



# AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL BULLETIN

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## INTERNATIONAL ASSEMBLY 1966

PRELIMINARY replies from National Sections and individual members suggest that there will be an exceptionally large attendance at this year's International Assembly to be held in Copenhagen from Friday September 2nd to Sunday September 4th. We are awaiting full replies before making the final division of delegates into the four Committees in which much of the Assembly's work will be done. The Committees will deal with:

1. Action at International Level.
2. Extension of AMNESTY's Relations in Sensitive Areas.
3. Action for Prisoners.
4. Extension of AMNESTY's Influence Nationally and Co-operation between National Sections.

Various resolutions have also been submitted for consideration. One resolution from the Swedish Section reads as follows:

"Since AMNESTY was founded the international situation has changed a great deal and the movement has got new important experience.

1. The need for broad collective initiatives for general amnesties for political prisoners is becoming more and more urgent. We think it necessary that the individual work for adopted prisoners to a greater extent should be combined with well prepared international campaigns of

action for general amnesties in specially chosen countries every year.

2. There is reason to reconsider, make clear and sum up AMNESTY's aim, working methods and forms of organisation. We therefore wish to question whether the aim "a movement for freedom of opinion and religion" is adequate or perhaps too limited, whether a tripartite division of the world is outdated and whether all political prisoners shall be eligible for adoption. We suggest that the executive committee takes on itself the task of preparing international campaigns of action for general amnesties in countries to be chosen by the annual conference, and that it puts forward a proposal for a co-ordinated, renewed programme for AMNESTY. (Swedish Section.)

Resolutions covering some of the points in the Swedish Resolution have also been received from other Sections. In particular it has been suggested that adopted prisoners should no longer be labelled East, West and Third World but instead prisoners in Communist countries, in countries where the Communist party is *specifically* discriminated against and in other countries. The Library and Research Department are making an investigation as to how any new division of categories would affect the number of prisoners available for adoption. Perhaps delegates and others attending the Copenhagen Assembly would like to think about these suggestions.

## Prison Reports

THE Prison Reports decided upon by the Scheveningen Assembly of 1965 are at present with the printers. The countries dealt with are East Germany, Rhodesia and Paraguay and the reports are perhaps even better than last year's. Last year delegates speaking in the Committee considering Periodic Reports of the Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations went out of their way to praise the impartiality of AMNESTY's reports on South Africa, Portugal and Rumania and to say that these were some of the most useful reports submitted by non-governmental organisations. Once again we have sought above all to be factual and objective. In every case we have sought the co-operation of the Government concerned to explain and defend its policies or to give more information about conditions of imprisonment. Readers must judge for themselves whether the degree of co-operation we have received betokens an easy or a troubled conscience.

These reports will cost four shillings per copy in soft cover and twelve shillings and sixpence for all three reports bound together in hard covers. We hope to make them available for the International Assembly and to present them officially at Copenhagen.

## SOUTH AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

THE decision of the International Court of Justice *non-suiting* Ethiopia and Liberia is not so much a blow to the cause of freedom as to that of international law. It is no secret that a decision of the Court hostile to *apartheid* would have been extraordinarily difficult to enforce. Had such a decision been given, the United Nations itself might have proved unable to give practical effect to the judgment, for it was more than a rumour that South Africa was prepared to repel any attempt at U.N. intervention by armed force. The judgment favourable to South Africa saves the United Nations from the danger of appearing futile, but at the same time reveals that one of its principal organs, the International Court of Justice, is an anachronistic farce. Whatever the strict legal merits of the 8-7 decision, it is perfectly inexcusable to take over 6 years to reach it. Nor is it anything but nonsense to reach a decision that, because the League of Nations is dead, there is no legal way of following-up any of its decisions. It is like a domestic court of law saying that once a man is bankrupt, there is no-one, not even his family or his creditors, who can bring proceedings on his behalf.

The ponderous functioning and inordinate delays of international judicial tribunals are a matter of considerable concern to AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL. As a movement committed to the ultimate establishment of international judicial machinery to

enforce the Universal Declaration of Human Rights The Hague Court's decision on South Africa gives us cause for disquiet. Nor are we happy about the lengthy delays in hearing cases before the European Court of Human Rights. The European Commission, we are glad to hear, is seriously entertaining as a violation of the European Convention of Human Rights, the complaint of a German who was held in prison for 10 months before trial. Yet the Commission is now taking on an average over a year to consider each case, and it is only after a report from the Commission that the case can continue its journey to the European Court of Human Rights.

