

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

SECURITY COMPANIES AND AUTHORITIES AT SCAMMING COMPOUNDS IN CAMBODIA

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL

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Cover image: The illustration shows a security guard standing inside a scamming compound where people are tortured and forced to conduct online scams, illustrated by Colin Foo

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CONTENTS

1.	**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**	**4**
1.1	METHODOLOGY	5
1.2	BACKGROUND	6
1.3	ROLE OF SECURITY GUARDS	7
1.4	SECURING A PROFIT	8
1.5	MILITARY AND POLICE LINKS TO COMPOUNDS	10
1.6	LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND ANALYSIS	13
1.7	CONCLUSION	15
1.8	RECOMMENDATIONS	15

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

"They would come in to use me [while] the security guards stood guard at the door."

Maia (not her real name) travelled to Cambodia thinking she would be working in a hotel. She thought she would make enough money to send home to her children. She was picked up at the airport by a driver but after hours in the car, she began to worry about where she was being taken. When she arrived at the scamming compound known as "Park 8" (PV01[1]), she immediately knew something was wrong. The car was ushered through gates with security guards checking license plates and directing traffic. They wore black uniforms, and many of them had covered their faces. When she got out of the car she was taken to an office where two guards held her by each arm and a boss told her to sign a contract.

Security guards moved *Maia* to her room. Wherever she went inside the compound, security guards were nearby, watching and waiting. When people caused trouble for the bosses, like not wanting to work, it was security guards who came into the room with electric shock batons and did what the bosses told them to do.

Maia was tasked with contacting US citizens to scam them. The company targeted Americans. When she didn't meet her work targets, a security guard took her to a dark room and locked the door. When the managers came to the dark room to rape her, the door was opened by security guards who stood guard throughout the attacks.

Maia was raped three times inside the dark room. She was not the only one. Amnesty International spoke to three other survivors of Park 8 who were raped while at the site.

Maia recalled the security guards carrying shock batons and pistols; some had bigger guns. She even said that people that looked like they were in the military had come into the compound when a boss visited. When shown pictures of the Park 8 compound, she recognized the gates and buildings. And when shown pictures of security guards at the site, she identified one individual from a photograph.

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1. Amnesty International uses codes to refer to scamming compounds. An example is the code "PV01". Codes are preferred because many compounds are referred to by multiple names, most of which are unofficial and can be confusing. Where a compound is referred to by the same name by multiple victims, Amnesty International will use that name and then the Amnesty-allocated compound code, for example "Park 8" (the name) and "PV01" (the code). All codes for compounds, as well as full descriptions of compounds, are found in Annexes to Amnesty International's previous reports on Cambodian scamming compounds. See Amnesty International, *"I Was Someone Else's Property": Slavery, Human Trafficking and Torture in Cambodia's Scamming Compounds*, (Index: ASA 23/9447/2025), 26 June 2025, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa23/9447/2025/en/ (hereafter *Someone Else's Property*); and Amnesty International, *Falling Through the Cracks: Cambodia's "Crackdown" on Scamming Compounds and the Victims it has Failed*, (Index: ASA 23/1093/2026), 8 June 2026, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ASA23/1093/2026/en/ (hereafter *Falling Through the Cracks*).

During the government's July 2025 crackdown, she managed to escape when the compound bosses began fleeing.

Security Response, a company profiled in this report, provided security at the Park 8 compound.

Maia's experience reflects a broader pattern documented throughout the scamming industry in Cambodia.



Maia's story, illustration by Colin Foo.

Amnesty International documented private security guards operating at all 82 scamming compounds it visited between 2024 and 2026, with survivors consistently describing compounds staffed by dozens, and sometimes hundreds, of **guards who enforced confinement, prevented escape, responded to resistance and, in many cases, directly participated in torture and other serious abuses**.

Amnesty International identified at least five security companies – *Leap Somnang Security*, *Security Response*, *ZD Security*, *Dara Security (DAS)* and *Best Security* – providing services to at least 23 scamming compounds.

Amnesty International also found links between serving members of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) and the Cambodian National Police and at least 22 of the 86 scamming compounds spread across ten provinces.

Amnesty International calls for these security companies, their owners, directors and managers, potentially individual guards, and any military, police, politically connected or business actors to be investigated for their role in serious human rights abuses and other crimes under international and domestic law.

