

EAST TIMOR @Who Is To Blame?

Statement Before the UN
Special Committee on Decolonization - July 1994

Mr Chairman,

Each year for the past decade Amnesty International has come before this Committee to articulate its concern about human rights in East Timor. Each year our criticism has been directed principally toward the Government of Indonesia whose policies and practices have been directly responsible for systematic human rights violations in the territory for almost twenty years. This year we feel compelled to break with tradition: we address our remarks today not only to the Government of Indonesia, but also to member states of the United Nations (UN) who, in our view, share responsibility - both direct and indirect - for the long-standing human rights problem in East Timor.

Speaking before this Committee last year, we welcomed the passing of a resolution on East Timor at the 49th session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, and we expressed the hope that member states of the UN would continue to press the Indonesian Government to carry out the concrete recommendations contained in that resolution. We believed that by doing so, and by insisting that the government abide by international human rights standards, UN member states could contribute significantly to an improvement of the human rights situation in the territory.

Sadly, in the year and a half since the 1993 resolution was passed, the international community has effectively turned its back on the reality of systematic human rights violations in East Timor. It has accepted uncritically Indonesian Government promises of commitment to human rights and "political openness". The emptiness of those promises has been brought home in recent weeks with the banning of three of the country's leading news magazines, and by the use of repressive measures - including arbitrary detention and ill-treatment - to suppress those who have had the courage to speak out against them.¹ Such measures may have come as a surprise to those eager to believe the government's blandishments about the new climate of "openness" - but they are nothing new to most East Timorese. Speaking in September 1993, the Catholic Bishop of East Timor, Dom Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, put it this way:

People are not allowed the possibility to speak differently, to hold a different opinion...they are also denied the fundamental right to express what they would like to be politically.... The military say they don't beat anyone, that they respect the people, that they work for the prosperity of the people. But for me it is a pure lie. From 1983 till now I have heard only lies from them.²

¹ For details see Amnesty International document, *Free Speech Protesters Detained and Beaten* (ASA 21/27/94) June 1994.

² From an Interview with *Timor Link*, September 1993.

Many governments, while publicly professing concern over human rights in East Timor, have continued to supply military equipment to Indonesia - equipment which could be used to commit human rights violations. Others have provided military training to, or have conducted joint exercises with, Indonesian armed forces' units well known for human rights abuse. And while some governments have linked economic assistance to human rights performance, most aid donors have steadily increased their level of aid to Indonesia.³ Nor have expressions of concern for human rights had any noticeable impact on trading patterns. The willingness of foreign governments to conduct "business as usual" sends a clear signal that human rights take second place to economic interest.

The lack of concerted pressure from the international community has contributed to the perpetuation of a pattern of systematic human rights abuse in East Timor in the past year. Torture and ill-treatment have continued to be the centre-piece of a strategy for silencing real and suspected political opponents and for extracting political intelligence through intimidation and coercion. Extrajudicial executions have continued to be reported, while the fate of those killed or "disappeared" in past years has yet to be clarified. Following a well-established pattern, hundreds of alleged political opponents have been arbitrarily detained within the past year, and at least 26 are now serving terms of up to life imprisonment following unfair political trials.

Despite its stated commitment to the protection of human rights, the Indonesian Government has done little to investigate past violations, and has failed to take significant measures to prevent their future occurrence. Military authorities continue to dominate the government and to operate with considerable autonomy in East Timor, with scant regard to human rights concerns. With rare exceptions, the perpetrators of human rights crimes have not been brought to justice. And, notwithstanding repeated government claims of increased openness, access to East Timor remains limited.

The weakness of the international posture toward Indonesia was epitomized by the Consensus statement read by the Chair of the UN Commission on Human Rights in March of this year.⁴ Despite the fact that the Indonesian Government had failed utterly to implement any of the concrete recommendations made in previous resolutions - in particular the Commission's 1993 resolution - the Consensus statement praised the government for unspecified "positive measures" it had taken toward the protection of human rights. The dangers inherent in such a weak statement have been grimly illustrated by evidence of continuing human rights violations in the past year. Indeed, far from encouraging the Indonesian authorities to improve their human rights practice - as some government claimed it would do - the Consensus statement appears only to have encouraged them to preserve the status quo.

In Amnesty International's view, the Commission's statement was defective in four important respects. First, it made no mention of the problem of torture and ill-treatment of political detainees,

³ In the three years since the Santa Cruz massacre, the Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI), a development aid consortium which meets annually to agree bilateral and multilateral assistance to Indonesia, has consistently increased its total disbursement.

⁴ See Appendix I for the full text of the statement.

despite the fact that the systematic use of torture continued - and that specific incidents of torture were reported by Amnesty International - even as the Commission met.⁵ Also shocking was the Commission's failure to mention the recommendations made by the UN Special Rapporteur on torture following his visit to East Timor and Indonesia in late 1991.⁶ More than two years after that visit, the Indonesian authorities had begun to implement only one of those recommendations. The Commission's failure to refer explicitly to torture, or to the Special Rapporteur's recommendations, has helped to ensure that nothing has changed; as the evidence appended to this statement demonstrates, torture continues in East Timor.

Second, in its reference to East Timorese political prisoners, the Consensus statement conspicuously avoided mentioning that more than thirty people have been imprisoned in the past three years for their non-violent political activities or beliefs - including at least nine in the past year alone. It also failed to note that several hundreds of other alleged critics or opponents of Indonesian rule in East Timor have been subjected to short-term arbitrary detention without charge or trial in recent years. Instead, it called lamely upon the Indonesian Government to ensure that prisoners would be "treated humanely", that their rights would be "fully respected". The Commission appeared not to recognize that arbitrary detention is fundamentally inconsistent with the principles of humane treatment and respect for basic rights that it is entrusted to uphold. It also failed to note that, as a matter of principle, those detained for their non-violent political activities or beliefs should be released immediately and unconditionally.

Third, with respect to the issue of extrajudicial executions and "disappearances" the Commission's statement conveyed a misleading impression of the extent and the nature of the problem in East Timor. In "acknowledging the efforts made to account for those persons missing" after the Santa Cruz massacre, the Commission obscured the inadequacy of the government's response. As Amnesty International reported during the Commission's 1994 session, the government has provided clarification of the fate of only a small fraction of the estimated 270 dead and 200 "disappeared", and has attempted to disguise the inadequacy of its efforts by publishing information which is false and misleading.⁷ Moreover, by focusing exclusively on those killed in November 1991 the Commission lent credence to the Indonesian Government's claim that the massacre was an isolated incident, which did not reflect official policy or an established pattern of practice. The clearest evidence that the Santa Cruz massacre was not an isolated incident lies in the fact that scores of political killings have been reported in East Timor since 1991 - including at least twenty in the past year alone.

