

**SPAIN:**  
**REPORT OF SEMINAR**  
**“POLICE COMPLAINTS**  
**INVESTIGATION**  
**MECHANISMS IN THE**  
**SPANISH CONTEXT”**

**MADRID, 17 OCTOBER 2008**

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# INTRODUCTION

For several years Amnesty International has been investigating and reporting on allegations of torture, ill-treatment, and other human rights abuses committed by law enforcement officials in European Union countries, including Spain. This research has identified the lack of independent investigation of complaints against law enforcement officials as a crucial factor in cases where those responsible for wrongdoing are not brought to account effectively. This in turn creates a climate of impunity which encourages misconduct to continue, and creates suspicion and distrust between the public at large and the law enforcement agencies.

Amnesty International, along with the Council of Europe Committee for the Prevention of Torture, the UN Special Rapporteur on torture, and other expert human rights bodies, recommend the creation of independent police<sup>1</sup> complaints commissions – operating separately from the internal affairs departments of the law enforcement agencies and public prosecutors or investigating judges - to tackle this problem. Such bodies already exist in different formats in a number of countries and Amnesty International believes that such a mechanism could also be beneficial in Spain.

The purpose of this seminar was to bring together representatives of existing police complaints mechanisms, expert human rights bodies, academics, law enforcement agencies, and government authorities to share technical expertise on independent police accountability mechanisms and consider how such an institution could be established and operate in Spain. Specifically, the seminar aimed to:

- Help identify and understand different models for investigating police complaints already implemented in other countries;
- Consider the fundamental principles, criteria and requirements for such investigations to be considered effective; and
- Identify possibilities for the implementation of an independent police complaints commission in Spain.

*This document is intended to provide a summary record of the presentations and discussions which took place during the seminar. The views expressed are not necessarily shared by Amnesty International.*

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<sup>1</sup> The terms “law enforcement official” and “police” are used interchangeably in this document. In either case, the reference is to all officers of the law who exercise police powers, especially the powers of arrest or detention, including police forces responsible to military authorities (e.g. the Civil Guard).

# LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

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# 1ST SESSION- INTERNATIONAL POLICE COMPLAINTS MECHANISMS

## SPEAKERS:

Anneke Osse (Amnesty International - Netherlands)

Maneer Afsar (Head of Casework, Independent Police Complaints Commission - UK)

See presentations attached in appendix.

## MODERATOR:

Álvaro Gil-Robles, former Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights

**The first session concentrated on providing examples of independent police complaints mechanisms which currently exist outside of Spain.**

**Anneke Osse** began by considering the principle of accountability in law enforcement. Law enforcement agencies are granted substantial powers, including the power to use force. In order to operate effectively they must have discretion in how they use these powers, but they must always be exercised in the public interest – independent accountability mechanisms<sup>2</sup> ensure that these powers are not abused. They also ensure that the police do not become politicized – “the armed wing of the state” - or used by one sector of society against another.

The police are internally accountable and accountable to their own hierarchy. They are also accountable to the Ministry of Interior, the judiciary and parliament and should be accountable to public wishes as well. Independent accountability mechanisms are necessary to ensure that none of these influences outbalances the others or becomes too powerful.

There are common myths surrounding the need for independent accountability mechanisms. Some argue that independent accountability mechanisms are not needed because there is an independent judiciary which can examine complaints. However, in practice prosecutors and investigating judges work closely together with law enforcement agencies during the course of their work. This means they cannot be considered fully independent when investigating this type of complaint.

Another argument against independent police accountability mechanisms is that the internal

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<sup>2</sup> Anneke Osse’s presentation related to independent mechanisms which have the power to examine individual complaints but also a broader mandate to oversee the law enforcement agencies and their work in general (for example, their budget and policies).

police hierarchy is sufficient for addressing misconduct and complaints against police officers. However, evidence shows that this is not true as police forces often try to cover up incidents of wrong doing as they reflect badly on the body as a whole. Consequently, misconduct or poor procedures are not corrected effectively.