1.1 METHODOLOGY

Over the past three years, Amnesty International has investigated the scamming industry in Cambodia, identifying 86 compounds across the country, interviewing more than 150 survivors and reviewing records of more than 400 additional victims. That research led to the publication of two earlier reports: "*I Was Someone Else's Property": Slavery, Human Trafficking and Torture in Cambodia's Scamming*

Compounds (June 2025) and *Falling Through the Cracks: Cambodia's "Crackdown" on Scamming Compounds and the Victims it has Failed* (June 2026).

This present report examines one of the key players in perpetrating human rights abuses in these scamming compounds: the private security companies guarding the compounds. It documents evidence identifying **at least five security companies providing services to at least 23 scamming compounds**, from as early as December 2021 to June 2026, spread across the country, including in the provinces of Sihanoukville, Koh Kong, Banteay Meanchey, Svay Rieng, Kampot, Tbong Khmum, Mondulkiri, Prey Veng, Takeo, and Preah Vihear. This report also examines the **connections between these security companies and military personnel and police officers**.

In identifying security companies operating at scamming compounds, Amnesty International relied on the following sources of information:

- **Site visits to 82 of the 86 scamming compounds** it had identified in its 2025 and June 2026 reports. During these visits, researchers took photographs of security guards allowing them to identify companies' logos and uniforms and show photographs to survivors.
- **Interviews with 151 survivors** of scamming compounds between January 2023 and September 2026, many of whom recognised logos of security companies and described abuse by security guards.
- **Geolocations of videos posted by 222 social media accounts that were confirmed to belong to guards or showed guards working at scamming compounds.** Amnesty International reviewed more than 25,000 videos and pictures from these accounts between June and August 2026.
- Review of information and **documents published by the companies or their staff**, including corporate documents filed with the Ministry of Commerce; employment advertisements posted on company pages on Telegram, Facebook and TikTok between January 2025 and August 2026; and other information posted on company websites or their social media.
- Analysis of photographs and videos from scamming compounds to assess whether individuals depicted were **current or former members of RCAF or National Police, based on uniforms, insignia, rank markings** and other identifying indicators.
- **Satellite imagery analysis to determine specific guard positions** and other security infrastructure towers within scamming compounds.
- A wide range of **secondary sources**, including reports published by the UN and civil society organizations, media reports, sanctions designations and other relevant documentation.

Annex I to this report sets out a profile for each of the 23 scamming compounds linked to a known security company. **Annex II** to this report sets out evidence linking 19 social media accounts detailing compound presence or activity to what appear to be active members of the RCAF and police.

Amnesty International wrote to the Cambodian government, each corporate actor and named individual identified in this report to provide them with an opportunity to respond to the organization's findings. **Annex III** includes the responses of the government, companies and individuals that responded to Amnesty International's communications.

1.2 BACKGROUND

Since the Covid-19 pandemic, Cambodia became one of the major global hubs for the online scamming industry, which evolved from illicit gambling and fraud operations into a highly organized transnational criminal ecosystem. These billion-dollar operations relied heavily on trafficked workers

from around the world, many of whom were lured to Cambodia through fraudulent job advertisements and then subjected to coercion, violence and exploitation. These abuses were primarily perpetrated by transnational organized criminal groups that operated across borders and recruited victims from dozens of countries. Although the fraudulent activities are criminal, they are often embedded within seemingly legitimate business structures, including licensed casinos and hotels operating in special economic zones and through registered companies, including security guard companies.

In response to growing international pressure, the Cambodian government launched a nationwide crackdown on scamming compounds in July 2025, reporting hundreds of interventions, arrests and rescues. While authorities claim to have dismantled hundreds of scam centres, deported thousands of foreign nationals and largely eradicated large-scale scam operations, Amnesty International has identified significant shortcomings in these efforts, including failures to identify trafficking victims and hold perpetrators to account, despite evidence linking many licensed casinos and prominent business figures to scamming compounds. As a result, concerns persist that scamming networks have become deeply embedded within Cambodia's political and economic systems.

Human rights abuses persisted at scamming compounds in Cambodia, despite years of public reporting and repeated law enforcement operations, because of the role of security personnel who controlled access to compounds, prevented escape, and enforced the systems of coercion operating inside them.

