

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL
Briefing Paper May 1980


The Repression Trade



Outside the State Research Centre, Kampala


POL 34/000/1981

Amnesty International
British Section
Tower House
10 Southampton Street
London WC2E 7HF






The arrest of A. Podrabinek in Moscow, April 1977.



El Salvador — armoured car and police with prisoners.



INTRODUCTION

"Dr Edward Kakonge, a British educated lecturer in biochemistry at Makerere University, was at the State Research Centre three days after it was finally taken by Tanzanian and Free Uganda troops. He was present at that sad place to see if he could find the body of his brother who had been arrested two weeks earlier. 'Have you seen the radios?' he asked. 'They are British. How could you have done it?' Several Free Ugandan soldiers there, young men whose fathers were farmers in Northern Uganda where Amin's troops were running amok, asked the same question."

From Ed Harriman's account in New Scientist, 10 May 1979.

In January this year the Chairman of the British Section of Amnesty International wrote to the Prime Minister requesting that the Government should undertake a review of the present defective system of licensing control over the export of "repressive technology". Mrs Thatcher refused our proposal. In her reply she referred to the difficulty of identifying equipment that, although it is not manufactured to military specification, is used by the security forces of recipient governments. The Prime Minister also wrote that any widening in the scope of the existing controls would "have significant implications for our trade and our relations with other countries."

Notwithstanding the Prime Minister's refusal to contemplate any change Amnesty International remains convinced that a review of the existing licensing control system is urgently needed. Nothing whatsoever would seem to have been done to prevent such shameful transactions as those that were undertaken by the British firms that supplied Idi Amin's State Research Centre in Uganda.

However, more is at issue than failures in the system of licensing control. It is apparent that the Government not only neglects to prevent exports that contribute to repression overseas but that it is itself in the business of promoting the sale of arms and of what is called "internal security equipment": without doubt, many of these sales contribute to the practice of repression by other governments. It is for this reason that we are urging that the Government, and the companies, should refrain from promoting the sale of equipment, or of other forms of "technology transfer" such as on-the-spot training and technical assistance, where such transactions contribute to the operational capacity of security forces that are engaged in the repression of their own populations.

Amnesty International is not alone in its concern about the trade in repression. In recent months a number of Parliamentarians, as well as members of the Churches, have expressed their anxieties. Some, indeed, go further than can Amnesty International - that operates within a restricted mandate - and criticise the whole system of arms exports.

For its part Amnesty International is asking that the Government should provide Parliament and the British public with information about the forthcoming British Army Equipment Exhibition at Aldershot, as also about the other methods that are in use to promote the sale of arms. This is so that an informed judgment may be made as to the extent to which Britain is in the business of providing the "tools of repression" for foreign governments that violate human rights.

The briefing paper is intended as a contribution to the debate that is now taking place. Its purpose is the unambitious one of providing background information and analysis to assist those who are campaigning against the trade in repression. It does not set out to distinguish between "acceptable" and "unacceptable" exports, or between exports that are used in internal repression and those (they are often the same) that are used in wars between states. Neither does it seek to establish a schedule of transactions, or categories of goods, to which we object - with the implication that the organisation regards all others as tolerable. To attempt to make these distinctions would be an unwise, not to say specious, exercise. Only in a few instances can a direct connection be made between an individual case of torture, imprisonment, killing or disappearance and a particular piece of equipment. To comprehend the significance of technology transfers it is necessary to consider the overall contribution made by security exports to a repressive regime. Repressive regimes need certain tools to gain and retain power; without them, torture, imprisonment and other violations of human rights would be less likely to occur. All security transfers, whether for the benefit of the military or of the police, strengthen the security forces and contribute to their operational capacity. When - as happens so often - these forces are engaged in repression the consequence of the exports is to increase their capacity to imprison, torture and kill people. This is true whether the assistance from abroad is provided in the form of military technology, arms supply or training. There is nothing new in this observation: it has been made by, amongst others, those American legislators who four years ago decided to prohibit all forms of military aid, education, training, credits, sales or export licences "to any country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognised human rights."

It is no easy business to discover the human rights implications of security exports. The difficulty in tracing connections between human rights violations and such exports is vastly increased by the secretiveness with which both the Government and some of the firms habitually conduct themselves. Reasons both of commercial advantage and national security are advanced in order to justify this secrecy, that often amounts to a rejection of the right of Members of Parliament to know what is being done in Britain's name. Freedom of information is a goal shared by many, and especially by Members of Parliament whose rights as representatives of the public are restricted by official secrecy. For us in the British Section of Amnesty International this "right to know" is a vital necessity if public conscience is to be alerted to the significance for human rights of transactions that are officially sanctioned and promoted or, at the very least, that the Government neglects to control.

Attempts at inquiry are circumvented. Thus, in the House of Lords on 1 May 1980, the Minister of State in the Ministry of Defence, Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal, refused to provide Lord Avebury with a list of governments that have been invited to send representatives to the Army Exhibition at Aldershot. Lord Strathcona justified this refusal by referring to a criterion that is frequently mentioned: "deference to the wishes of many potential customers."

The uncertainties and ambiguities that surround the export of repressive technology are compounded by the existence of a large category of what is called "grey area" equipment: material that has both "civilian" and "military" applications. As the revelations that followed upon the fall of the Amin regime have shown, such equipment may be highly useful to security forces that engage in systematic repression. Yet the Government declines even to consider extending the licensing control system into this area and, in any case, refuses to discuss individual sales even when these are subject to licensing control. As the briefing document makes clear, some "defence salesmen" are ready enough to exploit these confusions. The controls that do exist suffer discredit and humane intentions are set at naught.

There are two summary points that need to be made.

- (1) The attempt to discover what is being done by British firms and by the British Government in providing, or helping to provide, the "tools of repression" is gravely inhibited by a number of official practices governing the provision of information. Both this Government and its predecessors have operated these practices and, in consequence, frustrated inquiry.

(2) Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal is quoted in Financial Weekly for 14 March 1980 as stating that there has been a marked change in the Government's attitude to arms exports. "We have an instinctive feeling that we would wish to sell unless there was a compelling reason not to. I think the Labour Government had an instinctive feeling that we should not sell unless there was a compelling reason." With this current of thinking in the ascendancy it is doubtful whether the Government will readily find the will to stop Britain being a paradise for international arms salesmen, some of whom seem to have supplied both Idi Amin in Uganda and Colonel Gaddafi in Libya. Illicit arms sales seem to prosper in the present climate of confusion and secrecy. The Government itself promotes gatherings of arms salesmen and of representatives of foreign governments (some of which are responsible for serious violations of human rights), but is not willing to tell Parliament and the public what is going on.

None of this inspires confidence in the Government's claim to be concerned about human rights.

