PUBLIC STATEMENT

16 April 2026 ASA 20/0897/2026

SUBMISSION ON DRAFT AMENDMENTS TO THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (INTERMEDIARY GUIDELINES AND DIGITAL MEDIA ETHICS CODE) RULES 2021

Amnesty International welcomes the opportunity to make this submission to the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (hereinafter 'MeitY') on the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Second Amendment Rules, 2026 (hereinafter 'the draft amendments').

This document outlines Amnesty International's key concerns regarding the proposed draft amendments that merit their immediate withdrawal. Since 2021, the Government of India has amended or attempted to amend the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules (hereinafter 'the Rules') multiple times ushering in restrictive executive control over content moderation. The legal framework has progressively become more restrictive, with each successive amendment expanding state control over digital content, increasing compliance burdens on intermediaries[1], and reducing procedural safeguards for users and platforms. It is also important to note that instead of addressing the issues raised by civil society and concerned individuals in ongoing court cases against the previous amendments in which interim orders have or have not been passed, [2] the draft amendments steamroll these concerns. They include the expansion of executive powers to fact-check and classify content; the continued use of vague and overbroad categories of prohibited content; compliance requirements that incentivize over-removal of lawful speech by intermediaries; executive control over content regulation without prior judicial oversight; the dilution of safe harbour protections, effectively turning platforms into enforcement arms of the state; privacy risks arising from continued emphasis on traceability of originator and data retention; and the disproportionate regulation of digital media. Introducing further amendments while these issues remain sub judice raises serious concerns about the absence of meaningful consultation and deliberation.

The draft amendments also run counter to established jurisprudence by Indian courts[3], and international human rights law standards, in particular the right to freedom of expression and opinion and the right to privacy.

1. Extension of Censorship to ordinary users

The proposed changes to Rule 8(1) expand the state's censorship powers over digital content by extending their application from intermediaries and publishers[4] to ordinary users, effectively bringing a wide range of user-generated expression under scrutiny.

The draft amendments substitute the current proviso to Rule 8(1) with the following:

"Provided that for the purposes of rules 14, 15 and 16, the rules made under this Part shall apply to— (a) intermediaries; and (b) news and current affairs content hosted, displayed, uploaded, modified, published, transmitted, stored, updated or shared on the computer resources of the intermediaries by users who are not publishers."

Rules 14, 15 and 16 fall under Part 3 of the Rules which sets out the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting's (hereinafter 'Ministry') "code of ethics and safeguards in relation to digital media".[5] These provisions establish the oversight framework including the constitution of an Inter-Departmental Committee (IDC) and confers powers to act on

[1] Section 2(w) of the Information Technology Act, 2000 defines an intermediary as "any person who on behalf of another person receives, stores or transmits that record or provides any service with respect to that record and includes telecom service providers, network service providers, internet service providers, web-hosting service providers, search engines, online payment sites, online-auction sites, online-market places and cyber cafes"
[2] Kunal Kamra v. Union of India; Software Freedom Law Centre & Others v. Union of India; Foundation for Independent Journalism v. Union of India; WhatsApp LLC v. Union of India; Agij Promotion of Nineteenonea Media Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India and TM Krishna & Ors. v. Union of India, amongst others.
[3] Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, Justice KS Puttaswamy v. Union of India, Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, MySpace Inc v. Super Cassettes Industries Ltd, Kent RO Systems v. Amit Kotak and Kunal Kamra v. Union of India
[4] Rule 2(s) of the Information Technology ((Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 defines publisher as publisher of news and current affairs content or a publisher of online curated content
[5] Part III, Code of Ethics and Safeguards in Relation to Digital Media, The Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, https://www.meity.gov.in/static/uploads/2026/03/824844a3b380467666137d39149ac47e.pdf

grievances relating to digital content, including emergency blocking powers, amongst others. Under the current Rules, the proviso to Rule 8 applies only to "publishers of news and current affairs content" and "publishers of online curated content".[6] Rule 2(m) defines "news and current affairs content" as "newly received or noteworthy content, including analysis, especially about recent events primarily of socio-political, economic or cultural nature, made available over the internet or computer networks, and any digital media shall be news and current affairs content where the context, substance, purpose, import and meaning of such information is in the nature of news and current affairs content."[7] Instead of formulating a sufficiently precise definition, the Rules adopt broad terms such as "noteworthy", "recent events" and "socio-political, economic or cultural nature" which collectively expand the scope of the definition and potentially encompasses all forms of user-generated content. Further extending the definition to all content based on its "context, substance, purpose, import and meaning", the Rules transform it into a catch-all clause leaving ample room for arbitrary application.