Some people argue that accountability is an “anglosaxon” concept which is not relevant in other jurisdictions. This is not true. The concept of accountability is relevant and important in all social and legal contexts. Examples were given of independent police complaints mechanisms in different contexts, including the Netherlands Police Complaints Commission, the Belgian “Committee P”, the Northern Ireland Police ombudsperson, the Independent Police Complaints Commission in England and Wales, and the El Salvador ombudsperson. Each of these bodies has different powers and a slightly different mandate, but each one provides some degree of independent accountability for the law enforcement agencies of that country.

**Maneer Afsar** introduced the work of the Independent Police Complaints Commission for England and Wales (IPCC). The IPCC became operational in 2004, replacing the Police Complaints Authority. Incidents such as the Brixton riots (1981) and the investigation into the murder of Stephen Lawrence (1993) had led to a loss of public trust in the police. The purpose of the IPCC was to restore confidence via independent accountability of the police.

The IPCC is headed by a team of Commissioners. To ensure their independence, commissioners can never have been previously employed by the police. There are 382 members of staff, including 130 independent investigators in a total of five regional sites. The IPCC monitors 43 regional police forces as well as customs and revenue staff and border agency (immigration) staff. Its budget for 2007-08 was £35m.

The majority of complaints against police officers are investigated by the relevant police force itself with no involvement from the IPCC unless the complainant appeals against the decision of the internal investigation. However, all serious complaints must be investigated by the IPCC. These include all incidents where someone has died or been seriously injured following direct or indirect contact with the police; serious assault; criminal behaviour; cases aggravated by discrimination and those involving serious corruption.

The police can choose to send a case to the IPCC for investigation if it relates to a matter which could have an impact on public confidence in the police due to its sensitive nature, for example, a case which relates to anti-terrorism legislation. In addition, the IPCC can take over the handling of a complaint on its own initiative if it considers necessary, or manage the investigation of a complaint being handled by the police. The IPCC also conducts audits of complaints dealt with by the police, to ensure they are dealt with appropriately. There are many different levels of involvement possible for the IPCC in handling complaints, depending on the gravity of the allegations.

Wherever evidence is uncovered of possible criminal acts, the IPCC sends these on for criminal prosecution.

A committee on “learning the lessons” has been established to encourage feedback from the findings of individual investigations across the police service, in order to improve policy and



practice in future.

Commitment from the police force is essential for the IPCC to work effectively. Some police officers are suspicious of the IPCC and uncooperative but many, particularly at senior levels, recognise the benefits its offers.

Maneer Afsar also briefly introduced the work of the international network for police oversight practitioners (INIOP), of which the IPCC is a member. This network aims to promote independent oversight of policing and develop minimum standards for such work. It provides a forum for sharing experience and best practice and helps countries in setting up or reviewing accountability mechanisms. It produces a regular newsletter for members. Further information is available at [iniop.secretariat@ipcc.gsi.gov.uk](mailto:iniop.secretariat@ipcc.gsi.gov.uk).

In the **debate** following the presentations, one participant questioned whether mechanisms such as the IPCC were genuinely independent. This may be a particular issue in regions affected by tense political divisions. In response it was argued that independence is about perception. The advantage of having a multitude of actors involved in accountability of policing is that each one counterbalances the others, preventing any one interest from becoming dominant.

Álvaro Gil-Robles commented that the existing ombudsperson (Defensor del Pueblo) has some of the powers recommended for an independent police complaints mechanism and therefore it would not be recommendable to duplicate the investigatory mechanisms. He suggested that it would be better to enhance the ombudsperson's role to this end, rather than create a new body. Some participants felt that the ombudsperson as an institution was not sufficiently specialized; it lacked the core mandate and full operative powers to carry effective investigations; it lacked a demonstrable history through its existence of carrying prompt and thorough investigations into allegations of police human right violations (with noticeable exceptions); and is not fully equipped to fulfil these specific tasks.