Finally, it is necessary to say a word to clarify the status of this document. The process of investigation into the international repression trade, as it is called, cannot be reduced to an exercise in seeking connections between individual exports and individual violations of human rights. Consequently, any serious analysis must come to terms with the key processes that are at work. This briefing paper is intended to provide a modest contribution to the effort of enlightenment that is being made by a number of individuals and organisations in this complex and morally charged terrain. It draws attention to some of the lines of responsibility and indicates the repressive potential of certain transfers of equipment and of associated operational assistance and training programmes. However, it should not be assumed that any part of the analysis, of the accompanying illustrations, implies some specific commitment by Amnesty International, whether to challenge this or that particular transaction or category of export, or to take up a position about some particular situation of repression or confrontation in which exported equipment is being used. We cannot prejudge situations in this way, let alone propose a precisely delimited schedule of prohibited exports.

What we can do, and have already done, is point to the evidence that exists that certain exports of security equipment - many of them in the "grey area" - have had deplorable effects on people. We must also point out that some of those concerned with these transactions seem to be indifferent to the moral dimension. For all of us who cannot and will not be so indifferent the refusal of the Government to provide information increases beyond measure the difficulties of assessing the human rights effects of these exports.

We have advanced certain principles - they are set out on the following page - that we recommend to those whose responsibility it is to make decisions, whether they be in Government or in Parliament. If public opinion is to have any impact on these decisions it will be necessary for the Government to allow the relevant information to be made available. Even as it is, with inquiry so frustrated, it is all too clear that Britain is deeply implicated in some of the most horrific episodes of our time.

Cosmas Desmond
Director
British Section,
Amnesty International


31 May 1980

AMNESTY CONCERNS

In the present phase of the British Section's campaign there are seven of these.

1. That the Government prohibit the sale of military-cum-police equipment to regimes in circumstances where this will enhance their capacity to engage in repression, and, also, that British firms should refrain from such sales.
2. That the Government should extend the existing licensing system to cover licences to manufacture, the export of information, and exports via third countries.
3. That the Government should extend the licensing system to cover sales of equipment in the "grey area", i.e. items that have both civilian and military applications.
4. That the Government should include within the scope of the existing licensing control system certain countries that, for historical reasons, are at present partially excluded from its operation (South Africa is a notable beneficiary of this exemption).
5. That the Government, and exporting companies, should refrain from providing training for police and military personnel from countries that engage in systematic violations of human rights. Furthermore, that the Government and companies should refrain from the provision of on-the-spot assistance to repressive regimes on matters that are to do with the specific practices and agencies of repression.
6. That the Government should make available to Parliament information about sales, training, and technical and operational assistance so that MPs and the public may make their own informed judgments.
7. That the Government should refrain from promoting sales of military-cum-police equipment to repressive regimes through, for instance, the medium of the biennial British Army Equipment Exhibition (this year the event is to take place at Aldershot between 23 and 27 June).

May 1980
Repressive Technology Working Party
(Antonia Hunt, Dick Barbor-Might, Helen Bamber)



1. THE PRIME MINISTER SAYS NO

- 1.1 In July 1979, the British Section of Amnesty International wrote to Government Ministers suggesting that they should undertake a review of the system for licensing the export of military equipment. The decision to make this approach was based on two considerations. First, the Amnesty movement was then involved in an internal debate on the human rights implications of such exports: the conclusion reached was that the organisation should challenge those exports, whether made by Britain or by other countries, that contribute to the violation of human rights within AI's mandate. Secondly, in May and June 1979 journalists revealed that a number of British companies, notably Pye Telecommunications Ltd., had supplied Amin's secret police in Uganda with telecommunications and other equipment that improved their operational capacity.
- 1.2 The "State Research Centre" was the principal recipient of these British exports. Together with other Ugandan organisations that were engaged in systematic repression, the SRC killed between 100,000 and 500,000 people in the eight years of Amin's rule. Many of these killings were conducted in a brutal and protracted fashion. At the time when the bulk of the equipment was being supplied, international public opinion was already alerted to the nature of Amin's rule. The British exporting firms could not have been in ignorance either of the nature of the regime or, specifically, of the role of the State Research Centre (to which the equipment was sold and consigned) in conducting this repression. Nonetheless, the official licensing system that was then in operation, purportedly to control overseas military sales, was so loosely designed and administered that it failed totally to prevent these transactions from taking place. For their part, the companies tended to argue that anything was permissible that was not expressly forbidden and that the moral questions should be left to the British government.
- 1.3 During the latter part of Amin's rule, it was suspected that repressive technology was being sold to Uganda, and on two occasions (one in 1976 and one in 1977), there was a parliamentary challenge by MPs such as David Steel, Greville Janner and Max Madden. However, if much was suspected, little was known for certain. The firms persisted in their competitive sales efforts, although Amin's regime was often in default of payment, and despite even the fact that one salesman, Mr Scanlon, was hammered to death by State Research Centre agents, apparently on account of deficiencies in the supply of equipment by his Leicester-based company. On the government side, British Ministers simply relayed the assurances of civil servants to those few MPs who expressed anxiety about what they feared was going on.

- 1.4 When Amnesty International wrote to Ministers in July 1979 the revelations about what had been found in the State Research Centre Headquarters in Kampala were still fresh in people's minds. There was no longer any doubt concerning Britain's share in the responsibility for the repression in Uganda. There seemed to be an irrefutable case for reforming a licensing system that had so manifestly failed to prevent Pye and the other firms from selling their equipment to the State Research Centre. Hopeful of reform, Amnesty drew the attention of Ministers to loopholes in the system, on the assumption that they would wish to close them at the first opportunity. Amnesty also pointed out that certain items of equipment were being supplied to South Africa that, while not formally in breach of the arms embargo, nonetheless materially assisted in the most vicious aspects of the apartheid policy (notably in the supply by ICL of computers for police purposes).
- 1.5 The replies that Amnesty received from Ministers in the three departments concerned (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Department of Trade and Ministry of Defence) were uniformly unhelpful. They indicated that the Government saw no reason to change the existing licensing system, partly on the ground that they could not assume responsibility for, or monitor, the 'end use' of equipment that has both military and civilian applications.
- 1.6 In January 1980, Amnesty International once again wrote to the Government - this time in the form of an open letter to the Prime Minister from the British Section Chairman, Professor Jacques Berthoud. Jacques Berthoud reiterated Amnesty's concerns: "We challenge what seems to be the readiness of Ministers to permit the export of sensitive equipment to the security agencies of governments that, while they pose no threat to us in this country, destroy the rights of their own citizens. Commercial considerations should not be allowed to inhibit a full appreciation of the moral and human consequences of such indifference or inertia". In her reply, Mrs Thatcher resisted Amnesty's conclusions about the human rights implications of the trade in repressive technology, and ignored the proposal that there should be a review of the existing system. She stated her view that any widening in "the scope of the existing controls would present us with very considerable practical difficulties and have significant implications for our trade and our relations with other countries".
- 1.7 Following this refusal, the British Section of Amnesty International has started to examine more closely the commercial trade in repression and to try and understand the reasons why the British Government should actively promote these exports.