1.3 ROLE OF SECURITY GUARDS

> **"They didn't need any razor wire […] there were so many security guards."**

Security guards were a core component of the systems of confinement, surveillance, coercion and punishment used to deprive trafficked people of their liberty and maintain forced labour, torture, rape and, in many cases, conditions amounting to enslavement. All 82 compounds visited by Amnesty International in 2024, 2025 and 2026 employed security personnel, while survivor testimony, social media content and satellite imagery indicate that many compounds were staffed by dozens, and sometimes hundreds, of guards.

KEEPING PEOPLE INSIDE

Survivor testimony indicates that security guards controlled access to compounds, searched or screened vehicles and visitors, monitored workers' movements, escorted people within compounds and responded to escape attempts. Many reported witnessing or experiencing guards beating people who attempted to flee.

The consequences for escape attempts could be severe. At PO21, a compound in Poipet referred to as "Blackgate", a child survivor from Thailand said a guard beat him so severely he could not sit down. Survivors who attempted a mass escape in July 2025 reported that guards recaptured many of those who fled.

VIOLENCE, TORTURE AND OTHER ILL-TREATMENT

Security guards did not merely enforce confinement. Some survivors described them as **active participants in systems of torture, rape and other ill-treatment**. Survivors reported violence was commonly used to punish people who attempted to escape, resisted orders or failed to meet work targets. *Gabe* (not his real name), a Ugandan man, said he was tortured at PV01 (Park 8) by security guards wearing different uniforms from the perimeter guards. *Gabe* said he was taken to a dark room with large basins of water:

"They would make me stand in the water in my underwear for hours. Sometimes they would chain me to the pole above the water by my hands. Sometimes they would come in and just beat me for hours on end […] they would also shock me with an [electronic baton] while I was in the basin."

Kenyangi (not her real name), a Ugandan woman, said guards stood by while her boss repeatedly raped her. Numerous survivors reported that guards directly inflicted torture and other ill-treatment, including beatings, electric shocks, isolation and prolonged detention in "dark rooms". *Kane* (not his real name), a Kenyan man, described being held in a barred cell that guards carrying electric shock batons and metal poles regularly entered to beat detainees on the orders of compound managers. In one compound, Park 8, survivors reported that guards stood outside rooms while women were raped by managers and accompanied women to medical appointments following pregnancies resulting from rape.

POSSESSION OF WEAPONS

Survivor testimony, social media evidence and Amnesty International's previous investigations indicate that **security guards at scamming compounds routinely possessed and used weapons**. Most of the 151 survivors interviewed by Amnesty International reported seeing guards carrying or having access to electric shock batons, which survivors consistently described as tools of intimidation, ill-treatment and punishment. A survivor of the P018 compound began to cry as she recalled the sound the electric shock batons made. *Pattara* (not her real name) said guards would routinely enter rooms with shock batons drawn and engaged to deter any possible resistance as they searched bags and questioned victims. She said children inside the room would cry during these periods.

More than a third of the 151 survivors interviewed reported seeing security guards or other people carrying firearms, including pistols and rifles. Survivors reported seeing weapons at nearly 20 different scamming compounds, including at facilities protected by security companies examined in this report. At Park 8, several survivors said a guard fired shots into the air after workers demanded the return of their passports. Survivors additionally reported that guards used large dogs as part of compound security operations, including along perimeter walls and, in at least one case, to pursue people attempting to escape.

1.4 SECURING A PROFIT

Although security guards were central to the operation of scamming compounds, little is known about the companies that employed and deployed them. This report profiles five companies that are linked to some of the country's largest scamming compounds. The companies are not isolated commercial actors, rather, they are embedded within networks that connect private security providers to military personnel, police officials, politically exposed persons (PEPs) and powerful business interest, forming part of the infrastructure that enabled the industry to operate. Survivor testimony indicates that guards employed by these companies were not merely responsible for perimeter security, but in many cases directly participated in the systems of confinement, coercion and violence that sustained the scamming industry.

- ***Leap Somnang Security* provided security services to at least 15 scamming compounds, making it the most frequently identified security provider documented in this report.** Ban Sophat is believed to control *Leap Somnang* and publicly served as its chairman while also serving as a colonel in the RCAF. The company has been linked to several prominent figures connected to the scamming industry, including *Neak Okhna* Ly Kuong, who was arrested in 2026 on allegations including organized crime, money laundering and illegal recruitment for exploitation. Survivors often reported that *Leap Somnang* guards, who they identified by their

logos, deprived them of their liberty under threat of violence and, in some cases, directly participated in acts of torture and other ill-treatment, including beatings, electric shocks, prolonged isolation and threats of death. One survivor said a guard punched him so severely that he lost multiple teeth, while another reported that guards broke his friend's leg after he resisted. One survivor described guards entering a dark room to shock him with electric shock batons on the orders of compound managers. The evidence presented in this report also indicates that *Leap Somnang* personnel were deployed across multiple provinces and maintained relationships with military, police and politically connected actors.

