
CHAD

SUBMISSION TO THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE
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Amnesty International submits this document for the Human Rights Committee's March 2026 review of Chad under the ICCPR. It highlights failures to prevent violence linked to herder-farmer conflicts in southern Chad; barriers to justice, remedies and reparations for victims; and lack of accountability for alleged unlawful or excessive use of force by law enforcement (Articles 2(3), 6, 7, 14, 21).

1. INTRODUCTION

Amnesty International submits this document ahead of the Human Rights Committee's consideration of Chad's third periodic report on the implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in March 2026. This submission is not an exhaustive account. It focuses on the protection of the right to life, including failures to prevent foreseeable intercommunal violence, as well as barriers to effective remedies, access to justice and reparations for victims of violence linked to herder–farmer conflicts in southern Chad, and accountability for alleged unlawful or excessive use of force by law enforcement in this context, engaging Articles 2 (3), 6, 7 and 14 of the ICCPR.

This submission is based on Amnesty International's research on human rights violations in the context of conflicts between herders and farmers in Chad. This research project was conducted between March 2023 and September 2025, and included visits to Chad, interviews, and a review of relevant judicial and other materials. The findings were published in November 2025 in a report titled Chad: Live off the land and die for it.[1] Amnesty International documented several episodes of violence between 2022 and 2024 (including violence linked to an earlier episode in 2019), affecting 14 villages across four provinces (in Moyen-Chari, Mandoul, Logone Oriental and Logone Occidental). In the incidents documented, violence between farmers and herders resulted in 98 people killed and more than 100 injured, the destruction of more than 600 homes, and the theft of hundreds of heads of livestock and harvested products.

Farmer–herder relations in southern Chad have historically relied on local arrangements around land, water and transhumance corridors. In recent years, multiple drivers have increased tensions and contributed to recurrent violence, including climate-related pressure on pastoral resources, demographic growth and agricultural expansion, land disputes (including around corridors and access to water points), the circulation of weapons, and the rise of "neo-herders", linked to state structures, who own large herds.

2. RIGHT TO LIFE: FAILURE TO PREVENT FORESEEABLE INTERCOMMUNAL VIOLENCE (ARTICLES 2(3) AND 6)

Chadian authorities have taken several measures intended to prevent and manage agropastoral violence, including the establishment of marked transhumance corridors and stationing zones designed to organize livestock movements and reduce friction around farms, water points and grazing areas. However, these arrangements have not prevented recurring attacks and reprisals. Authorities acknowledged that although corridors and stationing zones have existed for several years, they are not respected in practice, which undermines a key prevention tool meant to reduce predictable flashpoints during transhumance.[2]

Authorities have also promoted local dispute-prevention mechanisms, including joint parity committees bringing together farmers' and herders' representatives, alongside other local frameworks. In Logone Occidental, provincial authorities described preventive steps taken during transhumance periods, including public communiqués intended to facilitate livestock circulation and field tours to engage stakeholders and identify areas at risk. The Laoukassi Convention (May 2010)[3] was also referenced as a framework to reduce conflict through village land-management committees and farmer–herder conflict-resolution committees mandated to mediate and conciliate, with escalation to customary authorities and ultimately courts if local mechanisms fail. Despite these initiatives, the recurrence of deadly violence suggests that local mechanisms have not been sufficiently resourced, enforced or supported to address disputes before they

[1] Amnesty International, *Chad: Live off the land and die for it, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr20/0288/2025/en/, 20 November 2025*

[2] Meeting in person with the Minister of security in N'Djamena, May 2023

[3] Convention de Laoukassi, https://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/Cha231672.pdf, mai 2010

escalate into attacks, particularly in a context where concerns are raised about limited institutional follow-up and the population's perceptions of partiality from authorities.[4]

Legal and policy measures have also not filled key regulatory gaps. Chad still lacks a pastoral code. A draft pastoral code adopted by the National Assembly in 2014 was censured by the Constitutional Council[5], and while an Agro-Sylvo-Pastoral and Fisheries Orientation Law was adopted in 2018[6], the law governing nomadism and transhumance dates back to 1959 and is described by multiple sector actors as obsolete in light of current dynamics.[7] This legal gap weakens the state's capacity to regulate transhumance effectively, clarify rights and obligations, and manage land and resource disputes that are repeatedly linked to violence.