2. THE REPRESSION TRADE

- 2.1 That the Government does promote the trade in armaments is not in dispute. That it does so without overmuch concern about the consequences for human rights is also, sadly, not in doubt. The explanation for the vigorous promotion of arms sales lies partly in the existence of a relatively large industrial capacity for armaments production that cannot be fully absorbed by the requirements of the UK armed forces. Both Labour and Conservative administrations have strongly supported the efforts that have been made over the years to find markets overseas, and have been prepared to discount concerns about both human rights and the level of world armaments in the attempt to secure a large share of the world market. Since 1966, when a Labour administration set up the Defence Sales Organisation as an integral part of the Ministry of Defence, with the mission to promote these sales, Britain has become one of the world's four largest arms exporting countries.* In the course of a House of Commons debate on 25 January 1966 Mr Denis Healey (the then Secretary of State for Defence) made an authoritative statement of what was to be official policy.

"This is an international market which is worth about £1000m a year, and British industry has the same right to a share of that market as the industry of any other country...While the Government attaches the highest importance to making progress in the field of arms control and disarmament, we must also take what practical steps we can to ensure that this country does not fail to secure its rightful share of this valuable commercial market."

Fourteen years later this policy remains in force.

- 2.2 Although the high level of Britain's arms exports is primarily due to economic considerations, other factors are also at work. Both exporting and importing countries are involved in global and regional arms races. However, the demand for armaments is also generated by conflicts that are internal to societies. "There are more riots and upheavals than ever before, and thus we are doing more and more business every year."† Many governments, especially in Third World countries, maintain a capacity for internal war even in quiet times. They rely upon the armed forces and the police to guarantee a stability that is the

* The other three are the USA, the USSR and France. Other countries, such as West Germany, are also now coming to the fore.

† Telephone interview with the President of the American Jonas Aircraft and Arms Company, cited by Michael Klare in Social Control in the Developing Areas (monograph, 1979)

product of intimidation and the deterrence of opposition. In order to secure stability authoritarian regimes are driven to create a security apparatus that profoundly alienates the population, or sectors of the population, and that needs to be sustained by increasing expenditure upon armaments.

3. THE TOOLS OF REPRESSION

- 3.1 To avoid losing control regimes feel bound to use overwhelming force against even peaceful demonstrations, fearing lest these escalate out of control. Resistance becomes clandestine and a vicious circle of kidnappings, terrorism and armed struggle ensues in which torture becomes a standard device of the security forces, designed to intimidate and deter opposition as much as to extract information. The lack of legitimate channels for protest contributes to the escalating process of terror. In some instances regimes extend their counter-insurgency activities to neighbouring countries, as Iran did to Oman under the Shah, Indonesia to East Timor, Brazil to the "southern cone" countries in Latin America, and South Africa to Namibia. As events in Nicaragua and Iran have demonstrated, the stability that is so desperately sought may prove to be fragile and is liable to be destroyed by popular uprisings that few have predicted. Nonetheless, the regimes tend to secure significant international support, in many cases doing so on the grounds that they guarantee policies highly favourable to foreign trading and investment interests, that permit the massive repatriation of profits to the "home countries" of business corporations.
- 3.2 The militarised regimes that have emerged in the Third World require both conventional military supplies and specialised equipment for anti-dissident operations. Over the years this "arsenal of repression" has become ever more sophisticated, lethal and extensive, with regimes making their selection from the technological systems that are available to them (at a price) from the arms exporting countries. (To an increasing degree area denial, riot control and surveillance technologies that are developed and manufactured in the arms exporting countries are being deployed "at home" (see the section on TECHNOLOGIES below)).
- 3.3 Equipped with these armouries military regimes are enabled to seek "technological solutions" to situations that they cannot, and dare not, resolve by more normal political means. A sinister and incoherent statement that Idi Amin made to his security chiefs in February 1978 gives some sense of the fascination of "technological solutions" for dictatorships (in this instance the equipment in question is a security-printed national identity card system for the entire Ugandan

population, supplied by a Swiss entrepreneur, at a cost of \$7million).

"Gentlemen, I am soon going to introduce a new chapter about the movement of all people...for the time being there is a new system which is under a process in the Government-printer (sic) once it is ready I will show it to the entire population...It should be good to mount a National general check up within all the borders of Uganda to check each and everybody seriously in order to trap all these elements. Arrangements are already under way...People will be required to produce tax tickets of at least 4 or 5 years back. Then we shall get them."

The British expatriate Robert Astles and the "SSS Amin squad" were to take part in this scheme.

4. CONNECTIONS

4.1 Through the promotion and sale of repressive technology overseas the British Government, and British firms, become deeply involved in situations of repression abroad. Some of the transactions may well have no more than commercial motivations and the suppliers may not know, or perhaps not very much care, what their exports entail for the victims of the security forces to which the equipment is consigned. Reported remarks by representatives both of the Defence Sales Organisation and some of the companies reveal how little thought is given to the human rights consequences of the repression trade. Thus, the then head of Defence Sales, Mr Ronald Ellis, was reported in the Daily Express on 30 August 1977 as saying: "I have no scruples about selling to any country with which the Government says I can deal...I lose no sleep whatever on the moral issue. The morality lies with the user." More recently, a Pye Telecommunications executive, commenting upon his company's sales to the Amin regime, observed: "Take Bokassa in the Central African Empire, or the guy in Zaire, or Ghadaffi, I wouldn't say they are great shakes...if you start looking at them...then I'd do it with all of them. Not just Uganda. Pye, of course, sells to most." Of course, firms do not welcome adverse publicity and they are presumably sensitive to the prospect of public revulsion at their sales strategies. The director of one firm that supplied security equipment to Amin showed in his comment to New Scientist that he was aware of this dimension: "When we started getting press reports coming through - about the killings - it was a difficult situation. We had to play it closer to the chest." *

4.2 Such statements fail to hide a disagreeable truth. The supply of equipment to repressive regimes cannot properly be seen as being purely commercial, politically neutral, transactions. British firms - and the Government itself by means of its vigorous promotion of these categories of exports - become involved by proxy in the

* Ed Harriman, article in New Scientist, May 1979.

violation of human rights abroad, an effect that is enhanced by the programmes for police and military training that are sponsored by official agencies and companies alike, and further stimulated by the on-the-spot assistance that is frequently given to other governments in the development of their own facilities. All this activity requires intensive co-operation between governments and firms. In Britain the Defence Sales Organisation is closely linked with commercial organisations such as Racal, Industrial Military Services Ltd. (IMS) and a host of other enterprises. Much of what is sold abroad is transferred through the agency of officially sponsored programmes in which technical and operational support and training is provided alongside the actual equipment. The firms themselves become involved in helping to define the requirements of their clients, and thus become intimately involved in the situations with which the technologies are designed to cope.