At the present time the United Nations is contemplating the establishment of judicial machinery to enforce the U.N. Convention against Racial Discrimination. As soon as the first 27 countries have ratified that Convention, a Committee of 18 will be set up to hear complaints in the first place from one state against another, rather similar to the International Court of Justice. Only when states accept the optional clause in the Convention will individuals be able to bring their complaint to New York; in this last respect the machinery is like that under the European Convention of Human Rights. Will the new U.N. machinery be as slow and as expensive as that which has evolved over the years at The Hague and Strasbourg?

One significant point about The Hague decision on South-West Africa is that all the non-European judges, a minority of 7 to 8, decided that the Ethiopian complaint was receivable. It was the European judges who took the conservative, cautious view. It is Europeans who have been responsible up to now in evolving International Law and the procedure of international tribunals. This law and particularly those procedures are quite unrelated to the technical advances of the astronautical age. When space-craft can circumnavigate the globe in an hour, it is anachronistic beyond permissible endurance to have legal procedures which take years. These procedures are based upon the prejudices and subjective reactions of rather elderly men, nominally independent, but each in practice owing his appointment to his own national government. Today technologists have developed systems of scientific analysis of data; it is not necessary for rather deaf human beings to have to strain to understand lawyers and witnesses speak in a foreign language; evidence written in an international system of notation can be processed in seconds by machinery.

It is interesting to note that motorists are becoming so irked by the delays in litigation in their own national courts that there is a serious move in Britain and France to provide for universal insurance to cover all motor accident cases. Is there a moral from this move to oust the 19th century

trial-court procedure? Yes, that once there is a complaint to an international tribunal there should be no waiting about. Each party should nominate his own arbitrator, only pausing to have the appointment certified by the Clerk of the international tribunal. The appointments should lapse if the case is not heard within a time-limit. If the two arbitrators cannot reach an agreed decision within the time-limit, they should endeavour to pick upon a third-party umpire. If they cannot even agree on that, then an umpire should be appointed by the Clerk to the tribunal. In other words from now on we need a system under which there are no more state-nominated judges on international courts, but one where each party chooses an expert arbitrator (who need not necessarily be a lawyer). The Hague decision on South-West Africa will have served the world well if it is used as the occasion to up-date the methods of international justice.

### INDONESIA

THE recent wholesale killings in Indonesia have spotlighted one of AMNESTY's apparent weaknesses. The AMNESTY system of Group adoption has always meant that we have tried to focus attention on individual cases. Even when the International Secretariat or National Sections have tried to focus attention on groups they have usually been groups of prisoners of conscience. It is true that the International Assembly of 1964 at Canterbury passed a resolution opposing capital punishment for political offences in peace time and urging, as an interim measure, a cooling-off period of 6 months between the passing of death sentences and their execution. This resolution did not refer specifically to prisoners of conscience only but covered all persons charged with offences derived from political convictions. Nevertheless, AMNESTY has always been considered an organisation devoted primarily to individual prisoners of conscience rather than an organisation attempting to influence nationwide political situations.

What then should AMNESTY's attitude be to the events of September 30th, 1965, in Indonesia and their sequel? Without making any judgment on the vexed question of who started the sequence of coups and counter coups—Generals, Communists or Chinese-paid agitators—the fact remains that in the upshot a campaign of something approaching extermination against the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) was undertaken. The International Secretariat has had the benefit of extremely interesting confidential reports from experts on Indonesia and reliable observers who have been there recently. We publish extracts from a report circulated by us to National Sections and certain international organisations and newspapers.

“Apart from scattered violence that followed immediately after the failure of the coup, the main

clashes with the PKI appear to have come only after the arrival of the RPKAD (the army's elite corps of para-commandos) in Central Java towards the end of October. There was little communist resistance although it was said that the killing of PKI in Central Java started as a reprisal. The even more severe outbreak in East Java came on a wave of violence from Central Java at the beginning of November. By the end of November the wave spread to Bali, where the backlog of resentment and rivalry, and the tensions since the beginning of October, produced an emotional fever which resulted in large numbers of houses of communists and Chinese being burned.