In 2025, the Ministry of Livestock and Animal Production restarted a multi-stakeholder review of the draft Pastoral Code through zonal consultations. The process is facing difficulties, as the Catholic bishops of five southern dioceses have refused to participate, arguing that the draft Pastoral Code is unbalanced and could further fuel tensions.[8]

Finally, the ability of security forces to prevent loss of life has been limited by delayed interventions when attacks occur, including in situations where communities issued early alerts. Authorities acknowledged delays in interventions when villages are attacked, citing the country's size, limited territorial coverage, and resource constraints, with priorities sometimes shifted to border-related crises.[9] Communities reported difficulties reaching authorities and obtaining timely protection.[10] The continued circulation of weapons and an incomplete disarmament process further weakened by the dissolution[11] of the national disarmament commission in July 2024 contributed to creating a situation in which foreseeable risks were not effectively mitigated, and the population remained exposed to repeated, deadly violence.

3. ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND REPARATION FOR VICTIMS OF HERDER–FARMER VIOLENCE IN SOUTHERN CHAD (ARTICLES 2(3) AND 14)

Across the episodes of violence documented in villages in Moyen-Chari, Mandoul, Logone Oriental and Logone Occidental, victims described killings, injuries, destruction of homes and property, pillage, and displacement. In several locations, victims and community members reported that they did not file complaints, citing lack of trust in the justice system and the perceived cost and inaccessibility of judicial procedures in rural areas. Concerns were also raised about delays and about interference of administrative and military authorities in court cases.[12]

Structural and practical barriers undermine victims' ability to access justice. These include limited judicial presence and resources outside major urban centres; lack of transport and logistical means for justice actors and victims; gaps in technical capacities, including the absence of medico-legal analyses in cases

[4] Meetings in N'Djamena and Moundou with several NGO in May and October 2024

[5] RFI, Tchad : le projet de loi sur le code pastoral inconstitutionnel, https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20141227-tchad-projet-loi-code-pastoral-inconstitutionnel-eleveurs-agriculteurs, December 2014

[6] Gouvernement du Tchad, Ordonnance n°043/PR/2018 portant Orientation Agro-Sylvo-Pastorale et Halieutique, 31 août 2018.

[7] Meetings in N'Djamena and Moundou with several NGO in May and October 2024

[8] Land portal, Tchad : éleveurs, agriculteurs... le Code pastoral divise toujours de larges pans de la société, https://landportal.org/fr/news/2026/01/tchad-%C3%A9leveurs-agriculteurs-le-code-pastoral-divise-toujours-de-larges-pans-de-la, 14 September 2025

[9] Meeting in person with the Minister of security in N'Djamena, May 2023

[10] Amnesty International in-person interviews with victims and eyewitnesses, conducted in July 2023 and October 2024.

[11] Gouvernement du Tchad, décret n°113 du 22 juillet 2024

[12] Amnesty International in-person interviews with victims and eyewitnesses, conducted in July 2023 and October 2024.

involving deaths; and significant financial obstacles to filing and pursuing cases.[13] Victims reported they could not afford legal representation. Lawyers reported working pro bono in several cases and indicated that costs related to proceedings and evidence collection remain prohibitive for many victims.[14]

Accountability gaps remain significant. While some cases of violence were investigated and brought to trial and resulted in convictions and damages awards, several other incidents were reported as having no complaint filed and no procedure initiated, or no procedure opened despite serious violence, leaving victims of these violences without justice or reparations. Evidence gathered by Amnesty International also indicates risks of obstruction and interference affecting arrests and proceedings, including alleged obstruction preventing arrest in a major case concerning the village of Sandana. In this case, the Commission of Inquiry into the Sandana incidents, along with members of civil society and human rights NGOs, highlighted[15] the role of local authorities and security forces in perpetuating impunity: in 2019, an official allegedly prevented the arrest of an individual wanted for an attack on Sandana in 2019 and his accidental death in 2022 prompted another attack on the same village that year.