In response to these findings, Sophat Ban denied holding any ownership, director or management role in *Leap Somnang* or involvement in the company's operations or alleged abuses, stating that he had "served as an advisor to the company owner" and "did not authorize, direct or take part in any abuse of any person" and condemned "human trafficking, forced labor, confinement and violence."

- ***Security Response*** **provided security services to at least five scamming compounds, including some of the largest compounds.** Evidence reviewed by Amnesty International indicates that the company maintained close links to Panda Bank and the Huione Group through shared directors and business relationships. These links were further reinforced by co-location at a building used by Panda Bank, which, while not determinative on its own, constitutes relevant contextual evidence when considered alongside other connections. These relationships are significant given allegations and sanctions linking Huione entities to money laundering and cyber-scam operations. Survivors identified *Security Response* guards as participating in the confinement of trafficked people and described guards carrying firearms, preventing escapes, facilitating violent regimes that supported rape and directly participating in torture and other ill-treatment, including beatings, electric shocks and prolonged restraint. The company appears to have continued operating at scamming compounds despite repeated police interventions and extensive public reporting on the sites. Taken together with its business relationships with companies accused or sanctioned in connection with the scamming industry, the company appears to have played a significant role in the wider ecosystem supporting the scamming industry.

In response to these findings, *Security Response* denied all allegations, stating that it operates lawfully as a registered security services provider and that neither the company nor its personnel had engaged in, authorized or been aware of any of the alleged unlawful activities at the compounds referenced by Amnesty International. While the company stated that "the company's registered address" had since changed, the company did not specifically deny its links to Panda Bank or the Huione group.

- ***ZD Security*** **provided security services to at least two scamming compounds**, **BS02 and BS04, both in Botum Sakor; the latter is one of the most prominent and repeatedly investigated scamming compounds**, often described simply as "Long Bay". Evidence reviewed by Amnesty International indicates that the company, formerly known as BIC Security, has links to the ZhengHeng Group and the BIC network of companies, including businesses associated with Yim Leak, the son of former Deputy Prime Minister Yim Chhaily. US authorities have sanctioned and investigated the ZhengHeng Group network for alleged scamming compound criminality and money laundering. Survivors trafficked to BS04 described torture and other ill-treatment, beatings, prolonged confinement and violence following requests for assistance from Cambodian authorities. One survivor reported being taken off-site, beaten and tied to a bed for a week after refusing to work. Others described guards carrying firearms and making escape effectively impossible. The company's presence at a prominent scamming compound, alongside its connections to politically connected business interests and influential Chinese diplomatic and political actors, raises serious concerns regarding its role in the broader scamming compound ecosystem.

- ***Dara Security* (*DAS*) provided security services to at least two scamming compounds in Sihanoukville, SI03 and SI50, both of which Amnesty International documented as sites of human trafficking, forced labour, deprivation of liberty and other serious human rights abuses.** Survivors identified *DAS* guards as responsible for preventing people from leaving the compounds and reported that guards carried firearms and electric shock batons. Survivors from *DAS*-guarded compounds described torture and other ill-treatment, including beatings, electric shocks and threats of violence, while one survivor reported witnessing the suicide of a fellow trafficked worker following repeated abuse and denial of requests to return home. Another survivor from SI50 reported being subjected to electric shocks after failing to meet work targets.
- ***Best (Cambodia) Security Service* (*Best Security*) provided services to at least one scamming compound, BA06 in Bavet, a site where Amnesty International documented trafficking in children and deprivation of liberty.** Although Amnesty International identified only one compound linked to *Best Security*, the association is significant. Evidence reviewed by Amnesty International suggests that the abusive system previously documented at BA06 remained operational during the period the company provided security services. Researchers observed extensive perimeter security, guard towers and strategically positioned guard posts consistent with the confinement and monitoring of victims. The compound was also linked to entities later sanctioned by the United States for involvement in cyber-enabled scams and forced labour. Amnesty International further identified a sign outside the company's office displaying a telephone number associated with Deputy Police Chief Lay Channy who was involved in Cambodia's nationwide crackdown, raising additional concerns regarding potential connections between the company and law enforcement authorities.