“Estimates of deaths in Bali range from the official figure of the fact-finding committee at 12,000, to those of reliable observers who quote figures of more than 60,000. At Atjeh violence appears to have been injected with the fire of a holy war. There also there was a great deal of anti-Chinese rioting—according to one report no Chinese were left alive in the west coast area of the Province. A notable instance of the strength of the anti-Chinese feeling was the riots in Medun in North Sumatra, where staff of the Chinese consulate frightened by a demonstration, fired above the heads of the crowd, and thereby provoked the wreckage of the Chinese district with a loss of approximately 200 lives. In North Sumatra the army seems to have played a more active role in the attempt to eliminate the PKI—the official figures from Antara were 10,500 arrested, and many of these were shot and their bodies thrown into the Sungai Ular. Reliable information, apart from rumours, about the undoubted killings and arrests in other areas is even more difficult to obtain, although there are some Antara figures, such as the arrest of 30,000 (reported on December 20th) from S. Kalimantan.

“Total figures of any accuracy may never be known. Major General Sumarno's fact-finding committee announced on March 1st a total of 78,000 killed. This would appear, however, to be well below the figures more commonly accepted (except, perhaps, by the student groups). Before Dr. Subandrio's overthrow in mid-March there were strong rumours that he wanted to have Nasution and Suharto tried for genocide, and the number of dead was mentioned at a quarter of a million. The Western press usually quote figures between 300,000 and 750,000, although up to two million has been suggested. But as one Australian journalist pointed out, one raft carrying ten bodies floating down a stream seen by ten different people, becomes quite easily 100 dead.

“There are official numbers of arrests, but these too seem to be underestimated. By early June it was generally accepted that the figure was nearer 200,000. Even this may well be an understatement. Those reported as being directly involved in the

coup (some of these are communists, but many are not) are being tried by military tribunal, and reports indicate that those tried are found guilty and shot. Leaders and cadres of the PKI and its associates, containing the middle echelon of important communists, are considered a major security problem, and despite official assurances, some detainees are being summarily executed. There have been releases, but both the prison authorities—presumably in most cases the army—and the released prisoners have found themselves in difficulties. Those being released fear the consequences of freedom, and in some cases they are demonstrably correct in their fears. Those responsible for these releases fear both an upsurge of feeling against the ex-prisoners, and perhaps even more, reprisals from them.

“Certainly the families of the PKI or suspected PKI suffered also. Many women and children were killed. Army authorities on several occasions are reported to have said that the killing of the immediate family was done in order to stop reprisals either in the near or less immediate future. The extent of the deaths must often have been carried out for fear of future power to redress a balance.”

We took the opportunity of a mission to Britain of an Indonesian economic delegation headed by Mr. Umajadi, one of the deputy Foreign Ministers, to issue a press statement asking for a postponement of all executions pending the formation of a new government under General Suharto on August 17th and the full re-establishment of the normal legal processes. This received good publicity and provoked a reply from the Foreign Minister, Dr. Adam Malik, telling us (very politely) to mind our own business.

It may seem that AMNESTY should have given greater publicity to the terrible facts known to us but we have tried to be practical and realistic and feel that the first step is to bring Indonesia back into the comity of nations in the hope that the presence of United Nations or International Red Cross personnel will lead to an improvement in the conditions of the approximately 160,000 political prisoners now in detention. We have also drawn the attention of interested organisations and newspapers to the problem of the Chinese in Indonesia and in particular to the question of what may happen to them if there is a voluntary or involuntary exodus. Above all it is important that they should not be sent against their will to the mainland if they happen to be non-Communists.

## PORTUGAL—BRIEF REPORT

*by Lord Gifford*

ON July 12th and 14th I attended the trial in Lisbon of Roderio Rodrigues de Carvalho and Pedro Vieira de Almeida.