"A sales brochure of Lucas Defence Systems Ltd. described the services by saying that, 'We can offer not only hardware but a total systems design and management capability.' The Plessey Radar Division has set up an organisation at Addlestone, near Weybridge, to provide 'Procurement Packages' as a service to governmental organisations concerned with equipping military, police or other types of security force. The organisation offers to solve the often complex problems of defining its requirements, financing the project, surveying the available and relevant equipment and handling the varied and complicated transactions with suppliers. On the government side a publicity leaflet of the DSO offers to help '... the customer to identify his requirements, operationally as well as technically.'"*

- 4.3 Often enough the supply of costly high technology military equipment (e.g. air defence systems) is associated with the provision of security technology. The commercial and political affinities that are developed in the course of provisioning conventional military forces serve also to facilitate contracts for security purposes. Thus it is no accident that it is a British firm that has provided the Saudi Arabian secret police (the General Intelligence Department) with a computer network between their 27 branch offices - this in a country that has absorbed a high proportion of Britain's conventional overseas military sales. This computer system will contain files on potentially a million people, will include "surveillance lists" and "black lists", and will assist agents of the General Intelligence Department in taking appropriate "executive action". At the time of signing, Project S (as the Saudi deal was called) was the British computer industry's largest ever contract.+

* Frank Gregory, Arms sales involve more than the trade in weapons, AIDU Report (Science Policy Unit, University of Sussex), March 1980.

+ Duncan Campbell, article in New Statesman, May 1979.

BARBED TAPE: APPLICATIONS



Barbed tape system

Barbed tape is a ribbon of high tensile strength steel, zinc plated for maximum corrosion resistance and durability. Razor sharp barbs which are closely spaced along both sides of the tape provide snag, catch, and cutting characteristics far superior to that of standard barbed wire. Extensive tests by both government and industry have shown that barbed tape is more practical than barbed wire and is superior in deployment and storage.

Barbed tape concertina

Barbed tape concertina is formed from flat, razor sharp, steel barbed tape which is permanently cold-clenched to a hardened spring steel wire. Adjacent coils of the concertina are joined by steel clips to form a continuous barrier.

Light and compact, the standard roll of barbed tape concertina measures 1 m in diameter, and weighs only 13.4 kg. Two handles at each end of the roll make it easy for one man to handle.



- 4.4 More often than not the supply of equipment does not take place in a political vacuum but through the medium of a partnership between governments in which the exporting firms provide a dynamic element, constantly trying to promote the sale of their equipment and exploiting the political links that exist between countries to their own benefit. One common result of these transactions is to make national policy makers in supplying countries highly sensitive to the security requirements of regimes that feel themselves to be threatened, perhaps by popular uprisings, and that demand the re-supply of security technology in order to maintain control. In the view of Amnesty International those who export security equipment to regimes with a pattern of rising repression must bear a heavy share of the responsibility for what follows.
- 4.5 The Shah's regime in Iran provides a good example of this connection. As Robin Cook put the matter in a New Statesman article: "The internal function of the military is betrayed by their lavish purchase of surveillance equipment.... As one British executive ~~crowed~~: 'surveillance is one of the big growth areas in Iran!'. Thus the export of repressive technology, especially when this takes place through programmes of military/police collaboration, entails responsibilities for the extreme forms of coercion that are then employed. In some cases it would seem that the supplying governments fully intend that the exported equipment should be used in repression. In other words, the supply of repressive technology represents a deliberate intervention in the internal politics of the country, on the side of the repressive government and against those that it conceives to be its enemies. The point about the responsibilities that are acquired was made, succinctly, by President Julius Nyerere a few years ago.

"For the selling of arms is something a country does only when it wants to support and strengthen the regime or the group to whom the sale is made. Whatever restrictions or limits are placed on that sale, the sale of any arms is a declaration of support - an implied alliance of a kind. You can trade with people you dislike; you can have diplomatic relations with governments you disapprove of; you can sit in conference with those nations whose policies you abhor. But you do not sell arms without saying, in effect: in the light of the receiving country's known policies, friends and enemies, we anticipate that, in the last resort, we will be on their side in the case of conflict. We shall want them to defeat their enemies."

5. TECHNOLOGIES

- 5.1 The equipment that is used to suppress dissident sectors of a population includes not only conventional military weaponry but also a spectrum of technologies that range from surveillance devices to counter-insurgency gear. A disturbing development in recent years has been that much of this equipment is held in common between the police forces of industrial societies such as our own and the police and military agencies of repressive Third World countries. Quite what this portends for industrial societies is still only imperfectly understood. However, it is known that the "arsenal of repression" that is in use in militarised societies often includes items that also feature in the police armouries of countries such as Britain and West Germany and that are intended for deployment "at home" at times of "civil disturbance" (for instance, in protests outside nuclear power stations - see some of the illustrations contained in this document).
- 5.2 The conflict in Northern Ireland has helped to make Britain a world leader in the field of "police technology". British firms have developed a whole series of innovations in internal security equipment, as it is called, that have helped to bring about changes in domestic police methods - e.g., the extensive use by the police of computers and of surveillance technology. These innovations have also facilitated British exports to the Third World. Britain is not alone in the field. Thus American arms sales to Third World police forces have included - apart from weaponry that is designed to kill and mutilate people - supplies of CN and CS gas grenades, canisters of MACE and riot control guns. This "less lethal technology" enables a repressive government to make graduated increases in the application of violence.

"This escalation often proceeds in stages, as isolated incidents of resistance give way to organised opposition and government forces respond with intensified surveillance and harassment of the civilian population - thereby producing still more dissidents and thence justifying still greater levels of repression."*

- 5.3 Through the process of supply and re-supply the governments and firms that provision repressive governments enter into the calculations that are being made to try and contain enraged populations at an "acceptable" level of violence.+

* Klare, op cit

+ Consider, for instance, the British supplies that were made to the Shah's government of items of riot control technology towards the end of 1978.

- 5.4 It is doubtful whether these "less lethal" technologies are particularly humane. For, not only do they tend to trigger off intense anger amongst their victims - and thus stimulate further and even more violent exchanges - but they are also far from harmless. Frightful injuries can be caused; on occasion, people have even been killed. The medical dangers of, for instance, CN, CS, and CR gases are so serious that the mildest of these was condemned for use by the League of Nations in 1925 and Basle police, who employed CS gas outside the G8sgen nuclear power plant in July 1977, had felt constrained to warn their men of this and other gases: "If we use them we must bear in mind that those affected may be fatally poisoned." Most of the impact missiles that are used in riot control are liable to cause serious injury and even death.