In response to these findings, *Best Security* stated that an internal review found no record of the company providing services at BA06 and suggested that the uniforms of the guards may have been copied or misused by a third party. The company's chairman also stated that the deputy police chief is the landlord of the company's Svay Rieng branch office and that his phone number was placed on company signage to assist clients when the branch was first established, emphasizing that "operations, general management and all decisions are exclusively the responsibility of my side and do not involve Mr. Lay Channy".

1.5 MILITARY AND POLICE LINKS TO COMPOUNDS

For years, survivors have described the presence of individuals they believed to be members of the Cambodian military or police at scamming compounds. Additional evidence suggested that compound operators were routinely forewarned of police raids and rescue attempts. Until now, these accounts could not be independently verified.

New evidence collected and verified by Amnesty International links serving members of RCAF and the police to at least 22 of the 86 scamming compounds identified by Amnesty International, spread across ten provinces from December 2021 to June 2026. These individuals acted not only as guards, but also as company directors, beneficial owners, recruiters, trainers and captains. This evidence does not establish a formal policy or direction by the RCAF or the Cambodian police as institutions. However, the involvement of serving personnel across multiple compounds indicates, at a minimum, knowledge and acquiescence within parts of both institutions.

First, at least three high-ranking military and police officers had links to scamming compounds that indicate involvement with the industry:

- **RCAF Colonel Ban Sophat**, who, despite his denial of any involvement, Amnesty International concluded led and controlled *Leap Somnang*, a company that provided security services to at least 15 scamming compounds.
- **Deputy Police Chief Lay Channy**, who, according to *Best Security*, owns the property rented by a *Best Security* branch office and whose private phone number the company confirmed was displayed on the company's signage as a client contact number. Lay Channy's links to *Best Security* are notable given his apparent role in anti-scamming enforcement efforts in Svay Rieng province, including participation in raids on suspected scamming sites and attendance at a Ministry of Interior meeting on behalf of the Svay Rieng Police Commissioner.
- **Brigadier General Tek Bunthoeun**, whose wife's company was developing the land on which the BM02 scamming compound was located and whom evidence suggests was directly involved in the project. Amnesty International also identified evidence of serving military personnel participating in the compound's operation, including the training and supervision of guards by an apparent RCAF member.

Amnesty International has identified an additional 19 RCAF or police officers, some linked to *Leap Somnang*, *Security Response* and *DAS*, with geolocated images showing them at 12 scamming compounds (six of which are the same compounds linked to Ban Sophat and *Leap Somnang*). Amnesty International verified photographs of official uniforms against publicly available official records and created timelines showing it was highly likely they were active members of the armed forces while inside the scamming compounds. Other military or police personnel likely entered or acted as guards at scamming compounds but did not publicly disclose their affiliation on social media.

In three compounds, **active military members trained or led security guards**. Individuals were seen instructing guards or being saluted by them, typically standing at the front of a group of guards. These exercises served an organizing function by transmitting skills and standardizing the practices of the guard force. This was often necessary because compounds routinely employed more than 100 security guards, and many had no prior experience in security roles.

For example, TikTok user NC001 (account name changed to protect identity), pictured below, was a member of the RCAF during the same period that he published videos in which he is seen leading the security guards at the SI12 compound. At least two other guards at the same compound were confirmed members of the RCAF.



A frame of a video published on social media (left) shows security guards standing in formation and saluting a man at SI12. A picture published on the same social media account shows the same man wearing the Royal Cambodian Military uniform at a ceremony in Viet Nam. Blurring of face added by Amnesty International. Source: Amnesty International; TikTok user NC001 (not their real username).

In three cases, Amnesty International suspected members of the RCAF or police openly carrying firearms while inside scamming compounds.



A frame of a video published on social media (left) shows a security guard at Park 8, a location identified by Amnesty International as the PV01 scamming compound. The top right image shows the location where the video was filmed on satellite imagery. The bottom right image shows the Royal Gendarmerie of Cambodia's logo, which is visible on the guard's t-shirt. Source: Amnesty International, TikTok user PV001 (not their real username), Google © 2026 Airbus.

