well as post-mortem identification.
• Promptly complete or update, as appropriate, the investigation into the 30 August 2023 army massacre in Goma and make public its findings and recommendations. 

To DRC’s International Partners:

• Publicly call on DRC authorities to investigate the 30 August massacre in Goma swiftly and effectively and to hold all those responsible to account, including investigating General Constant Ndima and Major Peter Kabwe and further investigating Colonel Mike Mikombe.
• Support efforts by Congolese authorities for justice and accountability for crimes under international law and other human rights violations in the DRC, including those aimed at ensuring truth, justice and reparations for victims of the Goma massacre, as well as guarantees of non-recurrence, including legal and policy reforms regarding the right to peaceful protest, policing assemblies, and fair trial rights.
• Where the opportunity arises and where appropriate, consider investigating and prosecuting individuals suspected to be responsible for crimes against humanity or other crimes under international law committed in the DRC under the principle of universal jurisdiction.

The Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC to:

• Consider examining the 30 August 2023 killings in Goma as part of the ongoing investigation into the situation in eastern DRC.