⁵ The torture of Salvador Sarmiento, detailed below, was reported in an Amnesty International document distributed during the Commission's 50th session. See *Indonesia & East Timor - Fact and Fiction: Implementing the Recommendations of the UN Commission on Human Rights* (ASA 21/05/94) 16 February 1994, p.12.

⁶ In its March 1993 resolution on East Timor (1993/97, para 8), the UN Commission on Human Rights did call on the Indonesian authorities to implement recommendations.

⁷ For further details of the government's response, see Amnesty International document, *Indonesia & East Timor: Fact and Fiction* (ASA 21/05/94) 16 February 1994, pp. 2-6.

Finally, the Commission gave a seriously misleading impression of the human rights situation when it welcomed what it called a "policy of expanding access" to East Timor by international human rights and humanitarian organizations, as well as the international media. The fact is that all delegations visiting East Timor continue to be kept under close surveillance, making genuine human rights monitoring difficult and potentially dangerous to those they contact. As the evidence appended to this statement makes clear, in the past year alone scores of East Timorese have suffered imprisonment, torture, and ill-treatment because of their efforts to gather and disseminate information about human rights abuse in the territory. Thus, while the government's decision to invite the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary executions to visit East Timor in July 1994 was undoubtedly a positive step, concern remains that such obstacles and dangers may have limited his ability to conduct a thorough and impartial investigation. Finally, it must be stressed that, notwithstanding assertions about "expanding access", some international human rights organizations - including Amnesty International - continue to be denied access to the territory altogether.

Mr Chairman, every year for the past decade Amnesty International has testified before this Committee in the sincere hope that it will be the last time. But it is only too clear that unless the Government of Indonesia takes immediate and concrete measures to address the root causes of human rights violations, and unless member states of the United Nations apply concerted pressure on the government to fulfil its responsibilities under international law, it will be necessary to return here for many years to come. Thank you.⁸

1. Torture and Ill-treatment

In the 12 months since Amnesty International last addressed this Committee the organization has received reports of scores of East Timorese tortured or ill-treated by Indonesian security forces. As in previous years, the forms of torture described include electrocution, beating, death threats, faked executions, rape and other kinds of sexual abuse. Taken together, this information confirms Amnesty International's assessment, expressed consistently before this Committee since 1990, that short-term detention, ill-treatment and torture are used systematically in East Timor to intimidate even peaceful opponents of Indonesian rule, and to obtain political and military intelligence.⁹ More worrying still, many of those detained and subjected to torture or ill-treatment in the past year have been people trying peacefully to gather or to disseminate human rights information.

In November 1991 the UN Special Rapporteur on torture visited Indonesia and East Timor. His report, published in early 1992, concluded that torture was commonplace and offered eleven concrete recommendations for its prevention. Nearly three years later, the government had begun to implement only one of those recommendations, with the establishment of the National Human

⁸ The remainder of this document was not included in the oral presentation before the UN Special Committee of Decolonization but was submitted in written form.

⁹ See Amnesty International document *East Timor: Short-term Detention and Ill-treatment* (ASA 21/02/90) January 1990.

Rights Commission.¹⁰ The government's failure to act means that the root causes of torture have yet to be addressed. As the cases described in this report indicate, the consequence of inaction is that the practice of torture continues, and would seem destined to continue in the foreseeable future.

Case Study: Salvador Sarmiento

Indonesian military authorities have identified the Catholic church as a focal point of resistance in East Timor, and some of its more vulnerable members have increasingly been the target of ill-treatment and torture. In February 1994, Amnesty International reported the arrest and alleged torture of a young Catholic seminarian named **Salvador Sarmiento**.¹¹ Since then the organization has obtained detailed testimony of the circumstances leading to his arrest, the treatment he suffered, the identities of some of the perpetrators, and the conditions of his release.

Salvador Sarmiento, a student at the *Institut Pastoral Indonesia (IPI)*, was arrested in Dili by military intelligence officers shortly after 12 noon on 3 January 1994 as he walked toward home with a friend, **Matias Soares**. The two young men were forced into a military vehicle and driven to the headquarters of the military intelligence unit (*Satuan Tugas Intelijen - SGI*) of the Sub-Regional Military Command for East Timor (*KOREM 164/Wira Dharma*), in the Colmera district of Dili. Matias Soares was released the same day after questioning, but Salvador was held without charge for five days before being conditionally released on the evening of 7 January.

During that time he was repeatedly beaten, given electric shocks, threatened with a handgun and subjected to mock executions by soldiers. When he was not under interrogation, Salvador was held in a cell, sometimes naked, and with his hands shackled. The detention and beating took place with the full knowledge and acquiescence of the *SGI* Commander, an army Lieutenant Colonel whose name is known to Amnesty International.

During the initial interrogation, which lasted from 1pm until 5.30pm on 3 January, Salvador Sarmiento's military interrogators did not use force. However, when the interrogation resumed at 10pm that evening he was made to strip naked and was tortured in various ways while being questioned by six soldiers. In the course of interrogation, the soldiers held a pistol to Salvador's head and chest and threatened to kill him and dispose of his body.

As they beat and kicked me I said 'please just kill me rather than torturing me like this. In the name of truth I am prepared to die.' Then they said - 'If you really want to die we can easily arrange for your corpse to disappear.' Then they ordered me to pray, and so I prayed: 'Oh God please receive my soul and forgive them for what they do'. As I prayed one of them said 'Let's just shoot him and throw his body into the sea.' When

¹⁰ The Commission has surprised some critics by the energy with which it has carried out its work since it was established in 1993. However, doubts remain about whether it can meet the standards of independence and impartiality set by the UN, and whether it can be effective in bringing a halt to serious human rights violations. For further discussion of the Commission, see Amnesty International document, *Indonesia & East Timor - Fact and Fiction* (ASA 21/05/94) 16 February 1994, pp. 12-13.

¹¹ See Amnesty International document, *Indonesia & East Timor: Fact and Fiction* (ASA 21/05/94) 16 February 1994.

I had finished praying they did not shoot, but they threatened me twice more with a pistol. They held it to my head and to my chest so that I would confess...