These findings suggest that **serving members of the military and police were directly involved in providing security at compounds where serious human rights abuses were committed**. Because security guards played a central role in confining and abusing people inside the compounds, these personnel may themselves have participated in, contributed to or been responsible for those abuses. More broadly, **the findings strongly suggest that collusion between compound operators and state officials has helped the industry to persist despite the authorities' repeated, highly publicized crackdowns.**

1.6 LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND ANALYSIS

Amnesty International's research has found that **scamming compounds in Cambodia were characterized by a recurring pattern of human trafficking, forced labour, child labour, torture and other ill-treatment, rape, unlawful deprivation of liberty and, in many cases, enslavement. Security guards played a central role in maintaining these systems of abuse.**

Across the compounds documented by Amnesty International, guards received trafficked persons on arrival, controlled entry and exit points, prevented escape, recaptured escapees, enforced work requirements, escorted victims to punishment facilities, administered or facilitated beatings and electric shocks, and maintained continuous surveillance over those confined.

RESPONSIBILITY OF SECURITY COMPANIES

Guards employed by all five security companies—*Leap Somnang*, *Security Response*, *ZD Security*, *DAS* and *Best Security*—were linked to compounds where survivors described serious human rights abuses, including torture, forced labour, unlawful confinement, human trafficking and enslavement, with child labour documented at compounds linked to *Leap Somnang* and *Best Security*, and rape at a compound linked to *Security Response*. Across all five companies, the evidence indicates that guards were not merely providing perimeter security but were often integral participants in the systems through which severe abuses were carried out.

Many of the abuses documented in this report may constitute serious crimes under international law and Cambodian law, including trafficking in persons, torture, rape, unlawful confinement and enslavement. Guards who themselves inflicted violence may be characterized as direct perpetrators, while those who enforced confinement, prevented escape, escorted people to punishment rooms or stood guard during abuses provided assistance that may be characterized as aiding and abetting, or as intentional contribution to crimes committed by a group acting with a common purpose. Managers and executives of the security companies may bear superior responsibility, and under Cambodian law the security companies may themselves bear criminal responsibility as legal entities. Torture and slavery are crimes under international law subject that may be prosecuted under universal jurisdiction; trafficking may also be prosecuted by states whose nationals were victims or perpetrators.

RESPONSIBILITY OF CAMBODIAN AUTHORITIES

Under international human rights law, Cambodia has an obligation to protect all individuals within its territory from human rights abuses, including those committed by non-state actors, and to respond effectively when they occur by investigating the facts, holding those responsible to account and ensuring remedies for victims. Amnesty International concludes that **Cambodia has failed to adequately protect people from these abuses**. Despite extensive evidence linking security companies to compounds where serious human rights violations occurred, Amnesty International is unaware of investigations into the companies profiled in this report, their leadership or their wider networks. The government's response did not identify any such investigation. The evidence further suggests failures to regulate private security providers, monitor the use of weapons, investigate links between security companies and members of the military or police, or hold accountable actors connected to the scamming industry.

Further, where members of the military and police are involved, Cambodia's responsibility is not limited to a failure to exercise due diligence. Under customary international law, **the conduct of police and military personnel, as organs of the state, is attributable to the state**, even where they exceed their authority or contravene instructions, provided they act in an official capacity or with apparent authority. Where officials have participated in, facilitated or protected abuses within scamming compounds, Cambodia's responsibility is therefore engaged not only for failing to exercise due diligence, but directly for the abuses themselves. With limited exceptions, including the arrest of Ly Kuong, many of the companies, senior individuals and politically connected actors linked to the scamming compound industry appear to have remained largely untouched, contributing to a climate of impunity that may enable the continued operation of the industry.

In its response to Amnesty International, received on 15 October 2026, Cambodia's Ministry of Interior stated that between 1 July 2025 and 31 August 2026, authorities "cracked down on a total of 832

online scam sites" and sent "3,477 suspects (including 491 Cambodian nationals) and 446 case files to court." The Ministry said this showed the law is enforced "regardless of status or level of responsibility, including private security companies and private security agents." The figures included 10 security guards sent to court after a crackdown in Poipet, and six private security agents detained for illegal use of weapons. The Ministry also reported that "77 police officers received severe disciplinary measures" and that the Anti-Corruption Unit had "detained 17 suspects who were police, military, and civil officials," filing four cases to court for collusion with criminal groups. Describing the private security sector as "a support force for the National Police," the Ministry identified as a priority "strengthening the management and inspection of private security companies […] to prevent security services being used for illegal purposes."

