Dozens of demonstrators march with banners towards the Municipal Theater on Avenue Habib Bourguiba, calling for the rule of law, the protection of rights and freedoms, the cancellation of repressive decrees and freedom of expression in Tunis, Tunisia on September 13, 2024.

Last chance: why EU cannot afford to be silent ahead of Tunisian election

Hussein Baoumi is Foreign Policy advocacy officer at Amnesty International’s European Institutions Office.

This opinion piece was originally published here by EUobserver.

When I started as a researcher with Amnesty International in 2017, I had just moved to Tunisia, a country that had inspired and given hope to millions of people across the Middle East and North Africa for its transformation after the Arab Spring protests. 

Tunisia’s story contrasted sharply to Egypt, where I witnessed firsthand how rule of law backsliding under a repressive government devastates almost every aspect of life.

The authorities have been supported in their campaign of repression by billions of euros in aid and loans from the EU, funds that have been handed over without any insistence that Egypt abide by the EU’s standards on human rights.

Unless it changes course, the EU is about to make the same mistakes in Tunisia that it made in Egypt.

In July 2021, Tunisian president Kaies Saied suspended parliament, dismissed the entire government, including the prime minister, and took executive control of the country.

Since then, he has dismantled most independent institutions, adopted repressive decrees, severely undermined judicial independence and the rule of law, arbitrarily arrested opponents and critics, rewritten the constitution, and restricted media freedom and the work of civil society organisations. 

Unless it changes course, the EU is about to make the same mistakes in Tunisia that it made in Egypt

Hussein Baoumi, EU Foreign Policy Advocacy Officer

He has labelled opponents as traitors and foreign-funded agents and launched a wave of racist violent attacks against black migrants and refugees in the country.

These campaigns have left hundreds of victims behind bars and left others, as in the case of some refugees, to die at the borders in Libya. 

EU complicity

The EU is aware of these facts, as a leaked document has confirmed.

Initially alarmed by these measures, the EU nevertheless made a border externalization pact with the Tunisian government following pressure from Italian prime minister Georgia Meloni.

Signing a memorandum of understanding in July 2023, the EU promised up to €1bn in loans and aid to the Tunisian authorities, primarily to stop migrants and refugees from reaching European shores.

The deal, shrouded in secrecy, was widely criticised by the media, the European Parliament and civil society for the risks it poses to human rights, for bypassing parliamentary scrutiny and for the lack of consultation with civil society members in Tunisia and Europe.

The EU Ombudsman also opened a case in view of the European Commission’s failure to conduct prior human rights risk assessments.

Emboldened nevertheless, president Saied expanded the crackdown on human rights and rule of law ahead of the presidential election scheduled to be held in October to ensure his victory.

The Tunisian elections commission (ISIE), now reshaped at the president’s will, lost its independence and given free rein, ignored two clear and final court orders to reinstate three presidential contenders.

6 October election crackdown

The ISIE sent warning notes to private media and refused to allow the main Tunisian independent observation organisations to monitor the elections, citing ‘suspicious foreign funding’.

Tunisian security forces also arrested one of the only two candidates, besides president Saied, allowed to run for elections. When a judge ordered his release, security forces rearrested him and took him to another prosecutor over new charges and he was put under additional detention orders. 

Meanwhile, the EU has remained largely silent, over concerns that Tunisia may drift towards China and Russia or halt migration cooperation.

This logic is inherently flawed for two reasons.

Firstly, president Saied has made it abundantly clear that the Tunisian government will continue to draw closer to both China and Russia, with or without the EU’s support. Secondly, in deepening cooperation with Tunisia in the first place, the EU has bargained quite some leverage by giving president Saied control over migration cooperation. 

What to do? European leaders should be aware of the leverage they have on the Tunisian government and use it to ensure respect for human rights and rule of law in line with the principles set out in the EU-Tunisia strategic partnership agreement.

They can do this by firstly, reevaluating their extensive cooperation with Tunisia to press for guarantees that it does not lead to human rights violations.

Secondly, president Saied is aware that presidential elections are vital for international and national legitimacy. The repressive environment in the country has led many to voice concern over the situation of human rights in the country ahead of the elections including by taking to the streets. The EU’s scrutiny of those concerns would give pause to his government’s clampdown on human rights.

The EU must learn from the mistakes of its approach to Egypt where it has contributed to an endless loop of economic failures and bailouts. All the while, the space for the people in Egypt to exercise their rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association continues to shrivel. 

Both what EU leaders need to do in Tunisia and the consequences of failing to do so are clear. 

The EU must use its leverage to ensure that the Tunisian authorities uphold the country’s commitment under the EU-Tunisia association agreement including to ensure the rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, association, media freedom, and respect for rule of law in the lead up to  the elections.

Concretely this means the EU making it clear to president Saied that the ISIE must implement the administrative court’s decision to reinstate political contenders. NGOs must be allowed to monitor the elections and political opponents must be able to freely speak to the media without repercussions.

Without those three elements, the EU should be prepared to ultimately re-consider its cooperation with Tunisia.