# 2ND SESSION- FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE POLICE COMPLAINTS MECHANISMS

## SPEAKERS:

Ales Butala (Council of Europe Committee for the Prevention of Torture, CPT)

Lauri Sivonen (Office of the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights)

## MODERATOR:

Rachel Taylor (Amnesty International)

**The second session focused on identifying the fundamental criteria for an effective police complaints mechanism.**

**Ales Butala** noted that the Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) has on many occasions stressed the importance of the existence of effective mechanisms for examining complaints against the police as a preventive measure against ill-treatment. Such mechanisms must both be, and be seen to be, independent and impartial and should be properly funded and have adequate powers.

The CPT considers that investigations of complaints against the police should be entrusted to an agency which is demonstrably independent of the police. It is essential that the persons responsible for carrying out such investigations are independent from those implicated in the events, so investigating officials should not be from the same service as those who are the subject of the investigation, nor answerable to the same hierarchical superior as the officers against whom a complaint has been lodged. Ideally, those entrusted with the operational conduct of the investigation should be completely independent from the agency implicated.

However, combating ill-treatment and impunity must begin within the law enforcement agency itself - an external system for investigating complaints of police misconduct should not undermine the internal disciplinary system within the police. Disciplinary culpability of the officials concerned should be systematically examined irrespective of whether the misconduct in question is found to constitute a criminal offence.

Regardless of the formal structure of the investigation agency, its functions should be properly publicized. It should be possible for complainants to lodge a complaint directly with the agency and it should be mandatory for all law enforcement agencies to register with the agency all complaints they receive which could fall within its mandate. If, in a given case, there is reason to believe the misconduct alleged could constitute a criminal act the investigation agency should always notify the competent prosecutorial authorities. In criminal investigations, prosecutorial authorities must supervise the operational conduct of an investigation into possible ill-treatment by public officials closely and actively. When prosecutors decide to close an investigation into complaints against the police, they should give reasons for their decision.

An investigation into possible ill-treatment by law enforcement officials must be thorough. It must be capable of determining whether force used was justified under the circumstances, and be able to lead to the identification of those involved. All reasonable steps must be taken to secure evidence concerning the incident, including interviews with all alleged victims, suspects and eyewitnesses and gathering of forensic evidence. The investigation must be prompt and reasonably expeditious.

In order to ensure accountability in practice as well as theory, an effective investigation must include a sufficient element of public scrutiny. The victim (or the victim's family, in the event of a fatal incident) must be involved in the procedure to the extent necessary to safeguard their legitimate interests.

Finally, for an investigation to be truly effective, it must result in appropriate and adequate sanctions (both disciplinary and criminal) in cases when ill-treatment has been proven. Such sanctions have a dissuasive effect and help to prevent future incidents of torture or other ill-treatment.

**Lauri Sivonnen** reported that the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights held a workshop on police complaints mechanisms in May 2008. An opinion on relevant principles for effective and independent investigations is due to be published by the Commissioner in 2009.

It should be recalled that independent police complaints mechanisms not only criticize police officers, but can also exonerate them of false or controversial allegations. This ends suspicion over their actions and improves relations with the public. When mistakes or misconduct are revealed during investigations, this can improve policy and practice in the future. Such mechanisms clearly offer a great benefit to police forces.

According to jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights, there are five fundamental principles for the investigation of allegations of human rights violations by law enforcement officials with reference to Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. These are:

Independence – there should be institutional, hierarchical and practical independence between those investigating allegations and the police force accused. However, some tasks of the investigation may be shared with law enforcement agencies, depending on the gravity of the allegations.

Adequacy – the investigation should be capable of gathering evidence to establish the truth regarding the incident, determine whether police behaviour was unlawful, and identify those responsible. Investigators should take statements, look for witnesses, interview the accused, and gather forensic and medical evidence. No evidence should be accepted unquestioningly or disregarded without proper consideration. The rights of the accused officers must also be respected with regard for due process safeguards.