"Hard evidence of the type of hazard associated with rubber bullets, for example, came to light in 1972, when four surgeons working at the Royal Victoria Hospital in Belfast produced a report on information they had gathered about 90 patients who had sought hospital treatment after being hit by rubber bullets. It showed that 41 of them needed in-patient treatment. Their injuries included three fractured skulls, 32 fractures of facial bones (nose, jaw, cheek, etc.), 8 ruptured eye globes (all resulting in blindness), 3 cases of severe brain damage, 7 cases of lung injury and one case each of damage to liver, spleen and intestine. Overall roll-call included one death (more since), 2 people blinded in both eyes, 5 with severe loss of vision in one eye, and 4 with severe disfigurement of the face. Rubber bullets are not meant to be fired at distances of less than 25 metres, but the surgeons found that half of those brought into hospital had been shot at less than 15 metres and one-third at less than 5 metres."*

- 5.5 Perhaps even more disturbing than the development of "less lethal" weapons is the drastic increase in surveillance activities by state organisations that is apparent in societies like our own, as well as in police states. Computers have a complex and all embracing function. They play an increasingly important part in policing and military control. It is now normal practice for police communications to be integrated through a computer in a central control room: it monitors both vehicle and personal movement and can create the most effective web on control. Such systems are known as computerised "communications, command and control" (C3 for short). C3 systems can give security agencies detailed

* Steve Wright, New police technologies, Journal of Police Research, No.4, Vol.XV, 1978.

background information about an individual in a matter of minutes. It is significant that a modern police operations room is becoming almost indistinguishable from its military counterpart. Even in countries such as Britain, where it is possible to vigorously defend civil liberties, these developments are causing some serious alarm. In countries that suffer under military and other forms of dictatorial rule the use by the police of computer facilities and of modern telecommunication equipment is of proven danger to human rights. In Latin America there is evidence that the secret police - especially in Chile, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay - use computer facilities in order to maintain information exchange upon and surveillance of individuals who are of interest to one or other of the agencies. This capacity to maintain an almost Orwellian surveillance depends upon a technological capacity that is supplied by American computer firms. The results of placing these facilities in the hands of secret policemen of such proven ferocity are dreadful to contemplate.

- 5.6 In South Africa the British company ICL has been moving into the market in a major way. Amongst its customers have been the Department of Bantu Affairs and the South African police. Before one recent purchase of an ICL computer the South African police are reported to have said that they required it for the administration of the pass laws. ICL itself has referred to the establishment of "inquiry terminals" at frontier posts. The managing director of ICL (South Africa) is reported as having said: "Our computers are quite extensively used by Bantu boards in administrative jobs..... we also have a computer which stores information about the skills of Blacks." The Johannesburg Financial Mail described the system: "Computers flashing out reference numbers; photocopies relayed by telephone; perhaps even instant transmission of finger prints - all to keep track of members of the population. Sounds like George Orwell's 1984, doesn't it? Well, it's South Africa's way of modernising its pass and influx control systems." As matters stand at the moment these exports are all perfectly legal, even though ICL has taken up these contracts largely because its American rivals have been prevented from doing so by stringent legislation under the terms of United Nations sanctions. Both the British Government and the company seem to be well content with this situation.

5.7 It would seem that, notwithstanding the existence of NATO controls (known as the COCOM system), computers manufactured by Western firms may have been used for the purpose of surveillance in the Soviet Union. According to the British computer journalist, Roland Perry, computers are being utilised to record details of the mail delivered to suspected dissidents and in the recording of telephone calls. However, it does need to be recognised that manufacturers experience considerable difficulty in determining that particular computers are actually being used by repressive agencies (this will be particularly the case when computers are handed on from an "innocent" to a "repressive" user and when the user takes over the entire maintenance from the manufacturer).*

5.8 This section of the briefing paper is not intended to be comprehensive and the references to applications of repressive technology merely illustrate the theme. Considerable difficulties are encountered, and not only by Amnesty International, in assessing the implications for human rights of specific technological developments. It is clear that in many cases, for instance computer applications, there is uncertainty about potentials for repression as well as a general lack of information about specific exports. Thus, while there is concern in civil liberties circles about the use of police computers even in Britain, it is not at all easy to elucidate the human rights implications. Even for countries where there are gross violations of human rights, information concerning computer applications for repressive purposes is hard to come by, if sometimes highly suggestive.+

* However, the involvement of some computer manufacturers, as also of firms providing "software" and "liveware", in the customer's actual use of the machines can mean that suppliers get to know about the "end use" of their equipment.

+ "Refugees from other Latin-American police states also tell of the use of computer printouts during interrogations to cross-check data provided by detainees. According to these exiles, dossiers are shared among the police forces of Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and Brazil.

The most detailed report of the use of computer-generated information during a police interrogation comes from a clergyman. He entered Uruguay and was picked up by the police there for questioning. During the ordeal the police tried to get him to talk about a Catholic priest they were investigating.

6 THE "GREY AREA"

6.1 Computers are not the only items of equipment in what is sometimes called the "grey area", i.e., materiel that is capable of both "civil" and "military" applications. Vehicles, for instance, may be supplied supposedly for civilian use and then, with or without modification, be utilised by police and military forces. Where South Africa is concerned the export controls that have been instituted under the terms of United Nations sanctions have stimulated the practice of "evasion by re-classification." Thus, for a time at least, the American government classified as "noncombat" a whole series of exports to South Africa of transport, communications and surveillance equipment that greatly enhanced the operational capacity of the security forces. Very similar processes are at work in Britain. Anthony Sampson, the author of The Arms Bazaar, cites a British defence salesman on the evasion of the embargo.

"We were able to sell them some helicopters because they were half-French: and they're the deadliest machines against natives. When the South Africans came through with an order for patrol boats we told them to redraft the order to make it look as if they're for civilian use: ('surely you must have some black fishing boats that need protecting?')"

6.2 The UN resolutions do not prohibit the manufacture of arms inside South Africa by the local subsidiaries of transnational corporations. Moreover, they leave it to governments to define what constitutes "arms and military equipment." Some countries, notably the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, use narrow definitions. Thus, by various means (notably narrow definitions of what constitute "arms and military equipment" and the re-classification of equipment intended for the military as being for "civilian use") firms are enabled to avoid the full effect of existing licensing control systems, as they exist in Britain and elsewhere. The Amin regime

+ When detained for questioning the clergyman was presented with a computer printout describing the details of the career of his colleague. On the printout were all the addresses at which the sought-after priest had lived, his salary at each point in his career, his telephone numbers and his realtions with other Catholics in Uruguay.