Later they attached wires to Salvador's thumbs and applied electric current causing him to scream and his body to convulse. Following electrocution, the soldiers continued to beat him until he lost consciousness. He was revived but the interrogation continued until 3am.

The next morning, Salvador's face was bruised and swollen, making it difficult for him to eat. However, later that evening and the following day the interrogation continued and he was again subjected to beatings and death threats. On 5 January, unable to face further abuse, and afraid for his life, Salvador gave the "confession" the military had been seeking. Nevertheless, he was held for a further two days, during which time medication was applied to his face to reduce the extreme swelling caused by beating.

The substance of the confession and other information sought by military intelligence revealed the nature of official repression in East Timor in an era of ostensible "openness". The interrogators alleged that Salvador Sarmiento had led one or more "clandestine meetings" in the parish of Ossu, Viqueque, in late December 1993, at which plans had been made to organize a peaceful demonstration on the occasion of a visit by Australian Bishop Hilton Deakin in March 1994. Military intelligence authorities also sought to obtain information about the political views and activities of key figures of the Catholic clergy in East Timor, including the parish priest of Ossu, Father Sancho Amaral, and Bishop Belo.

Having secured this information from Salvador Sarmiento under duress, the military then forced him to sign an affidavit as a condition for release. In the affidavit, dated 7 January, he admitted to committing acts "prohibited by Indonesian law", and promised never to repeat them on pain of punishment. The statement said that he had been involved in "clandestine" activities but, significantly, it did not specify what law had been broken.

The affidavit, and a letter of clarification issued on the same day by the *SIGI* Commander, appeared to be aimed in part at protecting the security forces from any legal or political culpability for Salvador's arbitrary arrest and torture. The Commander's letter declared that Salvador Sarmiento was being "returned to his family in a healthy condition" while the affidavit stated, falsely, that his confession had been made "...while in a fit mental and physical state, without pressure from any party whatsoever." Just prior to his release, Salvador Sarmiento was taken aside by a military intelligence officer and warned not to tell anyone that he had been tortured.

Case Study: Benevides Correia Barros

Amnesty International has also received detailed information about an East Timorese university student, **Benevides Correia Barros**, who was detained and reportedly tortured by Indonesian soldiers during a visit home from Central Java in September 1993. Benevides had been detained for his role in non-violent demonstrations against the Santa Cruz massacre in late 1991, but the main reason for his arrest and torture on this occasion appears to have been his efforts to obtain photographic evidence of the consequences of military occupation, in the District of Bobonaro, East Timor.

Benevides was first abducted by military personnel while waiting for a bus in the town of Ainaro on 31 August 1993. He was taken immediately to the District Military Command (*KODIM-Ainaro*) where he was forced to undress, and then interrogated for five hours about his political opinions and activities. His interrogators threatened him, saying: "*If you want to live, tell us what you know, what you have heard, what you do and how your network operates.*" He was released without charge at about 10 am the following day, after the intervention of a relative who was a soldier there. However that was not the end of his ordeal. On 13 September he and a friend, **Francisco Almeida Godinha**, were arrested by two soldiers in the sub-district of Gailaco, near the town of Maliana, in Bobonara District, where they had been taking photographs of social and economic conditions. Describing their arrest and torture by three soldiers - a Sergeant, a Private and a Corporal of the *KORAMIL*, whose names are known to Amnesty International - Benevides wrote:

They ordered us to lie down by the side of the road, tied our hands up and one of them threatened to execute us there and then.... After about half an hour a platoon of ten soldiers arrived with the KORAMIL Commander who took over the interrogation.... They frog-marched us to a small hut near the side of the road, stripped us naked and started beating us for about an hour, hitting our heads, chests, genitals, kidneys, thighs and knees. Soon our noses, mouths and ears were bleeding.... We were pushed into a vehicle and driven to the KODIM in Maliana, where we were beaten while being questioned about taking photos... They tried to make us admit that we intended to use the photos to discredit Indonesia in the eyes of the international community.... Our hands were tied up, we were forced to stand facing the wall and they beat us, kicked us with their jack-boots and banged our heads against the wall... After five hours, my friend Francisco was put into a cell and I was driven... to a place about two kilometres from the KODIM. When we arrived, I was pushed out of the car still handcuffed, ordered to kneel down and start praying in preparation for being executed. This happened three times, after which they pushed me back into the car and took me back to the KODIM. We were held there for three days, from 13 to 16 September, without food or water.

Relatives who came to the *KODIM-Maliana* on 17 September to visit Benevides and to bring him food and fresh clothing, were prevented from seeing him. On 26 September, at about 2pm, he and Francisco were moved from *KODIM-Maliana* to the Sub-Regional Military Command (*KOREM 164/Wira Dharma*) headquarters in Dili. At about 6pm the same day they were transferred to the headquarters of military intelligence (*SGI*) in the Colmera district of Dili, where they were interrogated for a further five days.

Their relatives were not informed of the transfer. Benevides' father eventually learned that he had been moved to Dili, but when he arrived in the city he was unable to find his son. One of Benevides' sisters looked for him at the different military and police detention centres in Dili but was unable to locate him. The military authorities were keeping his whereabouts a secret; he had "disappeared". Several days later Benevides' relatives obtained a note from the local assembly (*DPRD*) asking the military authorities to permit them to visit him wherever he was. They were finally able to see Benevides on the morning of 1 October; he and Francisco were released shortly thereafter.

Following standard procedure in such cases, their release was subject to several conditions. First they were taken, with their families, to receive "political guidance" from the *KOREM* Commander and the Governor of East Timor. They were then made to sign affidavits promising not to repeat their "crimes". A letter of clarification from the *SGI* Commander specified that they were obliged to report daily to *SGI* headquarters, and that their families must assume responsibility if they engaged in any political activities. Finally, they were warned not to inform international human rights organizations about their treatment in military custody.

Case Study: Amarão dos Santos

Those who come to the defence of victims of human rights abuse in East Timor sometimes become victims themselves. **Amarão dos Santos**, the village head of Haupu, in the sub-district of Letefoho, Ermera, was reportedly badly beaten by military officers in January 1994 after he submitted a report to government authorities about the ill-treatment of another villager by military officers. The villager whose case he had reported, **Domingos Sama Lelo**, had been beaten by a military officer in the home of a local government official on 27 December 1993. Three weeks later Domingos was still in hospital recovering from his injuries.