Promptness – investigations should be expeditious. Delays can lead to the loss of evidence. Failure to act promptly gives the impression of a reluctance to investigate or even a collusion to hide evidence. It is also unfair on the accused officers for the procedure to be prolonged.

Victim involvement and public scrutiny – required as necessary to ensure the victim's interest are safeguarded. Some elements of the investigation may need to be confidential, but all decisions and reasoning must be distributed and made available to the victim. The results of the investigation should be open to the public. Victim support and counselling should be provided, as well as legal advice and representation where relevant.

Independent police complaints mechanisms can be part of a national ombudsperson or another body, but a general ombudsperson may lack sufficient resources to encompass this role. There are advantages and disadvantages to such a structure operating at a national vs. regional level. Sufficient funding is essential. The mechanism should be representative of society at large and consult regularly with relevant stakeholders (e.g. NGOs, prosecutors).

In the **debate** following the presentations, an example was given of the police complaints mechanism in Northern Ireland which has recruited police officers from other countries to act as investigators. This has the benefit of demonstrating both clear independence from any law enforcement agencies which could be implicated in a complaint, and the advantage of expert, professional knowledge of policing matters.

One participant noted that lack of trust in the investigations of police internal affairs departments is shared by both the public and law enforcement officials themselves. This makes their role very difficult and could be an argument in favour of an independent complaints mechanism. However, some participants felt that investigators external to the law enforcement agencies could never fully understand the reality of police work and therefore could not investigate complaints properly.

Regarding transparency of investigations and the involvement of the complainant, one participant commented that during disciplinary investigations of complaints against lawyers, the complainant is kept informed at every stage. The lack of information on the outcomes of internal police investigations is problematic because it leads complainants and the public to believe there is impunity for police officers, even if this may not be the case.

Another participant reported that in their police force a bimonthly magazine is published which includes information on outcomes of internal investigations, but this magazine is not available to the public. A participant from another police force stated that no information from the internal affairs department is made public, except via parliamentary questions. It was suggested that making this information public could be beneficial. Other participants reiterated that publicizing outcomes of investigations and sanctions is crucial for ending

impunity and impressions of impunity.

Some participants commented that the role of the general ombudsperson (Defensor del Pueblo) or autonomous community-level ombudspersons is essentially to promote human rights rather than to investigate individual complaints. Consequently, they felt that the ombudsperson was not an appropriate body to fulfil the role of an independent police complaints commission.

# 3RD SESSION – THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AN INDEPENDENT POLICE COMPLAINTS MECHANISM IN SPAIN

## SPEAKER:

Santiago Ripol Carulla (Legal adviser. Spanish Constitutional Court. Senior Lecturer of Public International Law. Pompeu Fabra University, -Barcelona)

## MODERATOR:

Carlos Villán

**The final session concentrated on how an independent police complaints mechanism could fit into the current Spanish constitutional and legal systems.**

**Santiago Ripol Carulla** reiterated that international human rights bodies had expressed concern at the lack of adequate investigation of complaints of torture and other ill-treatment in Spain and had recommended the creation of an independent police complaints investigation mechanism. The European Court of Human Rights has condemned Spain for the inadequate investigation of complaints of torture and other ill-treatment (see *Martínez Sala v. Spain*, 2004). This jurisprudence has been reiterated by the Spanish Constitutional Court (see for example Constitutional Court sentences 224/2007, 34/2008).

Spain was taking positive measures towards tackling this problem, through ratification of the optional protocol to the UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT). However, an independent police complaints mechanism should be a separate body to the national preventive mechanism (NPM) foreseen in OPCAT, as their mandates are different: the role of the NPM is to conduct regular preventive inspections, whereas the role of an investigatory mechanism would be to examine individual complaints concerning specific incidents. It was reiterated that an independent police complaints mechanism would not replace the role of the judiciary or criminal justice system but rather would complement it.