The interrogated clergyman said that the most incredible thing about the questioning was that, as far as he could tell, the man the police sought had never been in Uruguay.

This printout, a church spokesman claims, could not have been stolen from the personnel files of the Catholic church, it must have come from some police computer system. "Police in Latin America, he said, keep close tabs on many priests."

(Would you sell a computer to Hitler, by L. Nadel, H. Weiner, Computer Decisions, nd)



in Uganda also benefited in its time from ambiguities over the supply by British firms of "grey area" equipment, especially of vehicles and telecommunications. Thus landrovers and Bedford trucks were exported to Uganda: although they were destined for the military authorities they were not classified as military equipment. Not being so classified the vehicles were exempted from the export licensing system. Whether consciously or not, civil servants and politicians on occasion divert public inquiry by suggesting legitimate uses for dubious exports, even if the explanations sometimes strain credibility. (Mr. Callaghan; for instance, when he was Prime Minister, suggested that communications equipment that was going to the Amin regime was intended to spot television licence dodgers).

7 DUAL PURPOSES

- 7.1 Confusions in understanding can arise as the result of the dual purpose of many military forces. Thus, given that the *raison d'être* of armed forces, generally speaking, lies in external defence (and external aggression) it may be objected that equipment and training that is supplied to them from abroad raises no issues for those who seek to protect the human rights of domestic populations. However, in the contemporary world a great deal of military activity in a number of countries is directed towards the population, or towards sectors of the population that are classified by the government as dissident. In a number of countries counter-insurgency programmes conducted by regular military forces, and by specially created security agencies, have helped to bring about situations in which there is massive violation of human rights.
- 7.2 In some cases other governments have intervened in these situations, the interventions ranging from the provision of "hardware", training, operational assistance and the posting of "advisers", all the way to full-scale military involvement - amounting in some cases to occupation (witness what is now happening in Afghanistan and, in an earlier generation, happened in the Dominican Republic and Vietnam).
- 7.3 Thus, the distinction between armed forces that perform "external" duties and police forces that have "internal" functions frequently become blurred and may disappear altogether when a regime becomes committed to full-scale repression. When this happens the supply even of conventional military equipment to the armed forces of regimes may come to be regarded as deeply objectionable purely in human rights terms - and this quite apart from wider concerns about the effects on development in Third World countries of the diversion of scarce resources to expenditure on armaments. A strictly contemporary example is provided by the efforts that currently are being made by a number of Roman Catholic bishops in this country to help bring about a ban on American arms sales to El Salvador.

- 7.4 In a South African context the dual purpose of the military forces is especially clear, as is brought out by Anthony Sampson in The Arms Bazaar.

"...as South Africa continued on its collision course, with black states and guerrilla movements emerging all round it, the distinctions between military and civil equipment, or between external and internal defence, became all the more impossible. As the black townships turned to rebellion, policing was indistinguishable from military defence. When in June 1976 black children began rioting in the slum-city of Soweto outside Johannesburg... it was the French Alouette helicopters that were used to drop tear-gas on the crowds. In the use of electronics the line between civil and military was always blurred, and the arms salesmen blurred it further. In 1975 the South Africans ordered a computer-controlled communications network called the Tropospheric Scatter System from the British Marconi company, worth \$20 million, which was typical of the "grey area" between military and civilian equipment. It was not capable in itself of killing anyone; but was indispensable to computer-controlled warfare and the electronic battlefield. In any advanced police state, sophisticated communications were now inseparable from means of repression."

THE RIGHT TO KNOW

- 8.1 Some of the burdens of an arms sales policy become evident when alliances are reversed and arms exporting countries find themselves in diplomatic or military confrontation with an erstwhile client. A strictly contemporary example is provided by Iran, the armed forces of which were extensively equipped by Britain and the United States in the time of the Shah. Other adverse consequences have been extensively commented upon over the years - notably the propensity of wars in Third World countries, the diversion of scarce resources from development and social needs to military expenditure, and the dangers for the exporting country of reliance upon a trade that is at once so morally dubious and so prone to upsets (e.g., the abrupt cancellation by the Iranians early last year of immense arms contracts).
- 8.2 These upsets do not seem to have dissuaded the present Government from pursuing arms sales. Their policy may be gauged from the reported remarks of the Minister of State in the Ministry of Defence, Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.

" 'We have an instinctive feeling that we would wish to sell unless there was a compelling reason not to. I think the Labour Government had an instinctive feeling that we should not sell unless there was a compelling reason.' Had Britain, in the past, lost lucrative arms contracts because she took a more high-minded attitude than some other countries such as France? 'We did lose out to France because we took a more moral point of view,' he said. 'But we think we are less venal than the French.' But now, he said: 'I hope we give the French more of a run for their money.'" *

8.3 What this attitude may portend for human rights is hard to judge since Ministers do refer to human rights considerations when questioned in Parliament about the sale of arms. It is possible that the Government is applying stringent human rights criteria at the same time as it is vigorously pursuing new orders. However, it has refused even to contemplate a review of the existing licensing system (that permits so many objectionable exports to take place) and Ministers refuse, also, to provide relevant information to M Ps who want to find out whether Britain is implicated in human rights violations through the export of security equipment. This reluctance to provide information is nothing new. In this Parliament, as in earlier ones, members of both Houses have expressed disquiet at the effects on human rights of exports of security equipment to repressive regimes. However, inquiries have been frustrated by the refusal of successive governments to provide adequate information. It has been remarked that much less information is available to British legislators than to their American counterparts, and that Parliament is excluded from any important role in decisions concerning the sale of arms and of associated equipment to foreign governments. MPs have received the following answers to Parliamentary Questions on arms sales:

"Details of arms sales by country are not made available in the overseas trade statistics." (Hansard, 21 June 1977)

"Companies in the UK are under no obligation to publish

* Financial Weekly, 14 March 1980

information on their sales to the South African government or police. There are no powers available to compel them to do so." " (Hansard, 30 January 1978).

8.4 Exports of repressive technology to Uganda in the period of Amin's rule continued to take place although the Government assured MPs that no "arms or ammunition" were being despatched. These assurances did not relate to the continuing export to the State Research Centre and to others of Amin's security forces, of telecommunications equipment and vehicles. Not only was this material supplied but, also, nothing was done to stop the periodic visits to Britain of the Head of the Technical Services Division of the SRC, Haroun Adam, and other agents of this most brutal of security agencies. The principal purpose of these visits was to undergo training from the exporting firm at a location in Buckinghamshire. Nor was anything effective done to control the transport of sensitive equipment through the weekly flights from Stanstead to Entebbe. Had there been any serious effort by the authorities it would have come to light that the American arms dealer, Mr. Frank Terpil, was exporting arms to Uganda. However, as we have seen, even such a prestigious British company as Pye Telecommunications Limited was prepared, knowingly, to sell telecommunications equipment to the SRC. The company, through its spokesmen, has asserted that its own sense of responsibility is related entirely to that which the British Government permits, or that it does not expressly forbid. The denial of responsibility by firms and the Government's denial of knowledge only too readily combine to block any prospect that might exist for preventing the use of British manufactured equipment for inhuman purposes.