Although the Ministry of Interior reported significant enforcement activity, its response did not identify any investigation into the security companies, military and police personnel or business networks profiled in this report, and did not show whether any charges relate to torture, forced labour or trafficking or whether trafficking victims were among those prosecuted. The full response is included in **Annex III**.

1.7 CONCLUSION

Security companies and the guards employed by transnational criminal organized groups were essential to the operation of the compounds. These companies and their personnel were also linked to a wider network of actors, including members of the military and police, politically exposed persons, and powerful political and business interests. Despite years of public reporting, the Cambodian authorities have failed to investigate these companies or the networks of protection around them.

Accountability is essential for the victims and survivors of serious human rights abuses. Those who committed, facilitated or knowingly contributed to these abuses must be identified and, where sufficient admissible evidence exists, prosecuted in fair trials without the recourse to the death penalty. Survivors must also receive effective remedies and full reparation from the Cambodian state, which bears responsibility for failing to protect them and, where its agents were involved, for the abuses themselves, and, where relevant, from the security companies.

Such accountability is also indispensable to any credible and sustainable effort to end the scamming compound industry in Cambodia. Raids may temporarily disrupt operations, free victims, close compounds or lead criminal syndicates to relocate, but without further investigations, they will not dismantle the security infrastructure and networks of protection on which the industry depends and to which it could return.

1.8 RECOMMENDATIONS

TO THE CAMBODIAN AUTHORITIES

- Establish prompt, independent, impartial and adequately resourced investigations into the role of private security companies in the scamming compound industry in Cambodia, including the companies identified in this report and any other providers operating at scamming compounds.
- Suspend the licences of security companies credibly implicated in serious human rights abuses pending effective investigations, and revoke licences where companies are found to have committed, facilitated or knowingly contributed to abuses.

- Investigate all members of the RCAF, Cambodian National Police, military police and other state security and law enforcement bodies credibly suspected of owning, managing, recruiting for, training, supervising or working for private security companies linked to scamming compounds.
- Investigate the wider networks enabling scamming compounds, including security companies, casinos, property owners, developers, recruiters, financial actors, telecommunications providers and politically connected individuals.

TO PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES OPERATING IN CAMBODIA

- Immediately cease providing services at any location where people are unlawfully confined, trafficked, forced to work, tortured or otherwise subjected to serious human rights abuses.
- Provide or contribute to effective remedy for all human rights abuses suffered by victims linked to security guard companies.

TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

- Press Cambodia to promptly, impartially and independently investigate companies, company leadership and state officials linked to scamming compounds, including through international and domestic mechanisms, rather than measuring progress through raids, arrests or deportations.
- Review law enforcement, military, financial and security cooperation with Cambodian institutions and individuals credibly implicated in enabling or protecting scamming compounds.
- Exercise jurisdiction, including universal or other extraterritorial jurisdiction where available, over groups, companies and people suspected of responsibility for crimes under international law, in the scamming compound industry, and if enough admissible evidence exists, issue arrest warrants.

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OFFICIAL BUSINESS

SECURITY COMPANIES AND AUTHORITIES AT SCAMMING COMPOUNDS IN CAMBODIA

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Amnesty International's new report shows how private security companies were central to the operation of Cambodia's scamming compounds and the serious human rights abuses committed within them. Drawing on research across 86 compounds, interviews with more than 150 survivors, site visits, social media analysis and other evidence, Amnesty International found that guards were not merely protecting premises but playing key roles in confining trafficked people, preventing escape, enforcing forced labour, and, in some cases, directly participating in torture and other ill-treatment. The report identifies five security companies linked to at least 23 scamming compounds and documents evidence connecting some of these companies to politically connected business actors, military personnel and police officers.

The report further finds links between serving members of the Cambodian military and police and at least 22 scamming compounds, raising concerns about official complicity and the failure of authorities to effectively dismantle the industry despite repeated crackdowns. Amnesty International concludes that security companies, individual guards, company executives and relevant state actors should be investigated for their possible role in trafficking, torture, deprivation of liberty, enslavement and other crimes. It calls on the Cambodian government to investigate security companies and state officials linked to the compounds, hold those responsible accountable, provide remedies to victims and survivors and address the wider networks of protection and support that enabled the scamming industry to flourish.

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