There was no reason why an independent police complaints mechanism could not be created

within the current constitutional system. Such a body could be created in the form of a specialized police ombudsperson at national level or a specific ombudsperson for each police force (national and autonomous level).

In the **debate** that followed the presentation, it was generally felt that individual ombudsperson for each police force would be preferable as these would be closer to both the citizen and the relevant law enforcement agency. Villán and others expressed the view that the existing ombudsperson (Defensor del Pueblo) and autonomous community level equivalents have the capacity to investigate allegations of torture and other ill-treatment but lack powers to institute reparation and are therefore not adequate to fulfil the recommendations of international bodies mentioned previously. Villán insisted on the necessity for the creation –in law- of an independent police complaint mechanism adequately staffed. Villán also highlighted that such a mechanism should not be the same body as the National Preventive Mechanism created in line with the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture (OPCAT).

It was noted that higher level courts have repeatedly ordered lower courts to reopen inadequate investigations into allegations of torture and other ill-treatment but there was still a strong tendency for this type of case to be closed at an early stage. It was noted that the heavy workload of the investigating judges and prosecutors and insufficient resources can make effective investigations difficult. Furthermore, in cases of allegations against law enforcement officials, the inequality of arms between the complainant and the law enforcement agencies must be recognised. An independent police complaints mechanism would not replace the powers of the investigating judge or prosecutor but help address the difficulties they face by increasing the resources and specialization available for investigating this type of complaint.

# CONCLUSIONS

David Díaz-Jogeix (Deputy Director – Europe and Central Asia Programme, Amnesty International Secretariat)

David Díaz-Jogeix thanked the speakers, moderators and participants for their contributions to the seminar. A variety of views had been expressed on the need for independent police complaints commissions, and what format such bodies could or should take. Most participants seemed to recognize the benefits of some form of investigation mechanism independent of the law enforcement agencies and criminal justice system. Further examination of the powers of the existing national and autonomous community ombudspersons and possibilities is necessary to identify if, with reform, these bodies could fulfil the role of independent police complaints commissions. Greater transparency on the part of internal police investigations into allegations of misconduct, including human rights violations, would improve accountability.


Amnesty International hopes to continue working in collaboration with the relevant authorities to design and implement an effective independent police complaints commission in Spain. The organization believes such a mechanism would help to reduce incidents of human rights violations by law enforcement officials and improve public confidence in the law enforcement agencies.



# ANNEXES AND SOURCE OF FURTHER INFORMATION

## POWERPOINT PRESENTATIONS

Speaker: Anneke Osse Anneke Osse (Amnesty International - Netherlands)





## Misconceptions

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- Internal police hierarchy is enough
- We already have (internal) mechanisms for receiving and dealing with complaints
- Disciplinary procedures
- Ministry control is sufficient
- We don't need independent complaints bodies as the judiciary are independent
- Accountability is an Anglosaxon institution that doesn't match our reality

Dia 2



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## Basic Assumptions

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- People have a right to security
- State is responsible for security
- Police prime State organ in this field
- Police are to work in the public interest
- For that police need some operational independence

Dia 3



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# Accountability


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Effective police accountability requires:

4 areas:	2 aspects:
1. Internal	A. A priori
2. To the State	B. A posteriori
3. Public	and Ongoing
4. Independent	

It's all about finding the right balance between different players!

Dia 6






# Accountability

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- Both individual officer and police institution
- *A posteriori* and *a priori*
- Internal and external
- Multiple actors keeping each other in balance

Dia 7





Public interest


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Is it best served by the State  
Or by the public?