8.5. Mr. Terpil, an "unfavourably discharged" agent of the CIA, and his colleague Mr. Korkala, found Britain to be a favourable place for their operations.

"Investigators assembling the case against two men arrested as 'major international gun-runners' have established that many of their activities were centred in Britain because British laws regulating arms sales could be bent more easily than American regulations. In particular, the end user certificates, the official documents needed to export arms, allegedly could be obtained and doctored more easily in Britain, even when a bogus final destination for the weapons was involved..... in (both Britain and the United States) Terpil and Korkala had high level contacts with people in the defence industries and the Services."*

* Report in the Daily Telegraph, 2 January 1980.

- 8.6 Not only does the Government refuse to agree to a review of the licensing system, it also refuses to say how the system is applied.

"The Department of Trade... denied that its controls on the export of arms were lax but declined to give any details of the procedures. A spokesman said: 'We are satisfied that our procedures for dealing with applications for arms export licenses are sufficiently strict.' It would be 'counter-productive' to describe how the controls were applied, and what checks were made."*

- 8.7 Ministers in the present Government have refused to be drawn into providing the sort of information that would help MPs to judge what is meant by the contrasting statements of Lord Strathcona in the House of Lords.

"We would not export arms to a country which is guilty of torture." (10 March 1980).

"The question of establishing the existence of torture is inevitably a very difficult and emotional one... I dare say that under some definitions there are practically no countries in the world which do not resort to what people would regard as torture... this is not a black and white issue....Because we choose to do a trade in arms with a country, it does not necessarily mean that we are placing a seal of political approval upon the complexion of the Government in that particular country." (23 April).

The questions that were put to the Minister by the Bishop of Guildford and by Lord Avebury during the House of Lords debate on 10 March are pertinent ones.

"...Will (the Minister) not agree that these issues ought to be the subject of widespread public debate because they concern the standing of our particular country in the world? Furthermore, will the Minister agree that such debate can be conducted only if there is widespread information about the kind of arms that are being sold and to what extent?"

* Daily Telegraph article, op cit

"...Does the noble Lord not consider that if people are debarred from obtaining even the slightest bit of information about the destination of arms sales, there will be widespread suspicion by the public that the criteria which the noble Lord mentions are not being properly observed and that we are selling arms to regimes which inflict torture and violence on their citizens?"

- 8.8 The Government's refusal to tell Parliament which governments have been invited to attend the forthcoming arms fair at Aldershot is of a piece with the general attitude of secrecy in this area. Commercial confidentiality is preferred to public knowledge. Debate upon the human rights consequences of the arms trade is under informed as a direct result of the frustration of legitimate inquiry. Members of Parliament, and the British public, apparently are regarded as unsuited to be trusted with information that is available to the companies that exhibit at the arms fair (there are several hundred of these) and to the representatives of the perhaps eighty countries that will be at Aldershot between 24 and 27 June.

NOTE: A schedule of repressive technology transfers that has been proposed by a leading American researcher, Mr. Michael Klare, is appended as an Addendum to this document. Appendices A and B respectively list the companies that are exhibiting at Aldershot and the governments the representatives of which attended the last biennial exhibition in 1978.

ADDENDUM

Schedule of Repressive Technology suggested by Michael Klare in Social Control in the Developing Areas - the International Repression Trade.

Hardware:

--Detection and surveillance gear, including eavesdropping equipment, telephone bugging devices, night-vision scopes, and other systems for spying on suspected dissidents and recording their statements and behaviour;

--Data-processing equipment, including computerised file systems, fingerprint processing equipment, automated data transmitting systems, and other devices permitting instantaneous access to information on suspected dissidents, their friends, associates and relatives;

--Torture and restraining devices, including electronic shock devices, truncheons, thumbscrews, trauma-producing drugs, shackles, and other devices for intimidating, torturing or otherwise incapacitating known or potential dissidents;

--Riot-control equipment, including anti-riot gases (CN, Chloracetophenone, or "tear gas"; and CA, orthochlorobenzal-malonitrile, or "pepper gas"), chemical "MACE" (an incapacitating agent produced by Smith and Wesson), riot batons and clubs, shotguns, riot shields and helmets, water cannon, and other equipment designed to break up and disperse large formations of people;

--Police and paramilitary gear, including pistols and revolvers, rifles and submachine guns, patrol cars and jeeps, armoured cars, communication gear, and other equipment used in police and paramilitary operations;

--Counterinsurgency gear, including small arms and grenades, jeeps and helicopters, light combat planes armed with napalm and antipersonnel munitions, infra-red detection systems, and other hardware for locating, tracking, and destroying guerrilla forces in urban and rural areas.

--Battlefield equipment including tanks, artillery and combat aircraft in use by the regular military forces when these are employed to force rioters off the streets, or to crush an incipient insurrection (note: such materiel may be used in full-scale civil war, in a threatening mode to deter potential insurgents, or to carry out a seizure of power possibly followed by the repression of dissidents using less potent weaponry).

Software:

Training and indoctrination play a critical role in political warfare, and accordingly form an important part of the repression trade. Such "software", normally provided by friendly governments through military and police assistance programmes, can include the following:

--Training in the use of arms and equipment described above, and in the techniques of intelligence-gathering;

--Advisory support, in the form of police and military advisers who collaborate with local security officials in the planning, organisation, and execution of anti-dissident and counterinsurgency campaigns;

--Technical support, in the form of military missions, technical assistance field teams, and other units which provide logistical support, maintenance and upkeep of sophisticated hardware, engineering services, etc.;

--Sociological and psychological research to identify the "symptoms" of incipient revolt and to develop a repertoire of short-term and long-term remedies;


--Covert intervention by foreign intelligence operatives to discredit or immobilise potential opposition groups and to create alternative repressive forces.

These activities are obviously much harder to detect and catalogue than arms delivery programmes, but probably play an equal or greater role in the transfer of repression capabilities to Third World governments. It is obvious, for instance, that specialised training provided to foreign police and intelligence officials will have significant effects long after those officers return to their own country.