Where courts issued decisions awarding damages, further obstacles impeded reparations. This is illustrated by cases in Sandana (Moyen-Chari)[16] and Bara 2[17] (Mandoul), where criminal proceedings resulted in convictions and awards of damages to victims, but enforcement costs prevented victims from accessing compensation. The Bara 2 attack on 25 May 2023 killed 12 people (all adults), while Sandana recorded 7 villagers killed (and two assailants killed) on 26 August 2019, followed by a further 13 people killed on 9 February 2022. In Sandana, the Court of Appeal of Sarh issued criminal judgments relating to the 2019 and 2022 violence. On 4 April 2023, the Court convicted several individuals and awarded 300,000,000 FCFA (USD 537,017) for damages to the civil parties. On 15 May 2024, the Court issued a further judgment in relation to the 2022 violence, including convictions and an award of 200,000,000 FCFA (USD 358,011) in damages.

In Bara 2, following the violence of 25 May 2023, the Court of Appeal of Sarh issued a criminal judgment on 21 May 2024, including convictions and an award of 215,000,000 FCFA (USD 384,862) in damages to the civil parties. Despite these judicial decisions, victims faced an additional financial barrier at the enforcement stage.

To execute the judgments and access the awarded sums, victims were required to pay fees linked to enforcement/registration formalities, including a fee linked to a 3% registration duty. Victims were unable to cover these costs, which in practice blocked enforcement and prevented them from receiving court-ordered compensation. In parallel, people interviewed described reliance on customary settlements and amicable resolutions, including the use of customary compensation ("diya")[18] and arrangements negotiated through traditional authorities. These practices were linked to the perception that formal justice is slow, costly, or inaccessible, and to the immediate need for redress and social de-escalation at community level.

It should be noted that the Committee against Torture, in its concluding observations on Chad in December 2022 expressed concerns regarding the practice of "blood money (diya)" and its continued practice.[19]

[13] In-person interview with several officials from the Ministry of Justice, N'Djamena, September 2024

[14] Amnesty International in-person interviews with victims and eyewitnesses, conducted in July 2023 and October 2024.

[15] Commission of inquiry into the Sandana events established by Decision No. 001/PCMT/PMT/2022, *Report of the inquiry into the Sandana events*, September 2022, copy obtained by Amnesty International.

[16] Court of Appeal of Sarh, *Criminal judgment* No. 05/20223, 4 April 2023 and Court of Appeal of Sarh, *Criminal judgment* No. 010/2024, 15 May 2024

[17] Court of Appeal of Sarh, *Criminal judgment*, No. 020/2024, 21 May 2024

[18] Diya is a form of financial compensation paid by the perpetrator's family (or group) to the victim's family, most commonly in cases of killing or serious bodily harm, within customary or religious frameworks, sometimes used as part of a settlement intended to restore social peace.

[19] Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Chad, https://docs.un.org/en/CAT/C/TCD/CO/2, Para 37, 7 december 2022

4. EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE AND LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY (ARTICLES 6, 7 AND 21)

In addition, the context of intercommunal violence, incidents were documented during which law enforcement used live ammunition in contexts of public protest, raising concerns under the right to life and the obligation to ensure an effective remedy through prompt, independent and effective investigations.