The expansion of oversight to non-publishers raises serious concerns under Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which India is a State Party. As clarified by the UN Human Rights Committee, any restriction on freedom of expression must satisfy the requirements of legality, necessity, and proportionality.[8] While addressing misinformation may constitute a legitimate aim, the proposed framework fails the tests of legality, necessity and proportionality.

The use of overbroad categories such as "news and current affairs" does not meet the requirement of "sufficient precision" and risks arbitrary enforcement, contrary to established guidance by the UN Special Rapporteur on promotion and protection of the right of freedom of expression and opinion on content regulation.[9] The measure is also disproportionate, as it applies a regulatory regime designed for professional publishers to individual users, capturing a wide range of ordinary expression. This may include content such as documentation by civil society organisations, commentary by content creators and opinions shared by individuals on current events, which do not pose comparable risks. Notably, this expansion will take place without adequate justification of necessity for such a wide-reaching control over expression.

Further, Rule 16(2) empowers an 'authorised officer' appointed by the Ministry to "examine relevant content" and, where it is found to be of "emergency nature" and falls within the grounds set out in Section 69A(1) of the Information Technology Act (hereinafter 'IT Act'), to direct its blocking without delay and subject to subsequent approval by the Ministry.[10] The Ministry may then order continued blocking of such content, including content posted by an "identified or identifiable person, publisher of intermediary in control of such computer resource hosting such information" without providing the affected party an opportunity to be heard.[11] When read together with increasingly compressed takedown timelines – reportedly reduced to as little as one to three hours[12] – this framework poses a serious risk to the right to freedom of expression. Such restrictions are neither necessary nor proportionate, as they do not represent the least

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[6] Rule 2(t) of The Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 defines "publisher of news and current affairs content' as an online paper, news portal, news aggregator, news agency and such other entity called by whatever name, which is functionally similar to publishers of news and current affairs content but shall not include newspapers, replica e-papers of the newspaper and any individual or user who is not transmitting content in the course of systematic business, professional or commercial activity; Rule 2(u) of The Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021defines publisher of online curated content' as a publisher who, performing a significant role in determining the online curated content being made available, makes available to users a computer resource that enables such users to access online curated content over the internet or computer networks, and such other entity called by whatever name, which is functionally similar to publishers of online curated content but does not include any individual or user who is not transmitting online curated content in the course of systematic business, professional or commercial activity.

[7] Rule 2(m) of The Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, https://www.meity.gov.in/static/uploads/2026/03/824844a3b380467666137d39149ac47e.pdf

[8] UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 34, CCPR/C/GC/34, 12 September 2011, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/english/bodies/hrc/docs/GC34.pdf, paras. 22, 25, 33 and 34

[9] UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, A/HRC/38/35, 6 April 2018, https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/38/35

[10] Rule 16 (2) of The Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021; Section 69A(1) of the Information Technology Act, 2021 – "Power to issue directions for blocking for public access of any information through any computer resource.–(1) Where the Central Government or any of its officers specially authorised by it in this behalf is satisfied that it is necessary or expedient so to do, in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, defence of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to above, it may subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), for reasons to be recorded in writing, by order, direct any agency of the Government or intermediary to block for access by the public or cause to be blocked for access by the public any information generated, transmitted, received, stored or hosted in any computer resource."

[11] Rule 16 (2) of The Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021; In case of emergency nature, the Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting may, if he is satisfied that it is necessary or expedient and justifiable for blocking for public access of any information or part thereof through any computer resource and after recording reasons in writing, as an interim measure issue such directions as he may consider necessary to such identified or identifiable persons, publishers or intermediary in control of such computer resource hosting such information or part thereof without giving him an opportunity of hearing.

[12] Soumyarendra Barik, Indian Express, *Govt considering cutting online content blocking timeline from 2-3 hours to 1 hour*, 24 March 2026, https://indianexpress.com/article/business/exclusive-govt-cutting-online-content-blocking-timeline-1-hour-10598646/

intrusive means of achieving the stated objective and instead incentivise the precautionary removal of lawful speech by platforms to avoid penalties and loss of their safe harbour protection.

Moreover, rapid takedown obligations undermine the ability to assess content in its proper context, including intent and likelihood of harm, as required under international human rights standards such as the Rabat Plan of Action.[13] The absence of procedural safeguards, including the right to be heard, further exacerbates these concerns, particularly for ordinary users who may lack the resources to seek timely legal recourse. In effect, this framework risks transforming intermediaries and state into de facto arbiters of legality and truth.

The UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression has cautioned against imposing broad content moderation obligations on intermediaries and users, noting that such measures incentivize over-removal of lawful content.[14] Taken together, the proposed expansion is not narrowly tailored and fails to meet the requirements of legality, necessity, and proportionality under international human rights law. It must be withdrawn immediately.

2. Lack of Independent or Judicial Oversight

The proposed amendments to sub-rule 2 of Rule 14 empower an inter-ministerial governmental body to adjudicate content moderation and regulation without requiring a complaint. This concentration of powers without independent or judicial oversight raises serious concerns of arbitrary censorship and undermines freedom of opinion and expression.

The draft amendments substitute sub-rule 2 of Rule 14 with:

"The Committee shall meet periodically and hear the matters—

(a) arising out of the grievances relating to violation of the Code of Ethics by the publishers, in respect of the decisions taken at the Level I or II, including the cases where no such decision is taken within the time specified in the grievance redressal mechanism; or

(b) referred to it by the Ministry.

Rule 14 provides for the constitution of IDC comprising representatives from the Ministries of Information and Broadcasting, Women and Child Development, Law and Justice, Home Affairs, Electronics and Information Technology, External Affairs, Defence and other ministries. It may also include 'domain experts' at the discretion of the IDC. Under the current Rules, IDC is empowered to hear matters arising from complaints referred to it by the Ministry regarding violation of the Code of Ethics. However, the draft amendments expand the IDC's jurisdiction by empowering it to act on i) grievances arising from decisions at Level 1 or II, or ii) matters referred to it directly by the Ministry without any complaint.

In effect, the Ministry may refer any matter it deems appropriate to the IDC. Upon such referral, and subject to approval of the Ministry, the IDC is empowered to order deletion or modification of content, issue blocking directions under Section 69A of the IT Act, and impose a range of measures including warnings, censure, admonition, or reprimand.[15] It may also require apologies, mandate disclaimers, or direct modification of content classifications, descriptors, or parental controls.[16] These provisions collectively confer wide-ranging powers to regulate and restrict online content without independent or judicial oversight.

Allowing the Ministry to initiate scrutiny and removal of content without a complaint raises serious concerns regarding lack of independent oversight, particularly in light of the overbroad and vague definition of "news and current affairs" under the Rules. This approach runs counter to the order of Bombay High Court passed in 2021, which stayed the operations of Rules 9(1) and 9(3) of the IT rules that introduced a three-tier grievance redressal mechanism with government oversight.[17] The Madras High Court subsequently endorsed this position, observing that such a mechanism could "rob the

[13] UN Human Rights Council, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the expert workshops on the prohibition of incitement to national, racial or religious hatred, A/HRC/22/17/Add.4, 11 January 2013, para 29, pg. 11, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Rabat_draft_outcome.pdf
[14] UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, A/HRC/38/35, 6 April 2018, paras. 24 to 28, https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/38/35
[15] Rule 14 of The Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021
[16] Rule 14 of The Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021
[17] Bombay High Court, *Agij Promotion of Nineteenonea Media Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India*, 14 August 2021

media of its independence".[18] Despite these judicial findings, the draft amendments appear to reintroduce a similarly placed mechanism by granting government authorities expansive and largely unchecked powers over online content.

These developments raise serious concerns under the right to freedom of expression and opinion guaranteed by the Constitution of India and international human rights law which includes the right to seek, receive, and impart information.[19] The amendments risk adversely affecting any and all individuals engaging in public discourse online. In the stated effort to address misinformation, the framework effectively enables the IDC which is a non-judicial authority to determine what constitutes "fake", "false", or "misleading" information.

Moreover, by allowing the IDC to act without a complaint or identifiable harm, the amendments expand executive discretion in a manner that is unfettered and unpredictable, undermining the principle of legality, necessity and proportionality.[20] The absence of independent or judicial oversight further contravenes international standards, which require that restrictions be subject to independent review.[21] UN Special Rapporteurs have consistently cautioned that state-led monitoring of online content without adequate safeguards risks arbitrary enforcement and the targeting of dissent.[22] Such a framework is likely to result in self-censorship and a chilling effect on legitimate expression.

Overall, the amendment enables broad surveillance and filtering of online expression, including lawful speech that may be critical, controversial, or offensive, but nonetheless protected under the right to freedom of expression. It must be withdrawn immediately.

3. Executive notifications exceeding legal authority

The proposed amendments to sub-rule 4 of Rule 3 make the intermediaries' safe harbour protections contingent on adherence to a broad-range of executive and non-legislative instruments, raising serious concerns of lack of legal certainty, transparency and risks of arbitrary censorship.