**Countries the representatives of which attended the British Army
Equipment Exhibition at Aldershot in 1978*.**

Abu Dhabi	Gabon	Malawi	Sri Lanka
Algeria	Gambia	Malaysia	Sudan
Argentina	Ghana	Malta	Swaziland
Australia	Greece	Mexico	Sweden
Austria	Guyana	Morocco	Switzerland
Bahamas	Honduras	Nepal	Syria
Bahrain	India	Netherlands	Tanzania
Bangladesh	Indonesia	New Zealand	Thailand
Belgium	Iran	Nigeria	Trinidad
Bolivia	Iraq	Norway	Tunisia
Botswana	Ireland	Oman	Turkey
Brazil	Israel	Pakistan	United Arab
Brunei	Italy	Panama	Emirates
Burma	Ivory Coast	Papua New Guinea	United States
Cameroon	Jamaica	Peru	Uruguay
Canada	Japan	Philippines	Venezuela
China	Jordan	Portugal	West Germany
Colombia	Kenya	Qatar	Western European
Denmark	Korea	Saudi Arabia	Union
Dubai	Kuwait	Senegal	Yemen Arab Repub.
Egypt	Lebanon	Sierra Leone	Yugoslavia
Finland	Libya	Singapore	Zaire
France	Luxembourg	Spain	Zambia

*Information supplied by the Campaign Against the Arms Trade.



Companies which have indicated that they intend to take part in the British Army Equipment Exhibition to be held at Aldershot 24-27 June. Information provided by the Minister of State, Ministry of Defence, Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal, in the House of Lords on 29 April 1980.

A. D. Industrial Electronics Ltd.
Airflex Containers Ltd.
Airscrew Howden Ltd.
Airtech Ltd.
Armservice Ltd.
Arms & Armour Press
ATA Training Aids (UK) Ltd.
Automotive Products Ltd.
Avon Group

Barr & Stroud
Boosey & Hawkes Ltd.
The Boughton Group
Branglea Ltd.
Bridport International
Bristol Composite Materials Engineering Ltd.
British Leyland/Alvis Ltd.
British Aerospace Dynamics Group
BMARC
Britorian Ltd.
Brocks Explosives Ltd.
David Brown Gear Industries Ltd.

Cementation (Muffelite) Ltd.
Combined Services Publications Ltd.
Commercial Hydraulics Ltd.
Compton Webb Group Mktg. Ltd.
Crayford Special Equipment Ltd.
Henry Cooch Ltd.
CQC Ltd.
Crane Fruehauf Ltd.

Dunlop GRG
Decca Navigator
Defence Manufacturers Association Ltd.
Driclad Ltd.
Dowty Group
Dunlop Ltd.
Davin Optical

EMI Electronics Ltd.

Fairey Engineering Ltd.
Ferranti Ltd.
Flight Refuelling Group
Fodens Ltd.
A. E. Freezer

GQ Defence Equipment Ltd.
Gloster Saro Ltd.
GEC Marconi Electronics
Gallay Ltd.
J. R. Gaunt & Son Ltd.
Grundy & Partners Ltd.

High Duty Alloys Ltd.
Hotspur Armoured Products
Heywood Williams
Hunting Engineering Ltd.
Hyster Europe

IMI Marston
Invertron Simulated Systems
IMI Summerfield
IMS

Johnson Matthey Metals Ltd.
Jones Cranes

T. W. Kempton Ltd.

Liner Ltd.
Laird Anglesey Ltd.
Lake & Elliott Ltd.
Lasergage Ltd.
Lex Vehicle Engineering Ltd.
Lightweight Body Armour
Locomotors
Lucas Defence Systems
Lansing Ltd.

Magiboards Ltd.
Marlow Ropes
Marshall of Cambridge
MEL A Division of Philips Electronics Group
Membrain Ltd.
Microflow Pathfinder Ltd.
Miltra Military Training Aids
Miltrain Ltd.
Modern Precision Engineering Associates Ltd.
Morfax Ltd.
Massey Ferguson (UK) Ltd.

Newton Derby Ltd.

Olympic Gymnasium (International) Ltd.

Package Control Ltd.
Pennant Trainers and Simulators Ltd.
Pilkington P. E. Ltd.
The Plessey Group
Plumett Ltd.
Portals Water Treatment Ltd.
Powersport International Ltd.
Pylon Group

Racal Electronics Ltd.
Raychem
Rank Precision Ltd.
Remploy Ltd.
Royal Ordnance Factories
Rolls-Royce Motors Ltd.
Rose Morris & Co. Ltd.
Rubery-Owen Group

Sacol Powerline Ltd.
GKN Sankey Ltd.
SAS Group of Companies
Saunders Roe Developments Ltd.
Schermyly Graviner Technical Services Ltd.
Sleeman Engineering Ltd.
Scottorn Trailers Ltd.
Short Brothers Ltd.
The Singer Co. (UK) Ltd.
Sterling Armament Co. Ltd.
Sterling Metals
Stonefield Vehicles
Solartron Electronic Group Ltd.
Sperry Gyroscope
SSI Fix Equipment Ltd.
Standard Telephones and Cables Ltd.
Smith Industries
Denzil Skinner & Co. Ltd.
Simplon Lighting & Hemcol Ltd.
Storno Ltd.

Thorn Automation
Thos. Storey (Engineering) Ltd.

United Scientific Holdings Ltd.
UAC Motors

Vickers Shipbuilding Ltd.
Vickers Ltd.

Wallop Industries Ltd.
Ward Engineering Ltd.
Wrigley Union Trucks
Westland Aircraft Ltd.
Wharton Engineers (Elstree) Ltd.
Williams & Glyns Bank Ltd.
Wilsons of Scotland

THE REPRESSION TRADE

I L L U S T R A T I O N S

In sequence:-

- | | |
|-----------------|---|
| (a) Front cover | Outside the State Research Centre in Kampala, Uganda, shortly after the fall of the Amin regime. |
| (b) and (c) | Arrests in El Salvador and the Soviet Union. |
| (d) | French riot police in action. |
| (e) | Barbed or "sabre" tape:
Collage of advertisement material by a British company. |
| (f) and (g) | Scenes at Brokdorf in West Germany in November 1976. |
| (h) | Paramilitary forces in action - location unspecified. |
| (i) Back cover | Landrovers in South Africa (the advertising slogan was provided by Landrovers for the Aldershot Army Exhibition in 1976). |

Acknowledgments: Photographs at (d), (f) and (g) by Günter Zint.
Back cover reproduced by kind permission of the International Defense and Aid Fund.

Note: The inclusion of photographs in the document is for illustrative purposes only.

Landrovers for South Africa



Reproduced with the kind permission of International Defense and Aid Fund

No other vehicle ever produced can claim the international admiration and fame that surround the Landrover; overseas military authorities, in particular, continue to rely on the famous cross-country vehicle despite ever increasing competition from motor manufacturers world wide.