Carvalho was accused of escaping from prison in 1960, leading a clandestine life, being a member of the central committee of the Communist Party, directing Communist activities, circulating subversive literature, and using false identities. He was not permitted to attend at his own trial, nor to talk with his lawyer in private. The lawyer accordingly withdrew from the defence in protest; no evidence was brought for or against him; and at the end he was sentenced to 7 years. There was no need to impose security measures; as the judge pointed out, he was already subject to them.

Vieira de Almeida, a brilliant young architect aged 32, had by his own admission given Carvalho a meal and a bed on four occasions during 1962, and had given him his driving licence. In addition he was accused of being a member of the Communist Party, of working in liaison with Carvalho, and of maintaining contacts with other Communists. For this he was liable to imprisonment of 2 to 8 years, plus security measures.

The only witness for the Police spoke for about two minutes; he said that he had been psychologically disturbed at the time of the interrogation, and remembered nothing about it. The rest of the first day proceeded normally enough; the accused spoke for about fifteen minutes in his own defence, and a number of eminent witnesses were called on his behalf.

The most that anyone expected was a “light” sentence of a year or two, and many feared security measures. In the event the judges found that the charges relating to Communist activities were not proved, sentenced Vieira de Almeida to 6 months for harbouring Carvalho, but since he had already spent that time in prison before trial, ordered his release. It was a compromise verdict, but it represented a great victory for all concerned.

The most significant feature of the trial was the reference made to my own presence and to foreign intervention generally. I had been allowed to sit on the lawyers’ benches, and after the first day I had written to the President of the Court thanking him for this permission and expressing my confidence that I would be able on my return to say that justice had been done. On the second day, after reading the verdict, the President launched into declamatory peroration. Brandishing a fistful of letters—mostly from England—he said how perturbed he had been to receive them. He had not even shown them to his fellow judges. But he was not influenced by any outside pressure; the Portuguese courts were free, independent and fair. The English lawyer had recognised the independence of the court; and he advised foreign observers to go in future to other countries where they still condemned people to death and to life imprisonment. It was a remarkable performance, and everyone present thought that it showed that the judge

had in fact been extremely impressed by the pressure from abroad. It was reported at length in the Portuguese press the next day.

The extent of the Court's independence was illustrated later in the evening. Despite telephone calls from the defence lawyer to the judge, and from the judge to the chief of police and prison governor, the police refused to release Vieira de Almeida that night. It is very unlikely that they resisted much longer, but the incident was symptomatic of their power. Even if the judge was sincere in his protestations about the independence of the courts, I am convinced that the efforts of AMNESTY strengthened his hand against the police and made it easier for him to deliver a favourable verdict.

### EAST EUROPEAN SECTION

REPORTS in the Press recently of trouble in the Russian Baptist Church come as no surprise. Some time ago we adopted some Baptists, sentenced in 1962 to prison sentences after being convicted of "subverting youth from participation in social life", "organising Bible study groups for young People", and conducting religious propaganda generally. Some more recent information came in the form of a letter written by some members of a Baptist splinter group in the Altai district of Southern Siberia in 1964, telling of the imprisonment of some of their members on charges of conducting religious meetings illegally and under insanitary conditions, conducting propaganda against the official All Union of Evangelical Christian Baptists, and of "interpreting the Bible in a way harmful to society". Sentences of up to five years were imposed. Two weeks after the trial one of the prisoners, Nikolai Kuzmitch Hmara, was stated to have died, and his body to have arrived at his wife's home with burns on the soles of his feet, black and blue areas over the whole of his body and deep wounds in the lower abdomen.

This document is believed to be genuine, and the story it tells is consistent with other stories of religious persecution all over the Soviet Union. Although it is quite possible that some adherents to the splinter Baptist movements are fanatical, one should not imagine that stories of ritual child murder committed by desperado sectarian Baptists (*Izvestia* published a sensational story to this effect recently) are really relevant to the problem as a whole, nor should one assume that all members of Russian religious sects and splinter groups are a menace to society. Those people wishing further information about the background to the imprisonment of Russian Baptists and the dissensions between the State-infiltrated All-Union Council of Baptists and splinter groups should write and ask for the background sheet which has been prepared on the subject; groups having Baptist prisoners are automatically supplied with copies.