In Krim-Krim (Logone Occidental) on 22 November 2022, law enforcement officials killed demonstrators. This law enforcement shootings followed farmer–herder violence in the villages of Koutoumare 1 and 2 on 18 November 2022. On 22 November, the canton chief and gendarmes reportedly went to Koutoumare to recover a motorcycle left behind by assailants and arrested the person with whom the motorcycle was parked. In response, villagers marched towards the Krim-Krim gendarmerie to demand the detainee's release.[20] Witnesses stated that, as demonstrators approached the gendarmerie, law enforcement officers fired live ammunition without warning, killing eight people and injuring 37, including 35 men and two women. Residents and a human rights organization[21] indicated that no investigation or judicial action was initiated to establish responsibility for these unlawful killings, that no villagers were questioned by judicial authorities, and that the prosecutor did not respond to requests for information. Witnesses also stated that the detainee was held for about four months before being released without charge.

A similar pattern was documented in Laramanaye (Monts de Lam department, Logone Oriental) on 14 January 2025, in the context of escalating farmer-herder violence and insecurity in early January. After a woman was abducted in Ngaram Tapol (night of 4–5 January) and following subsequent killings and reprisals (including the killing of a young person from Bédara on 10 January, the killing of a herder the same day, and the arrest of three village chiefs), tensions intensified. On 12 January, after a young man from Seh was found with his throat cut, residents reportedly brought his body to the Laramanaye sub-prefecture and blocked the road, demanding action. On 14 January, women protested outside the sub-prefecture, some reportedly bringing along the abducted woman's child, while young people protested at the gendarmerie, demanding the release of the arrested village chiefs. According to media reports[22] and a civil society report[23], gendarmes responded by opening fire, killing four young people and injuring three others. To Amnesty International's knowledge, no investigation was opened following this incident.

The absence of prompt, independent and effective investigations into alleged unlawful killings and unlawful or excessive use of force combined with broader barriers that prevent victims of intercommunal violence from accessing courts and obtaining court-ordered compensation undermines the right to an effective remedy and weakens protection of the right to life and the right to peaceful assembly.

[20] In-person interviews in Krim-Krim (July 2023) and Moundou (October 2024)

[21] Ligue tchadienne des Droits de l'homme (LTDH), *Rapport sur les évènements de Krim-Krim*, 30 November 2022

[22] Lepaystchad.com, Logone Oriental : des femmes du village Laramanaye manifestent torses nus pour protester contre l'insécurité croissante, 14 January 2025

[23] CAMOL, *Rapport sur les tueries dans le département de Laramanaye du 17 au 19 janvier 2025*

5. RECOMMENDATIONS

Amnesty International recommends that the Chadians authorities:

- Develop a coherent legal framework on transhumance, in consultation with representatives of herding communities, farmers and civil society organizations, that defines the periods, corridors, resting points and rules for the use of natural resources, taking into account climatic and demographic realities.
- Adopt a consensual Pastoral code and revive joint committees composed of herders, farmers, local authorities and state representatives in order to prevent conflicts and locally manage incidents related to the passage of herds.
- Adopt and implement measures to control the use of weapons by individuals, by establishing an effective licensing system, promoting regular disarmament operations and establishing an effective control system.
- Create, as needed, police stations near areas identified as having a high potential for conflict and strengthen existing ones; ensure that these stations are sufficiently staffed and provided with adequate means of communication and transport, so that they can interact regularly with the surrounding villages, carry out prevention patrols, respond to alerts and reach the locations as quickly as possible in the event of an incident.
- Ensure effective, independent and impartial judicial investigations into all cases of violence between farmers and herders; if there is sufficient evidence, prosecute and try those suspected of murder, serious injury, looting/destruction of livestock, houses, fields and other essential livelihoods through fair trials before competent, independent and impartial courts.
- Ensure that victims of violence between farmers and herders can obtain, where necessary, appropriate reparations, including taking the necessary measures to ensure the effective enforcement of court decisions, granting damages to victims and waiving the costs imposed on victims to ensure the enforcement of decisions, so that they can receive their compensation.
- Ensure effective, independent and impartial judicial investigations into all alleged cases of unlawful killings and unlawful use of force by defence and security forces during demonstrations; if there is sufficient evidence, prosecute and try persons suspected of murder and other human rights violations through fair trials before competent, independent and impartial courts.

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