On 11 January, several days after submitting his report, Amarão dos Santos was summoned to the District Military Command in Ermera (*KODIM-Ermera*). There he was beaten by soldiers before being transferred to Dili under the authority of the *KODIM* Commander. His wife, who saw him briefly on 12 January before he was transferred, said that his face was covered with bruises. She reported the information to the police in Ermera (*POLRES Ermera*) but was told that her husband would be safe in the hands of the *KODIM* Commander. When asked about the reported ill-treatment the following day (13 January), the Sub-Regional Military (*KOREM 164/Wira Dharma*) Commander for East Timor (Colonel Lumintang) said that he had not received a report on the case.

Case Study: "Isabel"

Amnesty International has continued to receive reports of the sexual molestation and rape of East Timorese women by military forces in the past year.¹² Many of the victims have been young women living in remote rural areas where combat troops continue to conduct counter-insurgency operations. Yet even women detained by military authorities in Dili and other towns are vulnerable to such treatment. The practice of short-term arbitrary detention, and denial of access to relatives and lawyers, inevitably increases the risk of rape.

One young woman, shot during the Santa Cruz massacre, has described how she was molested and harassed by soldiers while recovering in the military hospital in Dili. On the night of 13 November, one day after being admitted to hospital with five bullet wounds, she said that two soldiers came to her bed, cut off all her clothes with scissors, and began to touch her body. She was unable to move due to her wounds, and so simply closed her eyes so that she would not see their faces. Several

¹² Amnesty International has learned the names of dozens of women reportedly raped by Indonesian soldiers but, in the interests of their safety and well-being, their names are not reproduced here.

days later, after her wounds had begun to heal but while still in military hospital, she was taken for questioning. One of her military interrogators reportedly told her that he would come to her room to sleep with her. At the time she was staying in a room with only one other woman. That night, she awoke to find the same man touching her breasts and other parts of her body. When she tried to run from the room, the man grabbed her and continued to molest her. Asked how her experience had affected her, she said:

If men are hurt they can recover and forget what happened but for women, if they are raped or tortured, they cannot forget. Their life is destroyed forever.

2. Political Imprisonment and Unfair Trials

In the year since Amnesty International last addressed this Committee, hundreds of East Timorese political suspects have been arbitrarily detained by Indonesian military authorities for periods ranging from a few hours to several months. The vast majority have been held without charge or trial. At least nine have been tried for their non-violent political activities, while seventeen others continue to serve lengthy sentences imposed in previous years.

Indonesian Government and military authorities have stated that those held have not been "arrested" but simply summoned for "questioning". They have also maintained that those forced to undergo "political guidance" are not under arrest. However, such nuances cannot obscure the plain and continuing reality of routine political imprisonment in East Timor. The failure to charge or try suspects, or the decision to send them on "guidance" courses rather than to conventional jails, does not alter the fact that those suspects have been arbitrarily deprived of their liberty because of their political or human rights related activities.

Military authorities in East Timor have virtually absolute authority to detain suspects, to send them for political education, or to impose conditions on their release. This power is wielded independently of the judiciary or of the police who, under Indonesian law, have sole authority to arrest criminal suspects. The danger inherent in this extralegal power is compounded by the fact that, before being charged or tried, political detainees are usually held in military detention centres not readily accessible to relatives or lawyers.¹³ Even the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which has gained improved access to tried East Timorese prisoners within the past year, still faces serious obstacles in visiting those detained or sent on "guidance" courses by military authorities. Apart from breaching both international and Indonesian law, the lack of access to untried detainees dramatically increases the dangers of torture and ill-treatment described above.

In addition to the hundreds of political suspects detained without charge or trial, some 26 East Timorese are currently serving sentences of up to life imprisonment, imposed after unfair political

¹³ The principal places of detention reported in the past year included the military intelligence headquarters (*Satuan Tugas Intelijen - SGI*) of the Sub-Regional Military Command for East Timor (*KOREM 164/Wira Dharma*), and the various District Military Commands (*KODIM*) spread throughout the territory.

trials since 1984.¹⁴ The majority of those currently jailed were sentenced in 1992, accused of organizing and taking part in the peaceful pro-independence procession to the Santa Cruz cemetery on 12 November or the peaceful demonstration in Jakarta one week later. Information received by Amnesty International within the past year confirms earlier assessments that the trials and appeals of these political prisoners were not conducted in accordance with international standards of fairness, and that some tried prisoners have been ill-treated in custody (see Case Study below).

The imprisonment of real or alleged political opponents has continued unabated in the past year. At least nine other East Timorese have been tried and sentenced since mid-1993 for their non-violent political activities. Most recently, in June 1994, five young men were brought to trial for staging a brief and entirely peaceful pro-independence demonstration during a visit to East Timor by foreign journalists in April 1994. As of early July four of the five - **Pantaleão Amaral**, **Miguel de Deus**, **Isaac Soares** and **Rosalino dos Santos** - had been convicted and sentenced to 20 months imprisonment each (see Case Study below).

Other political prisoners convicted during the past year included a civil servant, **Pedro Sarmiento da Costa**, sentenced to one year in prison in September 1993 for writing a demand on a 10,000 rupiah bank-note that compensation be paid to the victims of the Santa Cruz massacre. Another man, **Alberto Rodrigues Pereira** was sentenced to 22 months in December 1993 for destroying an Indonesian flag. A police officer, **Corporal Augusto Pereira**, was sentenced to 18 months in prison and dismissed from the armed forces by a military court in February 1994 for giving sanctuary to East Timorese resistance leader, Xanana Gusmão, for three years prior to his capture in November 1992. Two more East Timorese were reportedly sentenced to prison terms of three years each in June 1994 for raising the *Fretilin* flag on 17 July 1993, as a peaceful act of protest against Indonesian rule.

Case Study: Peaceful Protesters Detained and Tried, May 1994

Twelve East Timorese were detained by Indonesian military forces in May 1994 in connection with their non-violent political activities. They included **Jose Antonio Neves** arrested by military intelligence officers in Malang, East Java, and eleven others detained in Dili in the preceding weeks. Four of them had been tried and sentenced by early July and were prisoners of conscience.

A leading member of the clandestine pro-independence East Timorese movement, and a student at a theological institute in Malang, East Java, Jose Antonio Neves was arrested by military intelligence authorities at the main post office in Malang on 19 May 1994 and taken to a safehouse of the military's intelligence unit (*SGI*). He was subsequently transferred into police custody (*POLRES Malang*). Another student, **Antonio Soares**, was reportedly detained in Malang later the same day and held briefly for questioning before being released without charge.