### Note to Groups with Hungarian Prisoners

ALL groups with Hungarian prisoners should recommence activities, if they have not already done so. Lord Gifford will be visiting Hungary again next month, and we still hope that the Hungarian Government will supply him with the information that he asked for last April concerning all our adopted prisoners there.

### PAKISTAN

THE increased tension between the two halves of Pakistan which are divided from each other by Indian territory has led to a decisive setback for the cause of press freedom. In July 1965 the Pakistan Government announced a 12-month moratorium on the Press Laws. This moratorium left the national Press free to regulate its conduct on a voluntary basis through its own Court of Honour.

Subsequently, however, the East Pakistan Awami League increased its agitation for regional autonomy. Mr. Tofazzal Hussain, editor of the Bengali daily *Ittefaq* of Dacca as well as an English and a Bengali-language weekly, was on several occasions warned that his outspoken criticism of the provincial administration was attracting unfavourable attention. On June 17th, 1966, Mr. Hussain was arrested and his printing-press seized. Two other journalists were arrested at the same time.

In Pakistan there have been vigorous protests from the Council of Pakistan Newspaper Editors and the East Pakistan Union of Journalists while working journalists in East Pakistan staged a 24-hour strike. Ironically, Mr. Hussain had not only been head of the Pakistan Section of the International Press Institute (which has also protested) but had been Secretary of the Court of Honour. Suits have now been filed by Mr. Hussain's son both to secure his father's release and to get back the confiscated printing press.

### NORTHERN IRELAND

THE International Secretariat, in conjunction with the British Section, is undertaking an investigation into the Special Powers Act in Northern Ireland and other measures as they may affect human rights and freedom of expression. As members will know, it is not the policy of AMNESTY for a Group or National Section to adopt prisoners in their

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own country but in this case there are no adoptions as such. We are particularly grateful to the Belfast Group for agreeing to co-operate in this enquiry.

### ADEN

As we go to press, we are expecting the imminent arrival in London of Dr. Salaheddin Rastgeldi, a member of the Executive of the Swedish National Section. Dr. Rastgeldi will be visiting London and Cairo before going on to Aden where he hopes to investigate both the conditions of detention and the reasons for detention given by the authorities. The Swedish National Section is making a generous contribution to the costs of this mission and the British National Section is also giving substantial financial support. We are particularly anxious to make more use of delegates from outside the United Kingdom.

### NEWS FROM THE BRITISH SECTION

The Annual General Meeting of the British Section took place on June 11th at Bristol University and was attended by over 100 people, with 21 Groups being represented. Domestic concerns occupied most of the day but for many the highlight of the meeting was the account by Mrs. Adelaide Hains, wife of the former Chairman of the Liberal Party in Pretoria, of her experiences as a "banned" person in South Africa.

The meeting agreed that a resolution be transmitted to the International Assembly at Copenhagen in September to urge the establishment of machinery in or before Human Rights Year 1968 for the issue of a United Nations passport to persons who have been deprived of their nationality by states pursuing a policy in contempt of United Nations resolutions.

A further resolution was passed expressing concern over the situation of detainees in Aden. The British Section is jointly sponsoring the visit of an AMNESTY observer.

The Treasurer displayed an *illuminated manuscript* of Salvador de Madariaga's "*Litany for the Day of Human Rights*". This was being printed at virtually no cost to AMNESTY and would be sold for framing at 10/6 a copy. Members are asked to encourage their friends, local schools, etc., to buy copies.

As in previous years AMNESTY *Christmas Cards* and lists of prisoners will be available by the end of August.

### Raffle

This was drawn on Midsummer Day, June 24th, 1966, and the prizewinners are: First Prize £100, Mrs. M. Withers, 9 Woodsome Road, N.W.5. Second Prize £50, Mrs. L. Trier, 12 Crescent Road, S.W.20.

Third Prize £25, Mr. A. Briggs, 37 Bettspool Meadows, Redbourn, Herts. All the prizewinners are connected with Threes Groups. You will be pleased to know that AMNESTY benefited by over £900, and we thank all those who took part either by selling tickets or by generous donations.

FATHER LANG of Farm Street Roman Catholic Church in Central London has informed us that Cardinal Beran, the Archbishop of Prague, will be visiting London towards the end of October and that any members of AMNESTY will be welcomed to attend a special Mass which he will celebrate. Anyone interested should get in touch with H.Q. nearer that time for further details.