We have to find a balance  
And add an independent mechanism

Dia 9


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
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Some will say:  
*"We already have an independent judiciary, and/or an ombudsman, why add another entity?"*

Dia 10



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1. Internal accountability

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- Internal police hierarchy: line of command providing a continuous oversight process
- Reporting procedures
- Mechanisms for receiving and dealing with complaints
- Disciplinary procedures
- Criminal procedures
- Whistle blowing

Dia 11



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2. Accountability to the State  
*a. Executive*

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
In most countries:

- National Chief of Police reports to the Minister (who in turn reports to parliament)
- Ministry formulates
  - Policy guidelines
  - Codes of Conduct
  - Codes of Discipline
  - Standard Operational Procedures
- Police Inspectorates

Dia 12



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2. Accountability to the State  
*b. Legal/ Judiciary*

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- Legal framework:
  - Criminal Code, Criminal Procedures Code, Police Act
  - Ethical and disciplinary codes etc
  - Sometimes: security legislation
- Judicial authorities, incl. Independence of judge
  - For overseeing police actions, eg criminal investigations
  - When police are under investigation themselves

Dia 13



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## 2. Accountability to the State *c. Legislative*

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- Parliaments pass legislation defining police functions & powers
- MPs may question members of the government
- *Ad hoc* parliamentary committees
- Review and approve police budget

Dia 14



## 3. Public accountability

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- Community responsiveness
  - Community Policing
  - Direct public / police interactions
  - Sometimes; Community Boards
- Media
- NGOs (victims and human rights NGOs)
- Academics

Dia 15







4. Independent Oversight Mechanisms


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- General: National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs), such as Ombudsman (based on *Paris principles*)
- Police specific oversight bodies
- Looking at broad overall picture
- Give recommendations (request; own initiative)
- Investigate individual complaints

Dia 16



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Criteria for independent oversight mechanisms

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- Funded by the executive and authorised by law but must be independent and impartial
- Mandate "as broad as possible" (*Paris Principles*)
- Adequate powers to investigate complaints and human rights violations & ensure remedial action is taken (make recommendations and monitor implementation), refer results to judicial bodies
- Individual cases and wider patterns, find root causes and persistent problems
- Sufficient resources & highly skilled staff

Dia 17



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## Examples in different countries

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Accusatorial:

- UK: IPCC
- Northern-Ireland: Police Ombudsman

Inquisitorial:

- Netherlands: Police Complaints Commissions
- Belgium: Comitee P

Dia 18



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## Netherlands

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- Complaints are handled by (regional) **Police Complaints Commissions**, accountable to the 'Regional Board of Mayors'
- Detention facilities are inspected (unannounced) by (regional) **Police Detention Oversight Commissions**, accountable to the 'Regional Board of Mayors'
- Serious misconduct: **State Police Agency**, operating under the (national) Office of the Procurator. The OoP decides on prosecution or refers for disciplinary action
- **National Ombudsman**: also investigates police complaints (in 2007: 8,3% were complaints re police)
- There is no independent police specific oversight body

Dia 19



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Speaker: Maneer Afsar (Head of Casework, Independent Police Complaints Commission - UK)




**An Introduction to the work of the IPCC**  
**MANEER AFSAR**  
**Head of Casework**

**A Brief History of Police Accountability in England**

1829	Sir Robert Peel founds Metropolitan Police
1929	Royal Commission – DPP investigator recommendation
1976	Police Complaints Board established
1981	Brixton riots
1984	Police Complaints Authority set up
1993	Murder of Stephen Lawrence
1997	Home Affairs Select Committee
2004	IPCC becomes operational





**Key Facts**

The IPCC is led by a team of Commissioners who are appointed for terms of 3 to 5 years. They cannot have ever been previously employed by the police.

Chair is appointed by the Queen.


382 staff, including 120 independent investigators operating from 5 regional sites.

43 Home Office forces, HMRC and UKBA officers with police officers, and other Non-Home Office forces under remit.

Covering 141,892 police officers, 14,021 special constables and 75,178 police staff.

Budget of £35m in 2007/08.





### Types of referral

#### Mandatory Referral...



There is a statutory duty for the police to refer to the IPCC incidents where persons have died or been seriously injured following direct or indirect contact with the police and there is reason to believe that the contact may have caused or contributed to the death or serious injury. The police must also refer complaints and conduct matters that include serious assault, criminal behaviour, cases aggravated by discrimination and those involving serious corruption.

#### Voluntary referral . . .

Where there is serious concern of impact on public confidence; complaints relating to use of anti-terrorism legislation for example.





#### Call-in Power . . .

The IPCC has the power to call in particular cases of concern or sensitivity which might not otherwise be referred to the IPCC




## IPCC Guardianship

### Guardianship

-  Setting, monitoring, inspecting and reviewing standards
-  Promoting confidence in the complaints system
-  Ensuring accessibility of the complaints system
-  Drawing out and feeding back learning

## Deaths during or following police contact



**ipcc**  
independent  
police complaints  
commission

## LEARNING THE LESSONS

- A multi-agency committee established to disseminate and promote learning across the police service.
- Designed to encourage forces to ask “Could it happen here ?”
- Members of the committee include:
  - Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO)
  - Association of Police Authorities (APA)
  - Home Office
  - Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC)
  - National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA)
  - Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC)
- Produces quarterly bulletins that are distributed to a variety of key stakeholders and include anonymised cases with a range of practical and policy recommendations with both a local and national focus.



**I N I O P**

### Introducing INIOP

A new international network for police oversight practitioners



### **Aims of the network**

The network has three core aims:

- Championing oversight of policing and setting minimum standards for oversight.
- Helping oversight professionals build capacity in their own countries by providing a forum for sharing learning and best practice.
- Supporting countries engaged in setting up or reviewing oversight mechanisms, or supporting those that come under political pressure which threatens their independence.

**I N I O P**

### **Global networking and partnerships**

Our approach to developing the network is shaped by six core principles . .

- Working in partnership with existing regional networks to strengthen and promote international cooperation and cross-fertilisation between oversight practitioners, academics and interested parties.
- Working to map existing oversight structures, and areas of development activity.
- Providing a store for knowledge, information and expertise.
- Working internationally to champion effective oversight, police accountability and minimum standards.
- Building a steering group whose composition reflects the diverse range of oversight bodies working internationally.

**I N I O P**

### Keeping in touch

The steering group produces a regular e-newsletter to keep people up to date with the latest developments in INIOP . . .



Email [iniop.secretariat@ipcc.gsi.gov.uk](mailto:iniop.secretariat@ipcc.gsi.gov.uk) to join the mailing list.

**I N I O P**

**i** **ipcc**  
independent  
police complaints  
commission

[www.ipcc.gov.uk](http://www.ipcc.gov.uk)

### USEFUL LINKS

- AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, **Spain: Adding insult to injury: The effective impunity of police officers in cases of torture and other ill-treatment** - Index Number: EUR 41/006/2007, 14 November 2007, London, available at <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/EUR41/006/2007>

- AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, **Case studies: France: The Search for Justice**, Index Number: EUR 21/007/2005, 6 April 2005, available at <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/EUR21/007/2005/en>
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- AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL SWITZERLAND, **Pour une police respectueuse des droits humains**, June 2007, available at [www.amnesty.ch/fr/themes/les-violations-des-droits-humains-en-suisse/download-rapport-police/Resume\\_rapport\\_police\\_def.pdf](http://www.amnesty.ch/fr/themes/les-violations-des-droits-humains-en-suisse/download-rapport-police/Resume_rapport_police_def.pdf)
- OSSE, ANNEKE, **Understanding Policing: A resource for human rights activists**, Amnesty International Netherlands, 2006, available at [http://www.amnesty.nl/bibliotheek\\_vervolg/police\\_and\\_human\\_rights](http://www.amnesty.nl/bibliotheek_vervolg/police_and_human_rights)
- COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Expert Workshop **Police complaints mechanisms: ensuring independence and effectiveness**, COMMDH(2008)16, 20 June 2008, available at <https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1312959&Site=CM&BackColorInternet=9999CC&BackColorIntranet=FFBB55&BackColorLogged=FFAC75>

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