Colleagues said that Jose Neves had recently returned from East Timor where he had been gathering information about human rights violations and political developments, and that on his return

¹⁴ Eight East Timorese political prisoners tried in previous years have been released since early 1993 after serving their sentences. For details see Appendix II.

to Malang he had hoped to make this available to the international community. One source said that at the time of his arrest he was carrying a letter from the current leader of the guerilla resistance, Konis Santana. The letter was to be read out at a conference on East Timor which took place in Manila in early June.

Most or all of the eleven detained in Dili had taken part in a peaceful pro-independence protest in front of the Mahkota Hotel in Dili during a visit to East Timor by foreign journalists in April 1994. They were: **Nuno de Andrade Sarmento Corvelho**, and **Anibal** of Santa Cruz, Dili; **Rui Fernandes**, of Bemori, Dili; **Octaviano**, **Pedro Fatima Tilman**, **Pantaleão Amaral**, **Miguel de Deus**, **Rosalino dos Santos**, and **Marcos**, all of Kuluhun, Dili; **Lucas Tilman dos Santos**, of Bairro-Pite; and **Isaac Soares** of Dili. They were taken to military intelligence (*SGI*) headquarters in Dili where they were interrogated about their political activities. Some were released without charge, but on 23 May a military spokesperson in Dili said that six of the eleven had been "detained for questioning" and that they might be brought to court if there was enough evidence against them.

In late June three of those detained - **Pantaleão Amaral**, **Miguel de Deus** and **Isaac Soares** - were tried at Dili District Court, and sentenced to 20 months imprisonment each for expressing opposition to the government. According to reports, none of the three were accompanied by legal counsel, either during interrogation or during their trial. A spokesman for the court told the press that the three were found guilty of "expressing anti-Indonesia sentiments in front of the public on April 14". Two others were due to be brought to trial on 21 or 22 June. One of them, **Rosalino dos Santos**, was sentenced to 20 months in jail in early July 1994 on similar charges.

Case Study: Unfair Political Trials and Ill-treatment

Addressing this Committee last year, Amnesty International expressed particular concern at allegations that the authorities had obstructed the efforts of several East Timorese prisoners of conscience to file appeals against their sentences before the High Court. A letter received from the prison in late 1993 confirms that, for a period of five months during and after the trials, officials did impede some prisoners' efforts to lodge appeals:

During this time, newspapers, official documents etc., were not allowed in; nor were the pens and papers which prisoners needed to work on their appeal to the High Court... This prohibition led to the rejection of the prisoners' appeals on the grounds of failure to present an appeal in accordance with the Penal Code. On another occasion all documents relating to the legal proceedings were confiscated, including the written sentence of the District Court of Dili, and drafts of the appeal to the Court... Any attempt to contact relatives was expressly forbidden for five months, including relatives of prisoners who were seriously ill.¹⁵

Amnesty International also expressed concern last year for the safety of **Saturnino da Costa Belo**, a prisoner of conscience who had shouted pro-independence slogans during the trial of Xanana

¹⁵ Letter to Amnesty International from confidential source in Becora Prison, Dili. The complete text of the letter is reproduced in Appendix IV.

Gusmão in March 1993. Recent information confirms earlier fears that he was subjected to threats and ill-treatment in retaliation for his remarks. According to the letter from prison cited above:

Because of the demand he made to the Indonesian Government while at the court to respect human rights in East Timor he was severely beaten and interrogated by the military police. They threatened him by placing the barrel of a pistol in his ear and he was put in a cell and left there in total darkness...Since he continued to refuse to apologise to the judge and did not admit to any wrongdoing, he was never again brought to the court as a witness on the grounds that he was ill, when in fact he was not ill at all.¹⁶

Cases Study: "Political Guidance" and Detention without Trial

At least fifty and possibly many more East Timorese were detained prior to and during the visit to East Timor of a delegation of US Congressional aides in September 1993. Many of those detained were reportedly taken to the interior where they were enrolled in "political guidance" courses for about one month before being released without charge. During the period of detention they were denied access to relatives and to the ICRC. As a condition for release, they were required to promise not to engage in the "crime" of pro-independence political activity, and to swear an oath of allegiance to the Indonesian Government.

In early 1994 Amnesty International received a list of 74 people said to have been undergoing "political guidance" courses under military supervision in September 1993. One of those named was **Jose Manuel da Silva Fernandes** who had been arrested on at least two previous occasions since October 1989. Addressing this Committee in August 1991, Amnesty International expressed concern that he had "disappeared" after his arrest in November 1990.¹⁷ In April of this year, the organization learned that he was in military custody in Viqueque. He is not known to have been tried.

Further arrests were carried out in the weeks prior to a scheduled visit by Australian Bishop Hilton Deakin in March 1994. After learning of the arrests and other repressive measures Bishop Deakin cancelled his visit. Most of those detained were subsequently released without charge, but again on the condition that they would not repeat their "crime".

3. Extrajudicial Execution and "Disappearance"

It is nearly three years since Indonesian security forces opened fire on a crowd of peaceful pro-independence protesters in the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili, killing an estimated 270 people, and precipitating the "disappearance" of some 200 others. The massacre and its aftermath continue to be of critical significance in any assessment of the current human rights situation in East Timor for at least three reasons.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ See Amnesty International document, *East Timor: Amnesty International Statement to the United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization* (ASA 21/14/91) August 1991, pp. 10 and 17.

First, new evidence has emerged suggesting that, in addition to those shot or stabbed at the cemetery, some protesters may have been killed subsequently while in military custody. Second, the government has yet to account adequately for the fate of the dead and the "disappeared". Finally, the government has failed to address the evident injustice of sentencing peaceful protesters to terms of up to life imprisonment while allowing the perpetrators of the massacre to walk free after 18 months or less.