### THE KIT CARD SCHEME

The Kit Card Scheme continues to be a great success and we are now working on a revision of the background information sheets on the countries from which prisoners are chosen. During the first twelve months in which the scheme was in operation seven out of the 36 selected prisoners were released.

The general object of the scheme is to choose cases which are at a critical stage, perhaps trial, appeal or imminent execution or alternatively individuals representative of larger groups whose plight has not attracted a great deal of public attention. All the detailed background work on the cases is done by the Library so that Kit Card Scheme members only have to send postcards with a short message to addresses indicated by the Library. Readers of Lord Gifford's report on Portugal in this issue will have an example of the effectiveness of the scheme—Almeida was one of the Kit prisoners.

Membership of the scheme costs 10/- over and above normal membership subscriptions of £2. There are at present about 600 Kit members whose cards from all over the world must make a considerable impression. We would like to have enough Kit members to divide them into two groups and take up six cases each month.

### TRAVELLING ABROAD

At this time of year many AMNESTY supporters are going abroad on business or holiday visits. These visits sometimes lead to valuable information for AMNESTY's Research Department but it is *imperative* that the Department should be contacted before any contacts or information are sought. In many countries as, for example, Spain, South Africa and certain Communist countries the security and liberty of individuals may be seriously endangered. The situation changes so fast that members should seek the Research Department's advice before doing anything in *any* country.

## UGANDA

AMNESTY is watching attentively political developments in Uganda, the former British East African Protectorate where internal conflicts culminated recently in the dramatic flight of the Kabaka, the traditional ruler of Buganda, after the storming of the royal palace by central government troops.

Although the internal political situation has observably been deteriorating since 1965, tensions only broke the surface during the first week of February 1966, when the leader of the Opposition (Democratic Party) accused two Ministers, the Prime Minister and an army colonel of being involved in corrupt arms deals with Congolese rebels, for which he alleged they were paid in gold and ivory. This was followed immediately by a demand from the Ugandan National Assembly for a commission of enquiry.

Four days later the Prime Minister returned from the north to deny the allegations of corruption and in turn make counter-allegations of coups and assassination plots. Troops and police were moved into the capital and on February 22nd five Ministers, including Grace Ibingira, Obote's "second in command", and other prominent political figures were arrested in the Parliament building and taken to Patikon Prison in Gulu, the capital of a remote northern province. Obote declared that this was done "because of my understanding of the wishes of the people of this country for peace and order". It was alleged, though no evidence was produced to substantiate this, that they had been guilty of "plotting to overthrow the state". The five Ministers have remained in detention without trial since that time. During March their Habeas Corpus pleas to the High Court were dismissed. In June they were released from prison and exiled separately to various areas in the north and eastern provinces, where they were restricted to within 400 yards of their houses. They were allowed to have their families with them but to see no unauthorised visitors. Throughout their detention they have been paid the salaries due to them as members of Parliament (but not as Ministers). The Ministers claim that they were beaten up in Gulu but this has been denied by the Government and certainly no sign of ill treatment was evident when they appeared in Kampala to take part in the enquiry into the corruption charges three weeks after their arrest.

On July 14th the East African Court of Appeal allowed the Ministers' appeal against the High Court's rejection of their Habeas Corpus plea on the grounds that the 1908 deportation ordinance under which they were held was invalidated by the human rights provision of the 1962 constitution (under which Uganda became independent) and an order was made for their release. A State of Emergency had been declared in Buganda on May 23rd, which permits the Government to detain

suspected persons without trial. The five Ministers were flown into Buganda in anticipation of an unfavourable judgment and immediately re-arrested under the emergency laws.

Two days after the arrest of the Ministers Obote suspended the constitution, alleging that a coup had been planned during his absence in the north and accusing the Kabaka, who is also the President of Uganda, of approaching foreign governments for military assistance. Other moves followed rapidly. Brigadier Opoloto, a Teso married to a member of the Buganda royal family, whose allegiance to the central government was suspected, was replaced by Colonel Amin (one of those accused of corruption by Ocheng) who now controls the army. Obote took over the Presidency and the Vice-Presidency and introduced a new constitution radically altering Buganda's privileged Federal status.