The draft amendments insert sub-rule 4 in Rule 3 stating:

"(4) Compliance with Clarifications, Advisories and Directions issued by the Ministry:

(a) An intermediary shall comply with and give effect to any clarification, advisory, order, direction, standard operating procedure, code of practice or guideline issued by the Ministry, by order in writing, in relation to the implementation, interpretation or operationalisation of the requirements prescribed under this Part;

(b) every such clarification, advisory, order, direction, standard operating procedure, code of practice or guideline referred to in clause (a) shall—

(i) be issued in writing;

(ii) clearly specify the statutory provision or legal basis under which it is issued;

(iii) specify the scope, applicability and compliance requirements in respect of the intermediary or class of intermediaries to whom it applies; and

(iv) be consistent with the provisions of the Act and these rules;

(c) compliance with any clarification, advisory, order, direction, standard operating procedure, code of practice or guideline issued under clause (a) shall form part of the due diligence obligations of the intermediary under section 79 of the Act.".

Section 79 of the IT Act provides exemptions from intermediary liability and protects intermediaries from penalties for user-generated content. Under this provision, intermediaries may lose their safe harbour protections if they fail to comply with due diligence requirements, particularly upon receiving notice from the government. The draft amendments expand

[18] Madras High Court, *Digital News Publishers Assn. v. Union of India*, WP No. 13055 of 2021, 16 September 2021
[19] Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India; Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
[20] UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 34, CCPR/C/GC/34, 12 September 2011, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/english/bodies/hrc/docs/GC34.pdf, paras. 22, 25, 34
[21] UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, A/HRC/29/32, 22 May 2015, https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/29/32, para 33
[22] UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, A/HRC/38/35, 6 April 2018, para 49 to 51 and 66

these obligations by requiring intermediaries to comply with "any clarification, advisory, order, direction, standard operating procedure, code of practice or guideline issued by the Ministry" as part of their due diligence.

However, such clarifications, advisories, directions, or guidelines are administrative and executive measures and do not carry the same legal status as statutes or rules adopted through legislative processes, which are subject to parliamentary scrutiny and public consultation. These instruments are not binding laws in the same sense, and making safe harbour protections contingent upon compliance with them raises serious legal concerns. Executive directions are often issued routinely and without transparent safeguards, creating a risk that they may be used to achieve outcomes that would otherwise require formal legal orders accompanied by procedural protections.

The draft amendments also do not clarify whether such notifications must be publicly disclosed. This raises concerns about transparency and accessibility. For instance, regulatory proposals such as the Broadcasting Services (Regulation) Bill, 2023 were circulated among select stakeholders through closed-door consultations, illustrating how policy processes may lack openness.[23] In such circumstances, intermediaries may be required to comply with directions that are not publicly available, imposing an unreasonable and impractical burden. This is likely to incentivise over-compliance and result in the removal of lawful content, particularly where the underlying directives are vague or overbroad.

From the perspective of international human rights law, this framework raises significant concerns. The UN Human Rights Committee has time and again clarified that restrictions on freedom of expression must be "provided by law," meaning they must be formulated with sufficient precision and must not confer unfettered discretion on authorities. Executive notifications that are not subject to parliamentary scrutiny, can be modified at short notice, and lack clear standards do not meet this requirement. The UN Special Rapporteur on promotion and protection of freedom of opinion and expression has similarly warned that regulatory systems based on vague or discretionary executive powers enable arbitrary interference with expression.[24]

The UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression has further cautioned that States should not rely on administrative directives to regulate speech or create systems in which platforms are required to comply with government instructions without independent oversight.[25] While international human rights standards recognise intermediary liability frameworks, they also impose clear limits. Imposing liability or penalties on intermediaries for failing to comply with broad or unclear administrative acts risks transforming intermediaries into "adjudicators of content" and delegating censorship powers to them. If safe harbour protections are made conditional on compliance with ever-changing executive notifications, platforms are likely to remove content proactively to avoid liability, resulting in the over-removal of lawful speech. Therefore, this amendment must be immediately withdrawn.

4. Indefinite data retention

The proposed amendments to sub rule (1) of Rule 3 mandate intermediaries to retain user data for at least 180 days and beyond if required by other laws. This poses a serious threat to right to privacy and risks enabling mass and unlawful surveillance.

The draft amendments insert the following in Rule 3, sub-rule (1):

"(a) in clause (g), before the words, brackets and letter "where upon receiving actual knowledge under clause (d)", the words and punctuation "without prejudice to any requirement relating to the preservation or retention of information applicable to intermediaries under the Act or any other law for the time being in force," shall be inserted.