The "Second Massacre"

Evidence brought to light in the past six months suggests that a number of those wounded during the massacre and taken to the military hospital in Dili were ill-treated or deliberately killed. One eyewitness has testified that some of the wounded at the hospital were hit with large rocks or crushed by military vehicles as they lay on the ground, and that others were given poison pills and lethal injections. Addressing the UN Commission on Human Rights in March 1994, an employee at the military hospital in Dili, **João Antonio Dias**, described the scene there shortly after the massacre:

The trucks kept arriving with more bodies. They drove right over the ones that were on the ground. Some of the wounded gesticulated, moving their arms and legs to show that they were still alive, but the trucks did not stop...The military were looking for a quick way to get rid of the bodies and the survivors...They went to the storeroom...took jars of pills, and started giving two pills and a glass of water to each wounded person. After taking these pills, the wounded started to lose their strength and their breathing became weaker... After a while, the soldiers returned to check whether they were dead. They killed anyone who was still alive by crushing their skulls with huge stones.¹⁸

Testimony about the behaviour of soldiers during and shortly after the massacre lends credence to claims that some survivors were deliberately killed. A young man named "**José**" (not his real name), who was wounded in the massacre, told Amnesty International how four soldiers beat him on the head and chest with the butts of their automatic weapons after he had been felled by a bullet near the entrance to the cemetery. As he lay on the ground he could also see soldiers assaulting his friend **Simplicio de Deus**. He said the soldiers cut one of Simplicio's ears off and slashed the other deeply with a knife. About 15 minutes later, both "José" and Simplicio were thrown on to the back of a military truck together with dozens of others. Most were already dead and the floor of the truck was wet with blood. "José" told Amnesty International that, while in the truck, he saw soldiers use bayonets to stab at least one person who was still alive.

Allegations that civilians were deliberately killed or "disappeared" after the massacre have been corroborated by other reliable sources, including the Catholic Bishop of East Timor, Dom Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo. Speaking in April 1994, Bishop Belo said:

¹⁸ Statement prepared for the UN Commission on Human Rights, 50th session, Geneva, 7 March 1994.

I cannot tell you how many people were involved but, naturally, there were people who disappeared following the shooting, the massacre. I know what happened at 2000 hours [on 12 November 1991] - because four people were killed with sticks near my house at around 2300 hours. Then, those young people I saw at the cemetery's chapel at 2300 hours, I went to look for them the following day at the hospital and they were not there.¹⁹

Information from government sources also lends support to claims that some of those detained or hospitalized after the massacre were deliberately finished off. An official government list of 84 people said to have died or "disappeared" after the massacre includes the names of at least 14 people reported by independent sources to have been detained (9) or hospitalized (5).²⁰ This suggests that at least 14 people may have been killed in custody, though the true figure could be higher.

Due to restrictions on access to the territory, Amnesty International has not been able to verify independently all of the claims recently made concerning a "second massacre". However, it notes that the allegation of deliberate killings in the days and weeks after the massacre is consistent with information previously reported by the organization.²¹ Moreover, in view of the fact that the ICRC, relatives, and the UN Special Rapporteur on torture were all denied access to those detained or hospitalized, and given the long-standing pattern of ill-treatment and torture of political suspects in Indonesian military custody, the organization believes that these allegations are credible and ought to be investigated promptly and impartially.

Impunity and the Fate of the Victims

Important as it is to establish the precise numbers of people killed, and the circumstances in which they died, Amnesty International is concerned about two equally important issues: the need to bring the perpetrators to justice, and the need to identify the dead and reveal the whereabouts of their remains. In Amnesty International's view, the government has failed utterly to address these issues in an adequate way.

While 13 civilians involved in peaceful protest during and after the Santa Cruz massacre were sentenced to terms of up to life imprisonment in 1992, the ten police and military officers tried in connection with these events received sentences ranging from just eight to 18 months for disciplinary offences. Despite substantial evidence of deliberate killing and torture, none of those tried was charged with murder and only one was charged with assault. Moreover, the higher ranking military

¹⁹ Interview with Bishop Belo on *Radio Renascenca*, 2 April 1994. Translation and transcription from *Summary of World Broadcasts (BBC)*, 5 April 1994.

²⁰ The list of 84 was given to the human rights organization *Asiawatch* in 1993. For further discussion of the list see Amnesty International report, *Indonesia & East Timor - Fact and Fiction* (ASA 21/05/94) 16 February 1994.

²¹ In November 1991, Amnesty International reported that some of those detained or hospitalized immediately after the 12 November had been deliberately killed in military custody and their bodies disposed of. See *East Timor: After the Massacre* (ASA 21/24/91) 21 November 1991.

officers, who were ultimately responsible for the actions of their troops, have not been brought to justice and there has been no indication that they will be.

The extreme disparity in the treatment of the military perpetrators of abuse and their civilian victims highlights a serious shortcoming of government human rights policy and practice. As noted by the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, in Indonesia and East Timor "...the perpetrators of human rights violations continue to enjoy impunity."²² The prosecutions of military and police officials that followed the Santa Cruz massacre were an exception to the general rule insofar as some members of the security forces were tried and sentenced. Yet in most respects these trials reflected the general problem of impunity.

In contrast to the vigour with which they have sought to punish the survivors, the Indonesian authorities have made only a perfunctory effort to identify those who died or "disappeared" during and after the Santa Cruz massacre. In the past two years they have provided clarification to the UN on the fate of only a small fraction of the people reported to have "disappeared" on or about 12 November 1991.²³ The government has located the remains of only 19 of the dead, and only one (the New Zealander, **Kamal Bamadhaj**) has been positively identified. They have failed to account for the whereabouts of some 200 reported as "disappeared" and as many as 270 believed to have been killed during and after the massacre. In a letter to US First Lady Hilary Clinton, dated 10 September 1993, the mothers of many of those who "disappeared" or died at Santa Cruz expressed the anguish caused by the government's failure to act:

*As mothers of the disappeared and dead children, we are still living in the silence of this horrendous pain, without knowing where the graves of our beloved martyred children are. We demand that the Indonesian Government return the bodies of our children.*²⁴

The government has attempted to evade its responsibility to account for the dead and "disappeared" by publishing information which is false and misleading. Most seriously, in letters to the UN's Assistant Secretary General for Human Rights (dated 13 September and 29 November 1993), the Indonesian Government claimed that, as a result of its investigations, the number still missing after the massacre had been reduced from 66 to 56. However, of the ten people the government claimed had reappeared, only two were actually on the government's own list of 84 dead and missing.²⁵ Of the remaining eight people that the government claimed had reappeared, four were actually unidentified corpses, with no known connection to the Santa Cruz massacre. Even the government, in a separate

²² Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions. (UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/7, para 355).

²³ Report of the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, dated 22 December 1993 (UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/26).

²⁴ Letter to Hilary Clinton from the mothers of the dead and "disappeared", dated 10 September 1993.