The Buganda parliament refused to accept the new constitution (as did six Opposition members), and asked the Uganda High Court to declare Obote's actions illegal and appealed to the United Nations to intervene. On May 23rd, the Kabaka issued an ultimatum to Obote asking him to remove his government from Buganda by May 30th.

Obote declared a state of emergency in Buganda and many arrests were made of chiefs and others known to be loyal to the Kabaka. Riots and unrest was reported throughout the kingdom. On the following day Obote's troops, allegedly searching for illegal arms, attacked the royal palace. In the fierce fighting that ensued it is believed that several hundred lost their lives. Violent disturbances were widespread throughout Buganda. In many rural areas local police stations were attacked and police and army were reported to be running riot under illiterate non-commissioned officers. Many prominent Baganda fled to Kenya. Estimates of the numbers killed vary from under 50 to 18,000. Reliable reports suggest a figure of between 1,000 and 2,000. Approximately 1,000 people are reported to have been detained, including members of the royal family. By the beginning of July the large majority of these had been released; the official estimate of prisoners still detained on July 1st was 63.

The Kabaka escaped from the palace during the fighting and arrived in England seeking political asylum a month later. The Nabagareka (the Queen) and other female members of the Royal family are reported to have been ill-treated during the storming of the palace and are now held under house arrest, having been removed from the prison to which they were first taken. The Uganda government has denied the reports of ill-treatment but more than one eye-witness accounts confirms the story. On June 30th Obote stated that the Kabaka's close relatives would be released from prison and

the Kabaka has asked that they should be allowed to join him in London. At the moment they remain under restriction. The Buganda Prime Minister and Attorney General are among those who have arrived in Britain as refugees. Another group, reported to be in financial difficulties, remains in Nairobi.

In addition to those arrested in Buganda in May it is unofficially reported that a number of Army officials are being held awaiting trial. Some of these, Obote has stated, will be tried next month on charges concerning aid to the Congolese rebels. Others are believed to be southern officers who may be charged with participation in alleged plots against the Government and against Obote's life.

The situation is still confused and reliable reports on events are difficult to obtain. The kingdom of Buganda remains in a State of Emergency.

The complex political situation in Uganda needs careful interpretation if this succession of events is to be properly assessed. Obote's arbitrary arrest of the five Ministers, suspension of the Constitution, and assumption of personal power have no basis in law but the Prime Minister's allegation of plots against the Government and himself do not appear to be without foundation. In the circumstances of a developing country such as Uganda, as yet without a real national identity, threats of this kind are not as amenable to legal control as they might be in a country, say, like Denmark.

Dissatisfaction with Obote sprang primarily from two sources: fears and resentments widespread among the southern Bantu areas (particularly among the more educated groups) of what they believe, rightly or wrongly, to be a northern-dominated government inimical to their interests; and the determination of the Kabaka of Buganda

to maintain for his kingdom a virtually independent status. Fears of the southern areas, which of course includes Buganda, were reinforced by the ethnic composition of both the Army and the Police (inherited from Protectorate days) in which northerners predominate almost to the exclusion of any other group, and by the post-independence distribution of Ministries and Civil Servant jobs to northerners of indifferent education, apparently in preference to better qualified southerners. The arrested Ministers, who come from four different Bantu areas and one borderline Nilo-Hamitic eastern province, formed the focus within the Uganda People's Congress for these discontents, which were also associated with a preference for more "western" political ideas in contrast to the egalitarian socialism characteristic of the north. The dissident group within U.P.C., headed by Grace Ibingira, appears to have planned, in co-operation with the Kabaka and the minute opposition party, to oust Obote and some of his Northern and more left-wing supporters from power. It was against this concerted action that Obote moved so drastically in February. The allegations of corruption are believed to have been intended as a first shot in a carefully planned political strategy. The exact nature of these plans, which may or may not have included a violent programme of action, remains to be ascertained, nor is it possible to determine whether it was the Kabaka who was using the dissatisfied elements within U.P.C. or vice versa. The Kabaka himself certainly resorted to violence in the end and it is quite possible that a violent overthrow of the government had, in fact, been intended which would also have "implicated" several southern and Teso officers in the Army.