(b) in clause (h), before the words "where an intermediary collects information from a user for registration on the computer resource", the words and punctuation "without prejudice to any requirement relating to the preservation or retention of information applicable to intermediaries under the Act or any other law for the time being in force," shall be inserted."

[23] Shemin Joy, Deccan Herald, *Centre to prepare fresh draft broadcasting services bill after consultations*, 12 August 2024, https://www.deccanherald.com/india/centre-to-prepare-fresh-draft-broadcasting-services-bill-after-consultations-3147666

[24] UN Human Rights Council, Disinformation and freedom of opinion and expression, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Irene Khan A/HRC/47/25, 13 April 2021, https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/47/25, para 40

[25] UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, A/HRC/38/35, 6 April 2018, para 68

Under the current Rules, intermediaries are mandated to preserve data related to take-downs and user registrations following the user's cancellation or withdrawal of their registration, for a period of at least 180 days. Rule 3(1)(g) also states that intermediaries should retain data for longer if directed by a court or an authorised government agency. Under the draft amendments, the existing 180-day data retention period cannot be used as a legal basis to delete user data if any another law requires the platform to hold it for longer periods. This may include criminal investigations or data retention mandated by other laws or regulations relating to different sectors.

The spirit and language of the amendment does not align with the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 which aims at restricting data retention as opposed to broadening it by requiring the deletion of personal data once the purpose for such collection has been fulfilled.[26] Moreover, the removal of an upper limit on the retention of data including registration details, user content, and activities, including metadata, heightens risks of surveillance, and unauthorised access or data breaches.

This raises concerns under international human rights law, particularly with respect to the right to privacy under Article 17. At the outset, the draft amendment incorporates data retention obligations from "any other law" without specifying scope, limits, or safeguards. This explicit yet open-ended obligation may incentivize data retention beyond what is necessary and proportionate. The UN Human Rights Committee has clarified that interferences with privacy must be provided by law, necessary, and proportionate, and must not be arbitrary.[27] Blanket or open-ended data retention obligations that are not narrowly tailored to a specific and legitimate aim fail this test. By requiring intermediaries to preserve and retain user data irrespective of the context or necessity, the provision risks enabling indiscriminate retention of personal data.

The draft amendment is also particularly problematic because it facilitates the creation of large-scale data repositories that may be accessed by state authorities under various legal frameworks. The UN Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy and the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression have both warned that mandatory data retention regimes significantly increase the risk of mass surveillance, as they enable authorities to retrospectively access detailed user information without adequate safeguards or prior judicial authorisation.[28] In the absence of clear limits, oversight mechanisms, and transparency requirements, such retention obligations can be used to monitor individuals' online activities, associations, and communications.

Further, the lack of clarity regarding applicable laws and safeguards creates legal uncertainty for intermediaries, who may respond by adopting overly cautious compliance practices. This can result in excessive retention of user data and increased cooperation with government requests, thereby amplifying surveillance risks.

The draft amendment also has implications for freedom of expression. The knowledge that user data is retained indefinitely and may be accessed by authorities can create a chilling effect, discouraging individuals from engaging in lawful speech, particularly on sensitive or political issues. The UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression has emphasised that surveillance measures, including data retention, must not be used in ways that deter individuals from exercising their right to seek, receive, and impart information.[29]

In sum, the proposed insertions introduce a broad and undefined obligation to retain user data that is neither necessary nor proportionate, lacks adequate safeguards, and risks enabling mass or arbitrary surveillance. Without clear limitations, independent oversight, and strict necessity requirements, such provisions are inconsistent with international human rights standards on privacy and freedom of expression. Therefore, the draft amendment must be immediately withdrawn.

Taken together, these amendments will institutionalize sweeping executive control over online expression, facilitate arbitrary censorship and mass surveillance while eroding the principles of legality, necessity and proportionality. By expanding an already overbroad regulatory framework, they risk silencing lawful speech and deterring public discourse

[26] Section 4, 6 and 8 of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023

[27] UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 16 on Article 17 (Right to Privacy), The Right to Respect of Privacy, Family, Home and Correspondence, and Protection of Honour and Reputation, https://www.refworld.org/legal/general/hrc/1988/27539

[28] UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, A/HRC/29/32, https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/29/32, 22 May 2015, para 55; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy, A/HRC/34/60, https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/34/60, 6 September 2017, para 16, 17, 18, 20 and 25; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, The right to privacy in Digital Age, A/HRC/27/37, https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/27/37, 30 June 2014, para 26

[29] UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La Rue, A/HRC/23/40, 17 April 2013, paras 39-40 and 65-67

that is essential for an open and rights-respecting society. The Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology must immediately withdraw these amendments and bring the Rules in line with India's international human rights obligations.