²⁵ The two were **Januario da Conceição**, who was said to have "surrendered" to the authorities on 14 May 1993, and **Afonso Maria**, who was reportedly "found" in his home on 5 November 1992. See "ABRI Terus Mencari 64 Warga Dili yang Hilang," *Republika*, 11 July 93.

passage of its letter of 13 September 1993, admitted that "...it could not be ascertained if these were the remains of persons considered missing after the Dili incident."²⁶

The Killing Continues

There has been no single incident of extrajudicial execution on the scale of the Santa Cruz massacre since November 1991, but political killings continue. In the period January 1993 to mid-1994 Amnesty International has received reports of the extrajudicial execution by government forces of more than 20 East Timorese, and the unlawful killing of seven civilians by opposition forces (see Appendix III). The victims have come from all walks of life, but the most vulnerable have been people living in areas of suspected rebel activity, where Indonesian combat troops continue to conduct intensive counter-insurgency operations. Continued restrictions on access to the territory, and obstacles to proper human rights monitoring, make it difficult to confirm these reports but Amnesty International believes that the allegations are sufficiently grave to warrant thorough and impartial investigation.

As in past years, there has been no indication that the Indonesian authorities have conducted proper investigations into the reported killings and "disappearances" and, in keeping with established practice, none of those believed responsible has been brought to justice. In one case mentioned by Amnesty International in its statement to this Committee last year - that of **Carlos** who died after being beaten in custody on 11 April 1993 - police authorities promised to bring the perpetrators to justice.²⁷ Amnesty International wrote to the authorities responsible in April 1993 welcoming this news and seeking information on the measures taken. As of early July 1994 they had not replied.

Government authorities did respond to appeals on behalf of one man, **Gaspar Carlos Xavier**, whom Amnesty International feared had "disappeared" after being arrested by military authorities in September 1992.²⁸ However, their replies did little to allay fears for his safety. In two separate communications dated 9 November 1993 the government confirmed that Gaspar Carlos Xavier had been arrested in Kupang, West Timor, in September 1992 on suspicion of involvement in East Timor's underground resistance. However, the letters made it clear that he had not been detained in a recognized prison but held in an unofficial detention centre at the discretion of military authorities.²⁹ Apparently seeking to evade responsibility for his "disappearance" the government said that he had

²⁶ The other four named by the government as reappeared were **Constancio Pinto**, **Antonio Lay**, and two asylum-seekers (**Profirio da Costa** and **Clementino Faria Oliveira**), none of whom had appeared on the government list of missing or dead. See Report of the UN Secretary General on the Situation in East Timor, dated 20 January 1994 (UN Doc No. E/CN.4/1994/61, Annex 1).

²⁷ *East Timor: State of Fear, Statement before the United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization*, (ASA 21/15/93) 13 July 1993, p.10.

²⁸ *Ibid* p.9.

²⁹ A letter from the Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia in New Zealand said Gaspar Carlos Xavier had not been imprisoned but "placed in a house from which he could come and go". The second letter, from the Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia in Germany, said he had been "held under house arrest with few limitations".

"abused" the "good treatment and trust given him" and had "escaped" from custody in December 1992. In offering this explanation, the government demonstrated a lack of understanding of its responsibilities for the safety of detainees and highlighted the vulnerability of all detainees held in unofficial military detention without charge or trial.

Case Studies: Recent Extrajudicial Executions

Two recent victims of apparent extrajudicial execution were **Francisco** and **Eusebio**, the sons of Deolinda and Laura of Leolima village in Ainaro District. According to reports they were shot by soldiers of Battalions 726 and 1633 on 10 January 1994 after refusing to allow the soldiers to confiscate their family's water buffaloes. Francisco died immediately from gun-shot wounds while Eusebio was wounded and taken away by the soldiers. His whereabouts remained unknown at the end of February 1994, after which no further information was available.

Also killed in apparent extrajudicial executions in the past year were two men named **Armando** and **Vicente**, village heads of Waige, Vemasse, Baucau District. According to reliable sources, they were shot dead on 5 August 1993 by soldiers of the elite Special Forces Command, *Kopassus* (*Komando Pasukan Khusus*), whose units are notorious for their poor human rights record in East Timor and Indonesia. The soldiers reportedly buried their bodies in a secret unmarked grave, where they remained until discovered by relatives two days later.

Another victim was a 30-year-old woman named **Joana Soares**, killed by soldiers in the village of Onu Larau, Bartoli, Viqueque District in October 1993. According to reports, the soldiers first stabbed her to death then mutilated her sexual organs with a knife. The same report said that four eyewitnesses - **Antonio Amaral**, **Tomas Gomes**, **Manuel Amaral**, and **João Soares** - were subsequently killed by soldiers, but precise details about the circumstance of their death were not known.

4. The Question of Access

In the two and a half years since the Santa Cruz massacre, the Indonesian Government has frequently stated its commitment to improving access to East Timor by human rights and humanitarian organizations, as well as the international media. To its credit, in the past year the government has permitted a wide range of official delegations - including parliamentarians, members of church organizations, journalists, and representatives of some human rights organizations - to visit the territory. The government has also facilitated improved ICRC access to tried prisoners in the past year, and in January 1994 it invited the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions to visit.

Nevertheless, serious obstacles remain to the proper monitoring and investigation of human rights in East Timor. Some international human rights organizations continue to be denied access altogether. Despite numerous requests and repeated public assurances that the territory is open to all, Amnesty International has not been permitted to visit. The organization's most recent request was outlined in a letter to Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, dated 6 May 1994, written after the Foreign Minister

made a public announcement that the government wished to open a dialogue with Amnesty International. As of early July 1994 the government had not replied.

Even where formal access is granted, the political and security situation in East Timor presents all human rights monitors and visitors with unique difficulties. Whatever guarantees may be offered in advance by the Indonesian Foreign Ministry, all official visits - whether by parliamentarians, journalists, diplomats or UN representatives - are closely monitored by local military authorities, and particularly by its far-reaching intelligence apparatus.

Official delegations to East Timor find, almost without exception, that they are prevented on various pretexts from visiting specific locations or meeting certain people. Most also find that visits to alternative locations have been organized on their behalf, thereby affording the authorities an opportunity to prepare the scene in advance and to ensure that time is spent in an unproductive way. Plainclothes intelligence officers and minders from the Foreign Ministry accompany delegations everywhere, and all contact with the local population is closely monitored. Those suspected of sympathy with the independence movement are warned in advance against approaching the delegation or undertaking any sort of demonstration.

Fully aware that they will be identified and their remarks recorded by Indonesian officials, most East Timorese are likely to be too frightened to approach a visiting delegation. Their fears are well founded. With the exception of a handful of well-known church or government personalities, those who do so are almost always subsequently detained. The best-known activists are commonly held without charge in the days and weeks prior to an official visit. Sentenced political prisoners are also subject to various kinds of control designed to prevent them from communicating with the outside world, and with domestic human rights organizations.

Case Study: Prisoners of Conscience Moved

In June 1994 six East Timorese prisoners of conscience serving sentences between five-and-a-half years and life imprisonment for their non-violent political activities, were transferred secretly from Dili to a prison several hundred miles away. The six had managed to stage a small pro-independence protest during a prison visit by foreign journalists in April 1994, causing the government considerable embarrassment. One of the journalists who visited Dili in April reported that, despite efforts by prison warders to prevent him, one of the prisoners shouted from his cell:

*They accused me of political crimes and tortured me with electric shocks, but they are invaders of my country and I don't accept their verdict. They prohibited us from talking to you and will punish us for this but we have to speak out.*³⁰

The Indonesian authorities claimed the prison move was a routine matter. However, given the background of the six prisoners it appeared likely that the move was intended to avoid embarrassment to the Indonesian authorities during future official visits to East Timor. The timing of the transfer suggested that it may have been designed to make it more difficult for the prisoners to

³⁰ Cited in *The Times*, 16 April 1994.

communicate with the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, who was scheduled to visit Jakarta and East Timor just a few weeks later.

Apart from their reputation as outspoken advocates of East Timor's independence, the prisoners - **Filomeno da Silva Pereira, Francisco Miranda Branco, Gregorio da Cunha Saldanha, Jacinto das Neves Raimundo Alves, Juvêncio de Jesus Martins, and Saturnino da Costa Belo** - had one thing in common which might have made the Indonesian authorities especially anxious to limit their contact with the Special Rapporteur: they were witnesses to the Santa Cruz massacre.

The prisoners were initially reported to have "disappeared". Relatives who went to the prison in Dili for a regular visit were reportedly told by other prisoners there that the six had been led away in handcuffs by a unit of the Police Mobile Brigade in the early morning hours of 9 or 10 June. As of 12 June, relatives had been unable to locate the six at other prisons and military installations in the city, and the authorities denied any knowledge of their whereabouts. Indonesian human rights organizations later discovered that they had been taken to a prison in Semarang, Central Java. Indonesian military authorities confirmed on 13 June that the six had been transferred to Semarang prison over the weekend.

Amnesty International welcomed the official clarification, but expressed regret that the authorities had failed to inform relatives in advance of the move, thereby causing considerable distress and concern for the prisoners' safety. It remains concerned that the prisoners are being held hundreds of miles from their homes, making visits by relatives and friends extremely difficult. Finally, in view of the fact that the six have been imprisoned for their non-violent political beliefs and activities, Amnesty International believes that they should be released immediately and unconditionally.

6. Conclusions and Recommendations

The human rights situation in East Timor remains serious in 1994 and, despite its often stated commitment to the protection of human rights, the Government of Indonesia has done little to address the root causes of the problem. This report has highlighted four particular areas of concern - torture, political imprisonment, extrajudicial execution and access to human rights monitors - both because they demonstrate the continuation of a long-standing pattern of abuse in East Timor, and because they appear to have been ignored or seriously misunderstood by member states of the UN.

Torture and ill-treatment continue to be used routinely to intimidate suspected political opponents of Indonesian rule and to extract political intelligence. At the same time, the government has failed to implement the concrete recommendations of the UN Special Rapporteur on torture. Political imprisonment after unfair trial, and short-term arbitrary detention remain commonplace. The government has failed to clarify the fate of more than a small fraction of an estimated 270 people killed and 200 others thought to have "disappeared" during and after the Santa Cruz massacre. The officers ultimately responsible for the killings have yet to be brought to justice, while civilians who survived the massacre or protested against it continue to serve lengthy prison terms. Meanwhile, further extrajudicial executions and "disappearances" have been reported during the year. Serious restrictions remain on effective human rights monitoring, and some human rights organizations, including Amnesty International, continue to be denied entry to the territory altogether. While the

government's decision to invite the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary execution to visit East Timor in July 1994 was a welcome step, concern remains about the conditions under which all such official visits take place.

The principal responsibility for improving the human rights situation in East Timor unquestionably rests with the Government of Indonesia. However, the international community necessarily shares some responsibility, particularly in view of East Timor's unresolved political status. The organization therefore offers the following set of recommendations to the Government of Indonesia, and to member states of the UN, in the belief that if implemented, they would go some way toward improving the situation.

Recommendations to the Government of Indonesia

- 1. Take immediate steps to implement the concrete recommendations of the UN Special Rapporteur on torture. In particular ensure that all persons deprived of their liberty are held in an officially recognized place of detention and are brought before a judicial authority promptly after arrest; and that all detainees are given prompt and unrestricted access to legal counsel of their own choice, as required by Indonesian and international law.*
- 2. Release all East Timorese prisoners of conscience immediately and unconditionally, and cease the practice of short-term arbitrary detention of peaceful political opponents and human rights activists.*
- 3. Account fully for the dead and the "disappeared" from the Santa Cruz massacre and its aftermath; and bring promptly to justice all those ultimately responsible for the Santa Cruz massacre.*
- 4. Permit all qualified observers and organizations - including those that have been critical of Indonesia's human rights record - to visit East Timor on a regular basis; and guarantee the safety of those who seek to provide information to visitors about human rights questions.*
- 5. Invite the UN Special Rapporteur on torture, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, and the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances to visit East Timor.*

Recommendations to UN Member States

- 1. Call upon the Indonesian authorities to implement the recommendations of the UN Special Rapporteur on torture.*
- 2. Express concern about the routine imprisonment of the government's political opponents in East Timor, and call for the immediate and unconditional release of all prisoners of conscience.*
- 3. Urge the Indonesian authorities to account fully for the dead and "disappeared" from the Santa Cruz massacre and its aftermath; and express concern at the government's failure to bring to justice all those ultimately responsible for the Santa Cruz massacre.*

4. Encourage the government to improve access to East Timor by human rights organizations, including Amnesty International, and to put an end to the legal and other obstacles that continue to impede the work of international and domestic human rights and humanitarian bodies.

5. Welcome the government's decision to invite the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions to visit East Timor in 1994, and suggest that it also extend invitations to the UN Special Rapporteur on torture, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, and the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances.